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Modern breech-loading rifles flooded into Arabia and 
the region around the Persian Gulf between 1880 and World 
War I. This work examines in detail, and analyzes, the 
introduction of modern arms to Arabia, the origin of those 
arms, the trade patterns by which they were moved, and the 
international and local political factors that affected the 
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trade. The international arms trade was driven by three 
major factors. First, the rapid technological development 
of small arms in the nineteenth century fed the market, 
resulting in the availability of hundreds of thousands of 
obsolete military rifles for resale. Each time new rifles 
were adopted by the armies of Europe, old stocks were dumped 
on the private arms market. 
Second, international politics and European colonial 
rivalry contributed to the growth and maintenance of the 
arms trade. The French Consul at Muscat protected the trade 
in the Persian Gulf, while French arms dealers commanded a 
substantial portion of the trade. British efforts to slow 
the flow of arms through Muscat was hampered by European 
politics. 
Third, the internal politics of the region created a 
demand for the modern arms. Inside Arabia, the resurgent 
Saudis fought Rashidis and Hashimites in a series of wars, 
while other tribal raids and wars further built the demand 
for modern rifles: if one group had modern weapons, its 
enemies felt a need for them also. Outside Arabia, a strong 
demand for weapons in Persia and on the Northwest Frontier 
of India helped" pull weapons to the markets of the Gulf. 
This thesis deals first with the changing technology 
of weapons in the nineteenth century, so that the military 
3 
impact of the new weapons can be understood. The types of 
modern rifles introduced to the Peninsula is then reviewed, 
finding that the Peabody-Martini and the Martini-Henry, and 
their numerous variations, were the weapons most commonly 
imported in the decades around the turn of the century. 
with this information as background, the international 
politics of the arms trade are examined. Emphasis is on the 
Anglo-French rivalry at Muscat that gave treaty protection 
to French arms dealers. European fears that modern arms 
would reach Africa and make colonial control of the 
continent difficult or impossible led, in 1890, to the arms 
control provisions of the General Act of Brussels. The Act 
did not, however, extend to Arabia. 
The heart of the work is a detailed examination and 
analysis of the arms trade in and around Arabia. The arms 
trade in the region was centered in two main entrepots, 
Djibouti in French Somaliland and Muscat in southeast 
Arabia. By the late l890s, the bulk of the trade was passing 
through the Suez Canal before transshipment at one of these 
ports. Just over half of the arms reaching Muscat were 
exported to Persia and the Northwest Frontier, with the 
remainder reaching Arabia or Mesopotamia. The patterns of 
the private arms trade were complex, both at sea and on 
land, and are discussed at length. 
The political use of weapons by the Ottoman 
4 
Government, and by European states, contributed to the flood 
of guns into Arabia. The Ottomans, in particular, used their 
stocks of obsolete weapons to arm their client tribes in 
Arabia. Ottoman purchases of Sniders, Martinis, and finally 
Mausers, gave them a constant supply of older rifles for 
distribution. The arms trade in Arabia was controlled by 
international and local political developments, and fed by 
the availability of modern arms on the international 
market. The trade was complex and impossible to prevent so 
long as the European states and the Ottomans continued to 
sell or distribute obsolete rifles as new guns were 
adopted. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A Snider Squibbed in the jungle ­
Somebody laughed and fled, 

And the men of the first Shikaris 

Picked up their Subaltern dead, 

with a big blue mark in his forehead 

And the back blown out of his head. [1] 

War, death and modern weapons swept through Arabia in 
the opening years of the century, as they now sweep across 
the plains of southern Mesopotamia. The great powers of the 
world and of the region supported their allies, sought to 
undercut their rivals or tried to block the perceived 
advance of their enemy. The trade in modern arms became the 
focus of international contention, and a cause of wealth, 
death and victory: it was at once the cause and the result 
of international and regional conflicts. This work examines 
in detail, and analyzes, the introduction of modern arms to 
Arabia, the origin of those arms, the trade patterns by 
which they were moved, and the international and local 
political factors that affected the trade. Throughout most 
of the period, Britain sought to protect her position in the 
region, and the sea routes to India, while France sought to 
undermine that position. The arms trade in Arabia was not 
unique. Nations behaved then as they had for millennia, and 
2 
as they do now. 
Arms and national policy cannot be separated. Writing 
about a more recent period, George Thayer notes that the 
increased availability of modern weapons following World War 
II has been accompanied by an increased level in regional 
violence. He suggests that graphs of the availability of 
arms and of the level of violence would match. [2] To argue 
whether arms or violence came first is to renew a chicken or 
the egg argument. What is clear is that both arms and a 
desire for violence are, and must be, present at the same 
time. This was true for Arabia. 
The change to modern arms in Arabia primarily involved 
a shift from muzzle-loading muskets to single-shot 
breech-loading rifles, followed by the introduction of still 
more modern magazine-fed rifles. The General Act of 
Brussels in 1890 sought to prevent modern arms from entering 
central Africa, and provided a working definition of those 
weapons. Article IX of the Act distinguished between the 
old "flint-lock guns, with unrifled barrels, and common 
gunpowder, known as trade powder"1 and modern "arms for 
accurate firing, such as rifles, magazine guns, or 
breech-loaders, whether whole or in detached pieces, their 
cartridges, caps, or other ammunition intended for them." 
[3] The increased firing speed, range and accuracy of the 
rifled breech-loader made it far more dangerous than its 
3 
predecessor. 
Wyman Bury, a British official from Aden, pointed out 
the danger to the Ottoman Government, and by extension to 
the European colonial powers, of the modern arms he saw in 
Yemen in 1914. 
This covert traffic has gradually undermined the 
pillars of Ottoman rule, ••• Now the population is 
as well armed as the forces of government, far 
more numerous, and, on their own ground, more 
formidable, man for man. [4] 
The pattern of the arms trade to Arabia is simply 
traced. In the 1880s, the international arms trade was 
centered at Zanzibar, and was primarily aimed at Africa. 
With the controls of the Brussels Act, the trade shifted 
north to Muscat and fed into Persia, Afghanistan, and 
Arabia. Much of the trade moved directly from Europe through 
the recently opened Suez Canal to Djibouti or Muscat for 
regional distribution. At Djibouti and Muscat the arms were 
purchased by local captains or transshipped by the European 
firms based at those ports. This pattern remained in place 
until the turmoil of World War I. (Figure 1.) 
The arms trade in Arabia was driven by three major 
forces. First, the volume of trade was made possible by the 
rapid development of small arms in the nineteenth century. 
European armies began introduction of breech-loaders in the 
l840s: over the next sixty years, military rifles evolved 
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more quickly than at any time in the history of firearms. 
The armies of Europe and the Ottoman Empire adopted in quick 
succession muzzle-loading rifles, single-shot black powder 
breech-loading rifles, magazine-fed black powder rifles, and 
finally smokeless powder magazine-fed rifles. Each time new 
rifles were adopted, old stocks of weapons were dumped on 
the private international market. There was a constant flow 
of reliable, though obsolete, weapons into Arabia. An arms 
trade would have existed without the rapid technological 
changes, but those changes served as a pre-condition for the 
size and importance of the trade that developed. 
Second, the trade was driven by international and 
colonial politics which often determined the course of the 
arms trade, and encouraged its growth. The political 
disputes of Europe were of primary importance in the rapid 
technological changes in the arms themselves, as a series of 
wars swept across the continent. These same rivalries 
effected European colonial policy. In particular, the 
rivalry between Britain and France led to French protection 
of the arms trade in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The 
arms trade became, in part, a tactic used by the French to 
undermine the British in the region. It is important to 
remember that Britain had more at stake in the region than 
did France: anti-British activity in the Red Sea and Persian 
Gulf threatened the sea lanes to India, while arms reaching 
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the Northwest Frontier of India threatened the stability of 
that important border. And as Anglo-French rivalry ebbed 
with the rise of Germany as a common threat, the French 
allowed controls on the trade. 
Third, the trade was driven by the internal politics 
of Arabia and of the region in general, which created a 
local demand for modern arms. It must be remembered that 
the market for arms in Afghanistan and on the Northwest 
Frontier accounted for up to half of the arms entering the 
region. within Arabia, the resurgence of the Saudi state 
under Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, and the wars he fought against 
Rashidis and Hashimites created a constant demand for 
weapons. In addition, the raids and counter raids of many 
smaller groups also required guns and ammunition. And when 
the enemy had modern rifles, if became a matter of survival 
for a tribe to obtain the new guns themselves. 
The internal Arabian demand for modern arms meshed 
with the external European and American desire to dispose of 
surplus arms: the need to buy modern rifles matched the need 
to sell old rifles. Taken together, the international and 
the internal political rivalries were the most important 
factors shaping and driving the arms trade in Arabia. The 
British objected again and again to the arms trade, yet they 
continued to sell surplus weapons to the international 
market in Britain or South Africa, while fighting the arms 
6 
market in Muscat. Samuel Cummings, founder of Interarms and 
perhaps the largest private arms dealer in the world today, 
has said: "In the final analysis, the morality of armaments 
boils down to who makes the sale." [5] Sam Cummings would 
have been at home in the arms markets of Muscat or Djibouti. 
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Figure 1. Map showing the arms trade routes around 
Arabia in about 1900. 
The relative volume of the maritime trade routes is 
graphically estimated by the size of the routes on the 
map. Land routes only indicate general position. 
CHAPTER I 
DEATH AND TECHNOLOGY 
THE TRADITIONAL ARMS OF ARABIA 
Before examining the arms trade itself, it is 
necessary to review the traditional weapons present in 
Arabia prior to the introduction of modern, breech-loading, 
rifles. This will lead directly to a review of the rapid 
technological changes made in military rifles in the 
nineteenth century. These changes, and the resulting 
availability of obsolete weapons on the international arms 
market, helped drive the arms trade in Arabia. The arms 
trade would clearly have existed without the rapid changes 
then underway, but it would have operated on a much smaller 
scale, and would have been very different. 
In 1853, Richard Francis Burton disguised himself as a 
Turk and traveled south from Egypt through the Hejaz to 
Mecca and Medina. The book he wrote about his expedition 
contains valuable descriptions of the traditional arms of 
the Arabian Peninsula. Burton reported the local "sheikhs" 
commonly carried a crooked dagger (the Jambiyah), a sword, a 
short javelin, and a matchlock or a flintlock (called by 
British sources a fire1ock). A cartridge-case, powder 
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flask, flint and steel, priming horn and other equipment 
were carried on a bandoleer. A pair of long-barreled, 
flintlock pistols decorated with silver were also common. 
[1] 
Later, Burton repeated that matchlocks and flintlocks 
were the major guns carried in the central Hejaz, adding 
that double-barreled guns were rare. All of the weapons 
were imported into Arabia from Egypt, Syria, and Turkey. 
Local gunsmiths could repair, but not make, the guns, which 
were often kept for generations. pistols had recently been 
introduced to the Hejaz and were well liked, in part because 
they came from Constantinople: a pair of flintlock pistols 
was ten times higher in price than in England. [2] 
Burton's trip to Arabia occurred just as the armies of 
Europe were adopting breech-loading rifles as their major 
service arms. These first service breech-loaders were soon 
replaced with still more modern rifles, and the old stocks 
flowed onto the international market. At the time of 
Charles Doughty's travels near Hail during 1876-78 it 
appears that the new rifles were present but still uncommon, 
for the main weapons he mentions are old muzzle-loading 
muskets or rifles. Any breech-loaders he saw elicited 
special comment. In particular, he reported regarding 
Mohammed ibn Rashid, that "The Prince Mohammed is pitiless 
in battle, he shoots with an European rifle". [3] 
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By the start of the twentieth century, however, modern 
guns had largely replaced the older weapons, at least for 
combat, and the Martini-Henry (and its variants) had become 
the most common modern rifle in Arabia. In a dispatch dated 
July 10, 1907, united States Consul Magelssen at Baghdad 
reported on the types of weapons carried by the bedouin 
"Arabs in Turkish Arabia": 
The Bedouins ••• are nearly all armed with 
spear, sword and rifle, and some tribes carry 
Martini-Henri rifles almost to a man. [4] 
To understand the importance of the change first to 
Martinis and later to magazine-fed rifles and to smokeless 
powder, it is necessary to understand the changing 
technology of weapons in the late nineteenth century. 
THE INCREASED DEADLINESS OF MODERN WEAPONS 
In Palestine in the decades after 1850, a number of 
European observers reported that the battles for power 
between the "leading families in the mountains north and 
south of Jerusalem" were conducted with larger forces than 
in the past, and that they led to a far greater level of 
destruction. (The situation was aggravated by the 
withdrawal of Ottoman troops for the Crimean War.) [5] With 
more and better weapons available, the deadliness of even 
local clashes increased. with reason, Lorimer blames the 
arms trade for "intensifying anarchy and bloodshed in 
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Central Arabia and in some of the smaller states· of the 
Middle East. [6] The first great nineteenth century change 
in small-arms technology had occurred decades before the 
events discussed here. 
The dominant infantry weapon of the Napoleonic Wars 
was the smoothbore, muzzle-loading musket firing a round 
lead ball. The musket was fired through the use of a 
flintlock mechanism. In 1798-99, the discovery of fulminate 
of silver and fulminate of mercury provided for the first 
time an explosive that could be ignited by concussion. By 
1814, a percussion cap was developed for use in firearms. 
The percussion cap was soon in use for both small-arms and 
artillery. [7] The new caps eliminated one of the major 
uncertainties inherent in the old muskets. The flintlocks 
misfired "about every seventh shot," while the new 
percussion caps misfired less than one time in two hundred. 
[8 ] 
Muskets were still inaccurate and slow, however. 
British tests with a percussion musket in 1846 illustrate 
the problem. With the barrel elevated five degrees, the 
weapons had a maximum range of only 650 yards. At more 
normal firing distances, they were still inaccurate. Ten 
shots were fired at targets eleven and a half feet by six 
feet in size, at a range of 250 yards: all ten missed. To 
hit a target at 200 yards, the musket had to be aimed five 
13 
and a half feet above it; while at 600 yards, the aiming 
point was 130 feet over the target. Black powder 
muzzle-loading muskets had an effective combat range of 150 
yards or less. [9] 
Accuracy could only be improved by greatly increasing 
the amount of powder used, with the inevitable danger of the 
gun bursting when fired; by rifling the barrel so that the 
projectile spun, giving it greater stability in flight; or 
by improving the powder. Rifling was the best solution 
available at the time. But while rifling improved the 
accuracy of firearms, it also made them slow to re-load, and 
limited their use in combat. To ensure that the lead balls 
fit firmly into the grooves of the barrel, they had to be 
slightly larger in diameter than the bore. This required 
that they be forced down the barrel, often with the help of 
a mallet. While irregular troops and skirmishers did' use 
rifles, they were too slow for use on the line by regulars. 
Between 1850 and 1860, most European armies introduced 
various cylindro-conoidal bullets, for rifled 
muzzle-loaders. The most famous of these was the French 
Minie, adopted in 1851. The British adopted their own 
version with the Pritchett bullet used in the Pattern 1853 
Enfield. [10] The caliber of the bullets used in the various 
guns changed dramatically at the same time. The British 
musket used during the l840s had a caliber of .753: 
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three-quarters of in inch in diameter. The Minie fell to 
.702, and the Pattern 1853 declined further to .577, nearly 
a quarter of an inch smaller than the old musket bullets. 
[11] 
The new bullets solved two of the major problems of 
the old muskets. First, they were cylindrical, and had less 
resistance in the air and greater stability in flight. 
Second, to allow their easy use in rifles, they were 
slightly smaller than the bore and thus slid easily down the 
barrel. To avoid loss of gas and pressure when fired and to 
impart spin, however, the bullet still had to fit tightly 
into the rifling of the barrel. This was accomplished by 
designing the projectile so that its rear expanded as the 
powder exploded, wedging it tightly into the grooves of the 
rifling. The combined effect was dramatic, as noted by 
Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, formerly director of a United 
States Army study on the lethality of weapons: 
The introduction of the rifle musket and its 
conoidal bullet ••• was to have the greatest 
immediate and measurable revolutionary impact on 
war of any new weapon or technological development 
of war before or since. When and if tactical 
nuclear weapons appear on the battlefield, 
presumably they will have an even greater effect. 
But certainly not even the high-explosive shells, 
airplanes, or tanks of the twentieth century were 
to have effects of contemporary scale and 
significance comparable to the rifled musket in 
its early days. 
The principal reason for this dramatic rise in 
the lethality of small arms ••• was that with the 
rifled musket every infantryman had a weapon with 
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the same effective range as the largest and most 
powerful cannon - in other words to the limit of 
effective vision, or the crest of the next hill or 
ridge. [12] 
The increased range and accuracy of the new rifles had 
the immediate effect of greatly augmenting the strength of a 
defensive position and of infantry in general. An enemy 
force could be fired upon, with good effect, over a much 
greater distance than in the past. 
The evolution of gunpowder complimented the 
developments in rifle design. The first major change came 
in about 1860 with the principle of progressive combustion. 
The black powder was compressed into higher-density pellets, 
slowing the rate of its combustion and the building of 
pressure from the expanding gas. Older gunpowder created 
high pressure through a sudden release of gas in the 
weapon. Progressive combustion led to a release of gas 
throughout much of the bullet's passage down the barrel. 
The result was higher muzzle velocities from lower maximum 
breech pressure, and a flatter tr ajectory. [13] Minor 
additional improvements were made in black powder until it 
was finally replaced by smokeless powder. 
At about the time that the new rifled musket was 
placed in service, developments occurred that would soon 
allow the full introduction of breech-loaders. The 
percussion cap, powder, and bullet were combined into a 
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single metallic cartridge. The first service breech-loader 
was the Prussian needle-gun (adopted in 1842). Other 
European states soon followed Prussia's lead. It appears, 
for example, that the British began converting their stocks 
of Enfield muskets into breech-loading Sniders within a year 
or two of the Enfield's introduction. By the late l870s, 
the major armies of Europe were all armed with 
breech-loaders using metallic cartridges, and having steel 
barrels. [14] 
The Martini-Henry of 1871 became the most common rifle 
in Arabia by the early years of this century. It well 
illustrates the late black powder breech-loaders. The 
British Martini-Henry fired a 480 grain, .45 caliber bullet, 
with a muzzle velocity of 1,350 feet per second. [15] Speed 
and ease of re-loading were the major advantages of 
breech-loaders over muzzle-loaders. In Arabia, cavalry ­
mounted on either camels or horses - was of far greater 
importance than it was in Europe. And breech-loaders can be 
easily re-loaded while mounted. 
The next major development in rifle design came with 
the wide introduction of magazine-fed breech-loaders. These 
took the improved ballistics of the new bullets and the 
smooth loading of the metallic cartridges and greatly 
increased the speed with which the rifles could be fired. 
Most European rifles eventually followed the design of the 
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German Mauser in the l890s. A number, including the 
tube-magazine fed Mauser purchased by the Ottomans, were 
developed for use with black powder. The heavy fouling 
caused by black powder, however, slowed the introduction of 
new designs. The first magazine-fed rifles had scarcely 
been introduced into the armies of Europe before the French 
invention of smokeless powder in 1886 made them obsolete. 
Smokeless powder had several major advantages over 
black powder. It did not foul the gun as badly, it did not 
give away the shooter's position or obscure his vision, and 
it was slow-burning. [16] The slow, progressive, combustion 
of smokeless powder gave much higher muzzle velocities than 
had been possible with black powder. The difference becomes 
clear when one considers the reaction between the projectile 
and the explosive gasses in the gun barrel as the powder 
burns. 
Progressive combustion black powders burn at a fairly 
steady rate, giving an even pressure that forces the bullet 
out of the barrel: however, if the gun is long enough, the 
projectile still begins to lose velocity before leaving the 
barrel. with the progressive explosion of smokeless 
powders, the rate of combustion and the resulting gas 
pressure builds throughout the explosion: as a result, the 
projectile accelerates throughout its time in the barrel. 
For projectiles with the same mass, the new powders provide 
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a much higher muzzle velocity and resulting impact. (The 
formula is mass times velocity, squared.) 
Changes brought by the powder are illustrated by 
comparing three models of the Mauser. The single shot black 
powder Model 1871; the tube magazine-fed Model 1887, the 
last of the black powder Mausers; and the Model 1890, the 
first of the smokeless powder Mausers. The last two were 
both sold to the Ottomans. The Model 1871 fired a 660 grain 
bullet of llmm. caliber at about 1,427 feet per second [17]; 
the black powder Model 1887 (Turkish) fired a 284 grain, 
9.5mm caliber bullet with a muzzle velocity of about 1,758 
feet per second [18]; while the smokeless powder Model 1890 
(Turkish) fired a 154 grain bullet of 7.95mm. caliber with a 
muzzle velocity of about 2,720 feet per second. [19] 
There was thus a near doubling in the muzzle velocity 
between the 1871 and 1890 Models, with most of the 
improvement coming from the introduction of smokeless 
powder. The contrast is even greater with the old 
Martini-Henries: the British Service cartridge, as noted, 
had a muzzle velocity of 1,350 feet per second, while the 
Turkish version had a muzzle velocity of 1,380 feet per 
second. [20] When the Martini is compared with the Model 
1890 Mauser's 2,720 fps, the improvement is dramatic. 
The increased muzzle velocity of early single-shot 
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breech-loaders over muzzle-loaders and then of black powder 
over smokeless powder is vital. While the smaller bullets 
of the later guns had less wind resistance to hinder their 
flight, the most important difference was their velocity. 
Each round would fall the same distance per second (ignoring 
wind resistance) after leaving the barrel of the rifle. 
Thus, the higher the muzzle velocity, the further the round 
would travel before striking the ground. The flatter 
trajectory permitted more accurate aiming over longer 
distances. A shot that would merely announce a man's 
presence and fall short of his enemy with an older rifle 
would kill with the newer. Technology might well outpace an 
actual intent to kill. 
The second major change of tactical importance was in 
the increased rate of fire of bolt-action magazine-fed 
rifles compared with single-shot breech-loaders. The 
British found that troops using the Martini could fire 
between eight and twelve aimed shots per minute [21], while 
the new magazine rifles could fire up to 30 aimed shots in 
the same time. [22] The extra use of ammunition could be a 
problem, as pointed out by al-Nuri in his conversation with 
Musil (below, Chapter II), but the ability to shoot quickly 
in battle could "be a matter of life or death. 
The dates for the introduction of these changes can be 
quickly listed for review: cylindro-conoidal bullets for 
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rifled muzzle-loaders, c.1849-l860; breech-loading rifles, 
c.1848-l87l; bolt operated magazine-fed rifles (especially 
when combined with smokeless powder), c.1885-l895; smokeless 
powder, c.1885-l890. [23] The international market could 
move obsolete weapons quickly. For example, some older 
breech-loaders reached Central Africa in about 1886, within 
a year of their replacement in Europe. [241 Generally, 
however, changes took a number of years to reach Arabia. The 
delay seems to have shortened as the speed of technological 
change increased ~nd as European nations modernized their 
own stocks in the years leading up to the First World War. 
An additional factor that affected the use of the 
weapons in Arabia, as elsewhere, was the reliability of 
early breech-loading ammunition. In early Martini-Henries, 
for example, the base of the cartridge case was actually a 
separate piece of metal. (In the case of the British 
Service Martini, a coiled brass or iron case was used, 
before conversion to a solid brass case. [25]) When the 
rifle become hot, the fired shell could rip apart, forcing 
use of a special extraction tool to dig out the casing 
before the next shot. [26] Sources for Arabia do not 
mention the problem, and it may have been corrected before 
the weapon reached the area. 
The rapid changes made in the technology of infantry 
rifles in Europe, and the resulting dumping of older guns on 
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the world market, made the large scale introduction of 
modern arms to Arabia possible. It is, of course, 
inevitable that modern weapons would have eventually reached 
Arabia. But that eventuality could have represented a very 
long time indeed had the major powers not been burdened with 
enormous stocks of rifles that had became obsolete, and had 
they chosen to destroy these rifles rather than sell them to 
arms dealers. But they did not destroy them, and 
technological change helped drive the arms market in Arabia, 
and elsewhere. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE SWEEP OF TECHNOLOGY 
With a general understanding of the changing 
technology of military rifles during the period as 
background, the types of rifles actually found in Arabia can 
now be examined. This information will itself serve as 
background for the later examination of the arms trade. 
MODERN RIFLES IN ARABIA 
By the first decade of this century, the Martini-Henry 
was the most common modern rifle in Arabia. The 1907 
dispatch by the United States Consul in Baghdad [1] reports 
the prevalence of the Martini. At about the same time, 
British officials in the Persian Gulf made a detailed study 
of the tribes and weapons of the region. (c. 1905-07) The 
study was undertaken for the Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, 
then being prepared by J.G. Lorimer of the Indian Civil 
Service. The results of their study are scattered throughout 
Lorimer's work. There was still a considerable variety of 
guns in the region, some tribes being well armed, while 
others had few breech-loaders and still carried flintlock 
muskets. [2] In general, however, the old flintlocks and 
matchlocks were considered "entirely out of date", and it is 
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the Martini that is cited again and again in Lorimer as the 
standard modern rifle. [3] By 1896, Martinis were used to 
pay customs duty on arms imported into Bahrein. [4] 
The several variations of the Martini, and their 
different compound names, are easily confused. All are 
often referred to simply as Martinis. The two elements in a 
compound rifle name refer to the type of breech operating 
mechanism and to the barrel design. The rifle eventually 
called the Martini started as the peabody Rifle in the 
United States. A Swiss designer, Martini, altered the breech 
mechanism, creating the peabody-Martini sold to the Ottomans 
in 1873. [5] The British then replaced the original barrel 
with their own, called the Henry, yielding the 
Martini-Henry. Martini rifles in Arabia could be either the 
peabody-Martini or the Martini-Henry, with the sources 
seldom distinguishing between the two designs. 
Martinis are mentioned specifically for the Ajman 
Tribe of Hasa and eastern Arabia, [6] the Sheikhdom of 
Dubai, [7] the Muntafik Tribe of Iraq, [8] the Mutair Tribe 
of central Arabia, [9] the towns of the Oman Sultanate, [10] 
and Riyadh in Nejd. [11] In addition, un-named 
breech-loaders are cited for Jabal Sammar and the region 
around Hail. [12] 
During 1905-06, .dispatches from the Military Attache 
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of the British Embassy in Constantinople, Lieutenant Colonel 
Maunsell, also note the presence of Martinis in Mesopotamia 
[13] and with the Iraqi section of the Sammar Tribe. [14] As 
early as 1905, however, the acting British Consul at Basra 
reported that while the Muntafik Tribe carried Martinis, 
some of the tribes allied to it were already armed with 
Mausers. [15] The Martini was dominant, but still more 
modern rifles were entering the arms trade in Arabia. 
Observations made by travelers to Arabia in the years 
before World War I further document the distribution and use 
of modern rifles in different parts of the Peninsula. In 
1912, the Dane Barclay Raunkiaer traveled from Kuwait to 
Riyadh and then back to the coast of al-Hasa. Raunkiaer's 
trip broke his health, and he died shortly after returning 
home. The information he obtained at so high a personal 
price is of great value. He found that carbines were far 
more popular than rifles, that the Martini-Henry carbine was 
the weapon "most in use," and that it had "been known in 
Arabia for over a generation." Mausers were "met with now 
and then." Sheikh Mubarak of Kuwait, for example, had a 
paid guard of about 150 men who were armed with 
Martini-Henry and Mauser carbines. [16] Raunkiaer believed 
the major importation route for the Martinis was through 
Muscat after shipment from Djibouti. He added a description 
of the way in which the Martini-Henry was altered by the 
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local Bedouin tribes: 
No sooner has an Arab taken possession of such a 
carbine than he sets about making alterations. As 
a result it assumes a distinctly Arab character, 
while at the same time it loses most of its value 
as a firearm. First and formost the backsight ­
an offense to the Arab's sense of beauty - is 
knocked off, the foresight goes the same way, and 
where the sights have been, strips of tin or brass 
are bound round the barrel and kept polished. 
After thus making short work of the means of 
sighting, the Arab pursues the process of 
embellishment by paring as much wood as ever he 
can off the weapon, to make it lighter, and after 
the stock has finally assumed its form, he studs 
it with innumerable little nails with brass heads 
disposed in various patterns. That done, the 
formidable arm is put safely in the leathern 
holster, which has its place on the camel saddle 
behind the rider. [17] 
Charles Doughty in the l880s had noticed the same 
practice of cutting off the sights during his visit to Hail 
when a local gun-smith handed him "an army rifle [from 
India] whereupon I found the Tower mark; the sights - they 
not understanding their use! - had been taken away." [18] 
Raunkiaer's description is both reasonable and partly 
confirmed, but in blaming aesthetics for the alterations he 
was assuredly wrong. Of the alterations he described, I 
suggest that only the studs were primarily decorative. The 
others were practical. The paring of excess wood from the 
carbines would have not only reduced the weapon's weight, 
but also would have shifted its balance point and made it 
easier to handle while mounted. The wrapping of the 
carbines was a needed protection against sand and dirt, and 
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was a method apparently used in most parts of the Peninsula. 
The question of the sights is more difficult, but becomes 
clear on analysis. 
If a shooter is not trained, and trained well, to use 
sights he will find them an obstruction. The shooter must 
break the old habit of sighting down the barrel, and learn 
to concentrate on holding the proper sight picture on the 
target. This training requires a considerable use of 
ammunition, and ammunition was generally in short supply in 
Arabia. And without effective training, a quick conversation 
to the use of sights would have been difficult and 
expensive. In addition, the sights of a military rifle are 
easily knocked out of adjustment, and the regular use of 
l' 	 ammunition is needed to readjust them. As a final point, it 
is important to remember that when firing at relatively 
short ranges (up to about 200 yards) sights on a rifle are 
only needed for target shooting. Both men and animals are 
large enough to be easily hit without precision sights. 
Reporting on the northern parts of the Peninsula, 
Alois Musil noted that for hunting the Ruwala used 
muzzle-loading muskets and rifles with percussion caps or 
flintlocks. However: 
For fighting, the Rwala have rifles of as-sam', 
as-sehani and Mauser makes. Among the common 
Bedouins before the World War the sam', an old 
English military gun, was the most popular. A 
genuine one cost 40 to 45 megidijjat ($36-$40.50) 
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and was imported chiefly from Egypt, an imitation, 
tuggarijje, which came from India, sold for 28 to 
30 megidijjat ($25.20-$29). The sehani is a 
Turkish military rifle, a Martini, the umm sunki 
kind of sehani could be bought for 50-60 
megidijjat ($36-$45). All modern rifles are called 
Mausers by the Bedouins. Breechloaders are not 
liked by the Rwala and the rifles fitted with 
breechblocks, ummu-s-sba, are less sought after 
than those without. The original Mausers, 
especially the Mannlichers, cost 50-60 megidijjat 
($45-$54), the imitations, tuggari, were sold for 
as much as 20 megidijjat ($18) less. • •• In the 
camp of every tribe an expert mechanic may be 
found, who can repair guns and manufacture 
cartridges. [19) 
It is likely that economics had much to do with the 
preference for muzzle-loaders for hunting. Ammunition for 
the modern guns was both expensive and in short supply, 
while a flintlock could have been fired again and again for 
little cost. And while percussion caps would have had to be 
imported, their cost would have been much lower than the 
cost of brass ammunition. In addition, over the average 
distances involved in hunting (about 200 yards) a well made 
and smoothed lead ball is sufficiently accurate. [20) 
During hunting, reloading and firing speed is seldom vital, 
while during combat it can become a matter of survival. 
It immediately seems apparent that Musil was either 
not an expert on the military weapons he discussed, or he 
chose not to report accurately on these weapons. He refers 
to the Austrian Mannlicher as a sub-type of the German 
Mauser, while it was in fact a different weapon. The 
mistake is odd, for Musil traveled with Herr Thomasberger of 
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Austrian Military Intelligence on some of his expeditions, 
[21] and used weapons himself throughout his travels. When 
he states that the Ruwala preferred breech-loaders without 
breechblocks, he appears to refer to a developing preference 
for the newer magazine-fed rifles over the Martinis and 
Sniders. As this would have meant a change from black-powder 
to smokeless powder, the superiority of the cartridge may 
have been a more important factor than the rifle's action. 
Direct evidence that the Ruwala did not object to 
breech-loaders is provided in another of Musil's works where 
he reported a conversation with a prince of the Ruwala 
shortly after the start of World War I. The prince said that 
the best modern weapons were made by the "Alman" (Germans), 
and the next best by the "Namsa" (Austrians). [22] The 
German guns would have been Mausers, and the Austrian guns 
Mannlichers: both were magazine-fed breech-loaders. The 
advantage of smokeless powder and the problems of scarce 
ammunition, in addition to the difficulty of changing old 
shooting habits are illustrated by Musil's story of a 
meeting near Damascus with Sheikh al-Nuri of the Ruwala in 
November, 1908: 
An-Nuri showed me a Mannlicher carbine of the 
1898 Model which I had given him. Being used to 
the Martini rifle, he could not accustom himself 
to the Mannlicher lock and had had it changed to 
the Martini type. This pleased him beyond measure 
and made him boast that his carbine carried much 
farther and better than the Martini. To my mild 
reproof that he could have loaded the original 
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Mannlicher with five cartridges, while now he had 
to be satisfied with only one, he replied that at 
least he would not have to waste so much 
ammunition as before. [23] 
The identity of the "old English military gun," the 
sam', is unclear. Because he recognized the Turkish service 
peabody-Martini, it seems very likely that Musil would have 
identified the British service version of the Martini as 
well, had it been the gun in question. It also seems 
unlikely that he would have identified any of the 
magazine-fed Enfields that succeeded the Martini in British 
service as being "old." Thus, the best candidate for the 
sam' is the Snider breech-loading conversion of the old 
Enfield muzzle-loading musket. As this weapon was the 
standard service rifle of the Ottomans and the British 
before the Martini-Henry, it would have been easily 
available through Turkish sources, or from surplus European 
stocks. 
The availability of arms in south western Arabia was 
affected by a number of factors, including Government of 
India regulations. Wyman Bury suggested, in 1911, that in 
outfitting an expedition to the interior of Aden and Yemen, 
the traveler should arm his men with breech-loading 
carbines,.with a simple breech design and using "high 
velocity smokeless powder." He then noted that the .303 
Martini-Medford (I believe this to be a version of the 
British service Martini-Henry modified to take the newer 
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Enfield cartridge) would have been a good choice, but that 
Government of India regulations banned use of that caliber. 
The same regulations banned the ammunition for the "Snyder" 
(Snider) and the Martini-Henry. Bury ended by suggesting 
that the Mauser .350 saddle-carbine answered "all 
requirements." [24] 
In early 1914, Bury discussed the lack of military 
protection for Sana, Yemen, in the absence of Turkish 
troops: "modern commercial enterprise has armed the remotest 
tribesmen with modern weapons. • •• There the city stands in 
her isolation and arrogance like a fat heifer among w~lves, 
" [25] Even the local Arab gendarmerie, the zaptieh, were 
at a disadvantage. They served beside Turkish regular 
infantry, and were also responsible for most Ottoman 
dealings with the Yemani population. However, they were 
armed with an early pattern Mauser using black powder 
cartridges fed from a tubular magazine under the barrel. 
The smoke from the black powder was "a serious drawback in 
mountain warfare." [26] The Mausers observed by Bury were 
likely part of the shipment of black powder Model 1887 
Mausers ordered by Turkey in that year, and discussed in 
Chapter VII. 
The irregular troops in Yemen were not alone in their 
use of the old Mausers, however. Bury reports that Izzet 
Pasha's 1911 campaign included ~urkish troops of "several 
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European battalions" armed with "modern Mausers, burning 
smokeless powder." However: 
They have returned with their rifles, and all 
ammunition of that caliber has been shipped back 
to Europe or Asia Minor. Yamen is garrisoned with 
Asiatic battalions, armed with the same weapon as 
the Zaptieh, and the one or two European 
battalions that are still left there are similarly 
armed. [27] 
Thus by 1914, on the eve of World War I, Turkish 
provincial forces were still using the old-model Mausers. 
CHANGES DURING WORLD WAR I 
The situation regarding tribal arms changed with the 
great influx of arms during World War I, particularly in the 
area near Mesopotamia. In 1915, British troops at Basra were 
fired on nightly by Arab irregulars fighting for the 
Ottomans. A variety of rifles were in use, and they could be 
identified easily by their sound. "Heavy Martini bullets 
droned, Mausers fizzed, and individuals were sometimes 
recognized by the noise made by their particular weapons, 
" The irregulars took advantage of breaks in the fighting 
to strip the battlefield of rifles dropped by the dead and 
wounded. [281 
By the end of World War I magazine fed modern rifles 
appear to have largely replaced the older weapons. Bertram 
Thomas reported on the tribes of Northern Arabia and Iraq 
following the war, stating that they "re-armed themselves 
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with modern rifles of which the gleanings of the 
battle-fields had provided a bounteous harvest." Sir Arnold 
Wilson analyzed the results of the World War I arms glut in 
central Iraq in 1917, for both farmers and bedouin: 
••• the population as a whole had contrived to 
provide itself with modern weapons and abundance 
of ammunition, to such effect that the price of a 
Mauser or Lee-Enfield, which before the War stood 
at £ 20 or £ 25, had dropped to £ 5 or less. 
British and Turkish rifles had been picked up on 
fields of battle or stolen on the lines of 
communication in thousands; ammunition had been 
accumulated on a scale hitherto undreamt of. 
In one British camp over seventy boxes of 1,000 
rounds each were dug up and stolen from under the 
noses of the sentries. Every narrative of the 
period testifies to the ingenuity displayed in 
these predatory activities and the nervous 
irritation they caused. • •• the only action 
taken, at the instance of the military authorities 
and at their expense, was to purchase rifles and 
ammunition from any tribesman who would sell. 
More than half a million rounds, several hundred 
good rifles and as many useless ones were thus 
purchased, but the measure did more harm than 
good. Prices did not rise in the open market. 
The rifles and ammunition freely issued to our 
Allies on the Syrian side, together with captured 
Turkish arms, soon filled the gap, and the money 
we paid went to purchase more and better rifles. 
[29] 
The inundation of Arabia with modern arms during the 
Great War - and the battles fought around the northern edges 
of the Peninsula by the combatants - were the sharpest 
examples of international politics effecting the region 
during this period. But World War I was only the final of a 
series of international events to influence the arms trade 
in Arabia. Technological change was the first leg driving 
the arms trade, European colonial rivalry was the second. 
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CHAPTER III 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE ARMS TRADE 
THE GENERAL ACT OF BRUSSELS 
The rapid changes in technology have been reviewed as 
a precondition for the arms trade as it developed in Arabia. 
The international political rivalries that shaped and 
directed the course of the trade can now be studied. 
The arms trade in Arabia was influenced by, and often 
contrO.lled by, international political considerations not 
directly related to the region. This influence was felt in 
three major ways: first, the wars "and rivalries of Europe 
drove the evolution of weapons, and thus helped create the 
vast stock of surplus rifles dumped on the world market; and 
second, general colonial rivalry in Africa led to controls 
on the arms trade there and the shift of the trade north; 
and third, the rivalry between Britain and France protected, 
and in fact encouraged, the arms merchants and hindered 
British efforts at control. 
Between l849'and 1871 two new, unified, states rose to 
influence in Europe while a series of major internal wars 
shifted and re-shifted the balance of power. The increasing 
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power of Italy and Germany and the relative decline of 
Austria and France coincided with a desire by the two new 
states to gain overseas colonies. During the l870s and 
l880s, Germany and Italy sought to catch up in the race for 
colonies while France recovered from its defeat in the 
Franco-Prussian War. Britain, at first, stayed on the 
outside watching, then began to participate in Europe's 
series of shifting alliances. During the Berlin Congress in 
1878, Britain resumed a strong role in European politics, 
gaining a better position in the Middle East at the expense 
of Russia. [1] Despite France's defeat in 1870-71, the 
alliances formed during the l880s were primarily directed 
against France or Russia by Germany, Austria and Italy. 
The shifting of alliances continued until the final 
changes at the start of World War I. The various alliances 
had a constant effect on events in and near Arabia, and on 
the arms trade. Colonial rivalry, in particular, was soon 
seen as a threat to the peace of Europe itself, and the 
European powers began seeking ways to control their 
competition. 
Two important agreements on Africa preceded the 
Brussels Conference and helped settle the colonial situation 
on the East Coast of Africa, thus easing Anglo-German 
tensions. In 1886 Britain and Germany signed an agreement 
stating that both recognized the It sovereignty of the Sul tan 
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of Zanzibar over the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba ••• as 
well as over the Islands of Lamu and Mafia" and over a strip 
of the African coast opposite the islands. In addition, the 
agreement set the boundaries of the German and British areas 
of influence in East Africa. [2] The 1886 Agreement favored 
Germany, in that Britain agreed to Germany's area of 
influence in East Africa. A second Agreement four years 
later favored Britain, for Germany approved Britain's 
declaration of a Protectorate over Zanzibar and yielded 
parts of various African areas of' influence to Britain. [3] 
The new Zanzibar Protectorate (1890) put Britain in a 
stronger position to attack the southern link in the slave 
trade and the related arms trade. 
More than bilateral action was needed, however. In 
August, 1889 King Leopold of Belgium, on the suggestion of 
Britain, invited seventeen states to a conference at 
Brussels to discuss the African slave and arms trades. Many 
of the nations receiving invitations were uncertain of 
British motives in requesting the conference, and of whether 
they should attend. The French feared that the conference 
was a British attempt to isolate France, while the United 
States wanted to do nothing to help the colonial powers. 
Other states had a variety of concerns, but in the end the 
conference convened, and after much work produced the 
General Act of Brussels for the Repression of the African 
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Slave Trade. The Act included a lengthy section designed to 
control the arms trade in much of Africa. [4] As discussed 
below, the arms provisions of the Act helped force a 
northward shift in the arms trade from Africa to the lands 
around Arabia. Arab vessels that carried slaves from Africa 
to the markets of the Peninsula often also shipped guns. 
The linking of the slave trade and the arms trade by 
the Brussels Act was symptomatic of a growing problem for 
the colonial powers in the l880s; the peoples they wished to 
control were obtaining mode~n weapons that threatened to 
make their resistance more effective than it had been. 
British Consul-General Euan-Smith at Zanzibar stated the 
dangers in June, 1888 dispatch to the Foreign Office: 
The great question is that regarding the import 
of arms and ammunition into East Africa. This 
trade has now assumed proportions of which your 
Lordship may possibly be unaware. Formerly the 
arms so imported were cheap and worthless weapons 
manufactured to last for a maximum period of some 
two or three years and after that time becoming 
useless and worn out. Now, however, arms of 
precision and breech-loading rifles and ammunition 
are being imported in very large quantities and 
are rapidly taking the place of the flintlock and 
muzzle-loading cheap muskets. • ••, Unless some 
steps are taken to check this immense import of 
arms into East Africa the development and 
pacification of this great continent will have to 
be carried out in the face of an enormous 
population, the majority of whom will probably be 
armed with first-class breech-loading rifles. [5] 
The major goal of the Brussels Convention may, in 
'fact, have been to prevent modern arms from reaching central 
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Africa, and not suppression of the slave trade. [6] There 
was apparently a direct link between the slave and arms 
trades. While White believed that the act was aimed 
primarily at the slave trade, she noted that the slavers 
were generally armed with guns and were -the backbone of 
resistance to white penetration." [7] This linkage extended 
to many of the slave and arms traders active in the seas 
around Arabia. 
Regardless of the balance of motives behind the 
Conference, the General Act of Brussels established two 
different maritime control zones, one for control of the 
slave trade, and one for control of the arms trade. Figure 
2 shows both zones. The signers of the Act asserted high 
moral goals for their control of the arms trade, while 
implicitly admitting the fear of armed "natives" that 
apparently motivated their agreement. 
In regard to the arms trade, the General Act of 
Brussels provided, in part: 
ARTICLE VIII 
The experience of all nations that have 
intercourse with Africa having shown the 
pernicious and preponderating part played by 
fire-arms in operations connected with the 
slave-trade as well as internal wars between 
native tribes; and this same experience having 
clearly proved that the preservation of the 
African population whose existence it is the 
express wish of the powers to protect, is a 
radical impossibility, if measures restricting the 
trade in fire-arms and ammunition are not adopted, 
the powers decide, so far as the present state of 
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their frontiers permits, that the importation of 
fire-arms, and especially of rifles and improved 
weapons, as well as of powder, ball and 
cartridges, is, except in the cases and under the 
conditions provided for in the following Article, 
prohibited ••• 
(The Act ordered the establishment of 
governmental warehouses in the African colonies of 
the signers, and required that arms only be 
removed from the warehouses for the use of 
~olonial governments, authorized European
travelers, or persons working for Europeans. 
Article IX then specified which weapons were to be 
controlled and which could still be sold to the 
natives.) 
ARTICLE IX 
••• authorization shall ••• be refused for the 
withdrawal (from the government warehouses) of all 
arms for accurate firing, such as rifles, magazine 
guns, or breech-loaders, whether whole or in 
detached pieces, their cartridges, caps, or other 
ammunition intended for them. • •• 
The above rule as to warehousing shall also 
apply to gunpowder. 
Only flint-lock guns, with unrifled barrels, and 
common gunpowder known as trade powder, may be 
withdrawn from warehouses for sale. • •• [8] 
Most of the signers of the General Act ratified it 
without trouble. [9] The French Chamber of Deputies, 
however, refused to agree to the Articles allowing for the 
visit, search and detention of merchant vessels at sea by 
the warships of the other signers. (Articles XXI-XXIII and 
XLII-LXI) France had never allowed foreign warships to 
search vessels flying the French flag, and would not do so 
now. French honor would not be sacrificed. But neither 
would the British give up the enforcement clau~es that they 
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considered vital. To save the treaty, an unusual compromise 
was reached: France was allowed to exclude the offending 
passages from its ratification, while the other signers 
approved the entire treaty. [10] 
As a result the French were in a position to avoid any 
real regulation on the use of their flag, and they freely 
issued it to native craft engaged in both the slave and arms 
trades from Omani ports. This protection for the arms trade 
became vital and was to bedevil the British until the eve of 
World War I. 
USE OF THE FRENCH FLAG TO PROTECT THE ARMS TRADE 
International Law allowed a state to authorize use of 
its flag by any vessel, and under any circumstances, that it 
chose. Throughout the period this right was fully accepted 
by both Britain and France in regard to any persons who were 
residents in any of their formal colonies or protectorates. 
The acceptance of this principle is clear from the comment 
by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague in the 
Muscat Dhows Case that: 
•••generally speaking it belongs to every 
sovereign to decide to whom he will accord the 
right to fly his flag and to prescribe the rules 
governing such grants... [11] 
The General Act of Brussels, however, modified this 
right for its signers, and its modification became critical 
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to efforts to control the arms trade. Early disputes over 
flag rights in the region were generally related to the use 
of the French flag to protect the slave trade, and the 
earlier process by which native craft gained this protection 
is important. 
Traditionally the sailors of the region used the red 
Turkish flag, making it difficult to determine the exact 
origin of a vessel. As late as 1900, the traditional flag 
was still in general use in the Persian Gulf, and was viewed 
as the proper flag by the Arab sailors of both Oman and 
Kuwait. It was not until after the turn of the century that 
distinct local flags were put into service. [12] In the 
1847, however, a decree by the Ottoman Sultan prohibited 
Turkish vessels from engaging in the slave trade, and the 
British Navy was allowed to search suspected Turkish ships. 
[13] During the l840s most of the Gulf rulers had signed 
agreements allowing the Royal Navy to act against the slave 
trade. 
Additional local agreements followed. In reaction, 
Arab sailors began "to conceal their operations by use of 
the French flag, which secured them against search by 
British vessels". [14] For a number of reasons, the arms 
trade began to build strongly after 1883, and by 1891, use 
of the French flag had: 
••• become somewhat cQmmon among the subjects of 
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the Sultan of Oman. In 1892 the practice appeared 
likely to be extended to the vessels of Trucial 
Oman, and in the same year slave cargoes began to 
reach Basrah under French colours. 
Lorimer carefully added a caveat regarding the 
involvement of the French Government at this time: 
It should be mentioned, however, in extenuation 
of the responsibility of the French Government, 
that use of their flag by slave traders was often 
unauthorized and fraudulent. [15] 
Use of the French flag by slavers and arms traders 
along the east coast of Africa was little more than an 
irritant to the British. The real crisis developed when the 
French Consul in Muscat began to distribute French papers to 
local Arabs. This pra~tice was to severly limit the ability 
of the British to strike at the arms trade. 
TREATY PROTECTION FOR THE ARMS TRADE AT MUSCAT 
International Law assumed that all states were 
sovereign and independent, but unless there were political 
or military factors involved, the colonial powers did not 
extend this doctrine to the nations and peoples they wished 
to control. By the l890s, the British were in effective 
control of most of the Gulf littoral, or were in a position 
to extend their control witho~t interference from any other 
European power. However, European politics created in the 
mid-nineteenth century in Oman a shield that maintained the 
technical independence of the Sultanate, and protected the 
arms tr ade. 
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Britain and France began to take an interest in Oman 
late in the eighteenth century when the Sultan at Muscat 
ruled both Oman and Zanzibar, commanding much of the 
internal shipping of the Indian Ocean region. British 
interest, in particular, rose and fell in accord with the 
shifts of European politics and French activity in the 
area. 
Muscat remained neutral during the Anglo-French War in 
1793. But it was a neutrality of trade. In 1796 the British 
feared that Sultan ibn Ahmed had leaned toward the French, 
following reports that Muscati vessels carried information 
on British shipping to the French colony of lIe de France 
(Mauritius), and that Frenchmen were "frequently passing 
through Muscat" to Persia and the Levant. Also, Muscati 
merchants were "doing a thriving business" trading British 
goods captured by the French and were running the British 
blockade of the Mascarenes Islands. The Governor of Bombay 
sent an officer to Muscat to investigate. [16] 
By an Agreement signed in 1789, the Sultan promised 
not to give the French or the Dutch a trading or military 
base within his territory "whilst warfare shall continue 
between the English Company and them" [17] A further 
agreement in 1800 called for an East India Company Agent to 
be stationed at Muscat. 
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Notwithstanding these agreements, throughout the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, French privateers from 
lIe de France used Muscat as a base for shelter and supplies 
while attacking British shipping in the Indian Ocean. Goods 
captured by the French were sold to Muscati merchants, and 
both the merchants and the Sultan regularly purchased 
captured English ships and goods at Port Louis. Captured 
ships were re-sold throughout the Gulf and even at Calcutta. 
[18] 
Seyyid Said bin Sultan began his rule in 1806, and was 
faced with a renewal of the Anglo-French war. Said kept his 
French option open. He maintained the long-standing trade 
with Port Louis, and in 1807, concluded an agreement with 
the French Governor of lIe de France allowing for a French 
commercial agent at Muscat. [19] 
Both during and after the war, Said's policy was based 
on his desire to remain independent. While he saw the 
British as his protectors, both in the Gulf and in East 
Africa, [20] he did not cut himself off from the French. In 
1817 a French merchant from Bourbon visited Muscat and 
sought to revive the old lIe de France-Muscat trade. Said 
accepted the idea, and trade was soon underway, [21] 
sanctioned by·a commercial treaty with the Governor of 
Bourbon that gave most-favored-nation rights to both 
parties. [22] Said was thus able to use France's recovery 
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from defeat, and her renewed interest in trade and colonies, 
as a counter to British influence. 
Throughout the remainder of the century, British 
policy in the region was often based on fear. When the 
Egyptians were in control of central Arabia and the Trucial 
Coast, the British feared an expansion of Egypt's power, 
believing that France was behind Mahomet Ali's expansion. 
Later, they feared direct French action against the routes 
to India. Lord palmerston, following in pitt's tradition, 
stated the danger: "the mistress of India cannot permit 
France to be mistress directly or indirectly of the road to 
her Indian dominions." [23] Whether the danger came 
directly at sea, or indirectly through arms reaching the 
Northwest Frontier, the need to protect India largely 
determined the British reaction to the arms trade. 
Britain and France were not the only powers involved 
in the Indian Ocean, however, for the united States had a 
growing role in world trade. While The United States had no 
colonial ambitions in the Middle East, her commercial 
activity led to the signing of a treaty with Muscat in 1833 
that undercut any possible legal monopoly by the two 
European states. This agreement was Muscat's first treaty 
directly with a Western state, [24] as the earlier 
agreements had been signed with British and French colonial 
officials. A similar commercial treaty was not signed with 
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Britain until 1839 and with France in 1844. [25] The Treaty 
allowed the United States to send a consul to Muscat, and 
established the rules for future relations. It is of 
particular importance that the Treaty was requested not by 
the United states, but by Said. [26] 
It is probable, given Said's desire to balance British 
and French influence, that he sought relations with the 
United States as a counter to. both European powers. And if 
this was his goal, he was successful, for this Treaty helped 
insure Oman a legal status not available to the other states 
of the Gulf. 
The next importan~ step in securing international 
protection for Oman's legal independence was a commercial 
treaty with France, sigried on November 17, 1844, by Captain 
Romain-Desfosses and Said. It was similar to a treaty signed 
with the British in 1839 granting commercial and 
extraterritorial rights. The Treaty granted trading and 
consular rights in Oman that France later used to protect 
the arms trade. These included the right to "purchase, sell 
or rent land, houses or warehouses" in the Sultan of 
Muscat's territory. Any "premises occupied by the French, 
or by persons in their service" was protected by the Treaty 
and could not be "forcibly entered without the permission of 
the French Consul." [27] In addition: 
ART. 4. The subjects of the Sultan of 
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Maskat, actually in the service of the French, 
shall enjoy the same privileges which are granted 
to the French themselves; but ••• (convicted 
criminals lost such protection) ••• 
ART. 5. The two ••• parties acknowledge 
reciprocally the right of appointing Consuls to 
reside in each other's dominions, ••• and such 
Consuls shall at all times be placed on the 
footing of 'the Consuls of the most favored 
nations. • •• The French Consul shall be at 
liberty to hoist the French flag over his house. 
[28] 
Said was able to maintain his independence fairly well 
until his death in 1856. Unfortunately for the unity of his 
state, his sons Thwaini and Majid each claimed the entire 
succession. The British were not willing to allow a civil 
war to be fought between Muscat and Zanzibar across the 
Indian Ocean, and they moved to prevent the fight from 
developing. 
The rivals for the throne agreed to arbitration by the 
British India Government, and in 1861 Lord Canning, Viceroy 
of India, issued his Award. The Omani empire was partitioned 
into a rich African section ruled from Zanzibar, and the 
poor Arabian/Persian section ruled from Muscat. [29] 
The Canning Award called for an annual payment of 
40,000 Maria Theresa Talers ($MT, equal to £8,500) by the 
newly created Sultan of Zanzibar to the Sultan of Muscat, to 
compensate for his loss of income from the African sections 
of the combined state. The payment was "not to be 
understood as a recognition of the dependence of Zanzibar 
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upon Muscat." In exchange for the money, the Sultan of 
Muscat abandoned "all claims upon Zanzibar." [30] 
The effect of the Award on Oman was to be dramatic. 
The British had influenced the internal politics of the 
Sultanate during Said's reign, but not decisively. [31] 
Following the Award, Britain was drawn deeply into the 
affairs of Oman, for after 1866, she assumed responsibility 
for payment of the money. The Award became vital to any 
pretender, both economically and politically. British 
payment of the subsidy to a claimant served as recognition 
of his position, and no sultan held power long when it was 
withheld. British support kept unpopular Sultans in power, 
while the lack of British support led to the fall of popular 
rulers. [32] 
The Canning Award soon became an issue between Britain 
and France, for under France's 1844 Treaty with Oman, her 
legal rights in the Sultanate were equal to those of 
Britain. In 1860, French interest in obtaining a large 
building for their use in Zanzibar aroused British concern. 
The British Ambassador to France told the French that 
Britain would agree to no limit on Zanzibar's independence 
or to a foreign power gaining territory there. The conflict 
between supporting Zanzibar's independence while limiting 
that country's right to sell land certainly escaped both the 
British and the French. 
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The French Foreign Minister, M. Thouvenel, said France 
had no such interests and agreed to a document, signed March 
10, 1862 by which both nations guaranteed that neither would 
seek territory from Muscat or Zanzibar. [33] The Agreement 
implicitly accepted the Canning Award. It' was short but 
vital to the future independence of Oman, with the British 
and French stating that: 
••• taking into consideration the importance of 
maintaining the independence of His Highness the 
Sultan of Muscat and of His Highness the Sultan of 
Zanzibar, have thought it right to engage 
reciprocally to respect the independence of these 
Sovereigns. [34] 
In one of the stranger twists that occurred between 
British officials in London and India, the Government of 
India was not told of the agreement until 1890, after it 
suggested a British Protectorate over Oman. The Agreement 
prevented a full protectorate, and thus saved Oman from a 
direct take-over by the British. It also served in part as 
the basis for France's involvement in Oman at the end of the 
Century. [35] Because of French treaty rights in Muscat, 
Britain's influence in the Gulf did not go unchallenged. 
EUROPEAN RIVALRY AND THE FRENCH FLAG 
The shifting of European alliances and the settlement 
of African colonial matters had, by 1890, led to a 
rapprochement between Britain and Germany. This in turn, 
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strengthened the alliance between Russia and France. 
Russia's primary concern was British action, mainly in the 
Middle East, while France was chiefly worried about Germany. 
France, however, was engaged in colonial rivalry with 
Britain, and a Franco-Russian agreement was reached in 
August, 1891. [36] As a part of the general entente, France 
and Russia decided to act together to limit British power in 
the Gulf. Both sent warships to visit Muscat. [37] 
The French tried three inter-related approaches to 
disrupt British influence in Oman and the Gulf. First, they 
tried to gain a coaling station in Muscat; second, they 
issued the French flag to Omani vessels, knowing that it 
would be used to protect the slave and arms trades; and 
third, they supported and encouraged the arms trade through 
Djibouti and Muscat. They supported these attacks on British 
influence with anti-British propaganda, printed in Arabic 
and distributed throughout the Gulf. [38] The major facts of 
the flag dispute are simply stated. 
Around the time of the 1891 Franco-Russian agreement, 
French consuls at Aden, Obock, and Zanzibar began giving 
French sailing papers and flags to Omanis (mainly from Sur) • 
J 
The action was connected to the colonial and imperial 
faction in the French Chamber of Deputies, and in 1892 a 
member of ,that group, M. Deloncle, demanded the appointment 
of a French consul at Muscat "to keep a register of French 
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protected subjects." Deloncle believed that a strong French 
position in the Gulf would allow cooperation with Russia, 
and would encourage a possible Franco-Russian alliance. 
[39] 
The Foreign Ministry agreed, and in 1894 the new 
French Consul arrived in Muscat. Paul Ottavi was to serve in 
the Gulf until 1902, when he was transferred to the Zanzibar 
consulate. Kumar describes Ottavi as "an accomplished 
diplomat with a flair for intrigue", then adds: "Against him 
the Government of India pitted a series of officers whose 
diplomatic experience was limited to the congenial task of 
twisting the tails of the princes of India." [40] Ottavi 
soon began to issue French sailing papers and the French 
flag to Omani dhows. 
Sultan Faisal ibn Turki was at first afraid that the 
French would try to establish a protectorate over the Omanis 
to whom they had issued sailing papers, and that they might 
try to detach Sur from the Sultanate. In early 1895, 
however, Faisal was faced with a rebellion by conservative 
Ibadi forces wanting to re-unite Oman and Zanzibar. The 
rebels seized Muscat and forced Faisal into a harbor fort. 
He asked the British for aid, and was refused on grounds 
that British policy was neutrality, unless Indian interests 
were involved. Faisal appeased his enemies, but did not 
forget Britain's refusal to come to his aid. Kumar states 
S6 
that there is no direct evidence revealing Ottavi's role in 
the 1895 rebellion, but believes that the French Consul 
offered the Sultan military aid. Soon after Faisal's 
appeasement of the rebels, and their departure from Muscat, 
a French warship arrived. [41] 
Landen, citing French diplomatic papers, provides more 
information on these important events: 
•••Ottavi offered to help the Sultan ward off 
Masqat's attackers and had the gunboat TROUDE sent 
to the city. TROUDE arrived too late to actively 
support the sultan but the incident indicated 
France's good will, as well as the power at her 
disposal and ushered in a four-year period of 
French ascendancy in the court of Sultan Faysal. 
[42] 
During these years, the arms trade grew in volume and 
importance. Anglo-French colonial rivalry threatened to 
break into outright war during the Fashoda Crisis four years 
after the visit of the French warship to Muscat. The Boer 
War, however, pre-occupied the British between 1899 and 1902 
and helped keep them from devoting time to the Gulf and 
Arabia. By the time the British could again turn to the Gulf 
and the arms trade, both France and Britain had begun to see 
Germany as their chief danger. 
The impending alliance did not, of course, end 
problems in the Gulf. In May, 1903, fear of a Russian effort 
to gain a port in the Gulf led the British Foreign Minister, 
Lord Lansdowne, to make a declaration in the House of Lords 
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on the British position in the Gulf: 
••• our policy should be directed in the first 
place to protect and promote British trade in 
these waters. In the next place I do not ••• 
suggest, that these efforts should be directed 
toward the exclusion of the legitimate trade of 
other Powers •••• In the third place - I say 
without hesitation we should regard the 
establishment of a naval base or a fortified port 
in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very 
grave menace to British interests, and we should 
certainly resist it with all the means at our 
disposal. [43] 
The Russian danger was soon removed. With the 
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in January, 1904 - and 
Russia's defeat in the war - Russia was effectively removed 
as a significant factor in the Gulf. In addition, 
negotiations had been started in 1903 by Britain and France 
that led to the signing of the Anglo-French Entente in 
April, 1904. While the Oman dispute was not directly 
included in the Entente, it was agreed to submit the dispute 
over use of the French flag by Omanis to the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration at the Hague. With the German threat in 
Europe, problems in the Gulf became of secondary importance, 
while the Entente was primary. [44] 
The Hague Court issued its decision [45] on August 8, 
1905. The result of these rulings was to void any papers 
issued after 1892 to persons who had not themselves been 
French proteges before 1862. The Court also ruled that the \ 
1844 French-Omani Treaty only extended extraterritorial 
581 
protection to persons who were "in the employ of French 
citizens", and that the dhow owners simply flying the French 
flag were not in that classification. [46] The Court added 
that to extend extraterritorial protection to persons not 
covered by the 1844 Treaty would limit the independence of 
Muscat, and thus violate the 1862 Anglo-French agreement 
protecting the Sultanate. However, if a dhow met all of the 
conditions established by the Court and was entitled to fly 
the French flag, it would be protected by that flag in 
Muscati waters. That protection, however, did not extend to 
the owners or crew when ashore, and French papers could not 
be inherited. 
In the historical and legal dispute over naval visit 
and search, the French had won. Vessels flying the French 
flag were still exempt from the jurisdiction of anyone but 
the French when at sea. As Busch phrases it, "Britain won 
on land, France at sea." [47] And this meant that F~ance 
had lost in the political struggle for influence in Oman. 
Her right to issue her flag to Omani sailors had been 
effectively ended. 
Landen argues that the 1894-1904 flag dispute in Oman 
led to two major results. First, the Sultan was shown how 
strong Britain was in the Gulf, and was forced more directly 
under British influence. This helped with control of the 
arms trade. Second, Oman remained technically independent, 
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never becoming as dependent upon Britain as the Gulf states 
of Arabia. Oman was saved from the direct protectorate 
desired by the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon. [48] 
In terms of the international politics of Europe, the 
dispute was a minor obstruction to the developing 
Anglo-French Entente. [49] Once the pressure of events in 
Europe appeared to mandate that alliance, the dispute over 
use of the French flag and French encouragement of the arms 
trade were solved with relative speed. The solutions came, 
however, only after the French had significantly supported 
the arms trade for nearly two decades in an effort to strike 
at the British position in the area. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PRIVATE ARMS TRADE 
The international arms trade had two major elements: 
the private trade, between individuals and companies; and 
the governmental trade, the purchase of arms by governments 
or the direct distribution of arms by governments. Of the 
two, the private shippers were responsible for the largest 
part of the trade to Arabia. The dealers were primarily 
British or French, with Belgian and other Europeans engaged 
from time to time. Once the arms were in the region, Arab 
vessels from around the Peninsula delivered many of them to 
their final ports of destination. The next three chapters 
examine the private trade in detail, concluding with a 
discussion of the distribution routes within Arabia. 
THE EARLY PATTERN OF THE ARMS TRADE 
The arms trade to the Arabian Peninsula fed through 
two main entrepots: Djibouti and Muscat. The major route for 
European guns was through the Suez Canal to Djibouti, and 
then on to Muscat. While weapons were shipped from both 
ports directly to the Peninsula, most international concern 
centered not on the Arabian section of the traffic, but on 
shipments to European colonies in Africa. The British became 
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particularly concerned with arms reaching the Northwest 
Frontier of India. It is, in fact, because of British 
concern over the threat to India that we have much of the 
information available on the arms traffic to the Peninsula. 
The British first began to recognize the threat during 
and shortly after the Third Afghan War of 1878-81. Weapons 
captured from the tribesmen of the Northwest Frontier were 
traced to India: they had been shipped by sea from Bombay to 
the Persian coast, and then moved overland to Afghanistan. 
As a result of these findings, the British Government of 
India banned the export, or re-export, of arms from India, 
as reported by Lorimer: 
In 1880, when it was placed beyond doubt that 
large quantities of percussion caps exported from 
India to' Persia were reaching the Afghan troops at 
Herat and elsewhere, the Government of India ••• 
instructed the Government of Bombay to abstain 
from granting licenses for the export of heavy 
consignments of arms and ammunition to Persian 
Gulf Ports, and to watch carefully the import of 
such articles at Karachi and on the coast to the 
westward. On the 1st October in the same year a 
notification was published by the Government of 
India to legalize the detention at Indian ports of 
cargos of arms and ammunitions of war consigned to 
the Persian Gulf from other countries. [1] 
While there was no "large or systematic trade ••• as, 
yet ••• in the Gulf", the British encouraged the Shah of 
Persia to ban the export of percussion caps from his country 
in 1881. Lorimer asserts that the Shah had become interested 
in "the purely Persian aspect of the question", so that 
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later in the same year he also prohibited the importation of 
arms and ammunition into his country. [2] The suggestion 
that the Shah acted in his own interest, and not primarily 
that of Britain, is reasonable. Keppel reports that during 
this period (and until 1897) the trade was "chiefly confined 
to Persia and the countries at the head of the Gulf and on 
its southern shore", most of it through Bushire, and that 
many of the guns imported to Persia were purchased by the 
Bakhtiari tribe of the southern mountains. [3] It was 
clearly in the Shah's interest to try to stop modern arms 
from reaching a powerful tribe that regularly opposed his 
central authority. 
Following the Shah's order, the British Resident at 
Bushire warned "the principal firms doing business there 
under British protection" of the arms trade ban. Despite 
the new Persian law, and the warning from the Resident, the 
trade grew. In 1884 a "Persian Armenian firm under British 
protection," Messers A. and T.J. Malcom, began to import 
guns at Bushire. They were joined in the trade three years 
later by "Messers. Fracis, Times and Co., a Parsi and 
English house." But not all of the trade was in British 
hands, for in 1881 a French company at Muhammareh imported a 
shipment of breech-loading rifles and ammunition. 
Strangely, the shipment was "first seized by the local 
authorities, but was subsequently returned and sold off by 
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the owners at a very low price." [4] Busch confirms the 
laxity, and says that the Shah's ban was not enforced. 
Thus, only British and Indian firms were likely affected at 
all. [5] 
The Arabian section of this early trade may have been 
nearly as important as the Persian, for Keppel maintains 
that: 
At the same time, we may be sure that large 
quantities of rifles found their way into the 
possession of the semi-independent nomad tribes of 
the Arabian interior, especially among those 
chiefs who feared the aggressive designs of their 
powerful neighbor, Turkey. [6] 
The trade was growing, and shifting slowly from 
percussion caps to more modern arms. The total trade at 
Muscat was "now considerable," and danger to the Northwest 
Frontier was again feared. Both the size and nature of the 
trade were investigated in 1891 by Sir Robert Sandeman, 
Agent for the Governor-General of India in Baluchistan. 
Sandeman found that guns were being imported mainly at the 
ports of Gwadar and Chahbar on the Makran and southern 
Persian coasts, and secondarily at Ormara (Makran) and 
Muscat. The guns were apparently being shipped from 
Zanzibar, and were old smooth-bore American muskets of 
-little value." In addition, the numbers were small, for at 
Gwadar only about 300 a year were being imported. There may 
have been a greater immediate threat from the residue of the 
67 
Indian trade, for "There was also a considerable importation 
of lead, gunpowder and percussion caps on the Makran coast, 
chiefly from Bombay." [7] 
The British reaction was to demand that the Sultan of 
Muscat, who still had sovereignty over Gwadar, ban the arms 
trade in that port. On March 3, 1891, the Sultan "at the 
instance of the Government of India" issued a proclamation 
forbidding "the importation and exportation of arms and 
ammunition at Gwadar." [8] The Shah of Iran was also led to 
renew and strengthen his 1881 ban on the trade, because of 
continued trade by British and Parsi arms dealers in Tehran. 
Until the l890s, most of the arms trade in the Indian 
Ocean had been directed toward Africa, where the demand was 
large. Demand from the Gulf, however, increasingly drew the 
traders north. The geographical shift from Africa is first 
noted by Lorimer in connection with the refusal of the 
Government of Bombay in 1888 to permit transshipment of 
"1,477 guns, 44 pistols, and 32,050 bullets at Zanzibar for 
Bahrain." [9] The shifting of the trade continued, and was 
accompanied by the growth of the trade from Europe through 
the Suez Canal. 
SHIFT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRAFFIC TO ARABIA 
Several major factors encouraged development of the 
direct arms trade from Europe to Arabia, and determined the 
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timing of its growth. 
First, the logistics of shipping from Europe became 
easier with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the 
growth of trade through the Canal in succeeding years. In 
the first years after the Canal came into service, however, 
Aden was the only coaling station available on the Red Sea 
route, ensuring an advantage for the British. This changed 
in the years immediately preceding the growth of the arms 
trade in the region. 
France had purchased Cbock (on the north coast of the 
Gulf of Tadjoura, across from the later French base of 
Djibouti) in 1859. Nothing substantial was done with the 
land until the early l880s, when colonial wars in Indo-China 
and Madagascar, required a coaling station under direct 
French control that would end her ships' dependence on Aden. 
In 1881 a trading company, the Compagnie Franco-Ethiopienne, 
established a coaling station and factory at Cbock. Three 
other French firms soon followed: the Societe Fran~ais 
d'Cbock and the Factoreries Fran~aises in 1882, and the 
Compagnie Mesnier in 1883. Because of the geographical 
limits of Cbock, France moved her main base across the Gulf 
to Djibouti in 1888. [10] The development of Cbock and 
Djibouti was spurred when the British reacted to the 1884 
Tonkin affair by closing Aden to French warships in January, 
1885. The French were forced to re-examine their need for a 
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dependable coal station in the region, and decided to 
develop Obock and Djibouti. [11) Between them, the two ports 
were vital to the arms trade, with Djibouti rapidly becoming 
the major transshipment point for weapons imported from 
Europe. 
Second, as discussed above, the design of military 
rifles developed rapidly in this period, with guns recently 
placed in service quickly becoming obsolete. The major 
technical change affecting the arms trade around 1890 was 
the conversion from black-powder to smokeless powder. 
Following the French introduction of the new powder in 1887, 
all major European powers were forced to put new weapons in 
service, and as with any extensive conversion, the old 
stocks of weapons entered the international market. Many 
were repaired and shipped from Belgium at this time. [12] 
And many of them reached Arabia and the Gulf. 
The danger from the flow of old military rifles into 
colonial territory was noted by a British missionary in 
Uganda, writing to the British Consul-General at Zanzibar in 
April, 1888. Wh~le his comments deal with Africa, the danger 
would soon extend to Arabia and the Northwest Frontier of 
India. 
The fact that almost all the European Powers 
being at present about to adopt magazine rifles, 
will not be without its effect on East Africa. 
Discarded Martini-Henry, Mauser, Gras and other 
breech-loaders will now be poured into the 
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Zanzibar market and unless prompt measures are 
taken to the contrary these will soon be in the 
hands of all the tribes of the interior. [13] 
Closer to Arabia, the obsolescence of the Ottoman 
stocks of Sniders and Martinis, and their replacement with 
Mausers between 1887 and 1893, made the older weapons 
available for use by provincial forces and for distribution 
to client tribes in the peninsula, as discussed in Chapter 
VII. This influx of breech-loaders would have driven rival 
tribes and political groups to also seek modern arms. 
Third, the arms embargo imposed by the Government of 
India apparently closed a major regional source of weapons, 
requiring a turn to European sources of supply. During the 
mid-nineteenth century, the United States had dominated the 
international arms market because of its lead in 
manufacturing technology. By the late l880s, however, the 
change to smokeless powder allowed the Europeans to dominant 
the mar ke t • [ 14 ] 
Fourth, the decline in the traditional shipping 
industry in the Gulf forced local sailors to find other 
cargoes if they were to survive. Muscat's former prosperity 
had been largely based on her role in commerce as a regional 
entrepot, but European steamers made direct shipment from 
India and Europe both possible and cheaper. During the 
decade from 1862 to 1872 the traditional entrepot system was 
destroyed by a combination of the steamers and the split of 
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the Sultanate after the Canning Award. By the l890s, a large 
percentage of the local and regional trade was being carried 
by the foreign steamers, and the local shippers were being 
put out of business. [15] 
With the decline of Oman's "legal" shipping trade in 
the 1870-1900 era, only the smuggling and slaving ports 
remained prosperous. Landen cites the examples of Wudam and 
Sur: 
Wudam, in 1840 a tiny al-Batinah settlement of 
palm frond huts with approximately 100 people, by 
1900 had become a smuggling center counting 40 
seagoing vessels which frequented other Gulf 
ports, India and the Yemen. More important as a 
center of illicit commerce was Sur •••• After the 
1860s, with the virtual disappearance of the 
sultan's navy, Masqat's hold on the port became 
almost nonexistent. As seamen flocked there to 
escape taxes and supervision, Sur became the 
largest sail port in Oman during the late 
nineteenth century. Its population of 12,000 made 
it the largest single city in Oman in 1900, ••• At 
the time, over 100 seagoing ships were based at 
Sur, but even this figure represented a drop from 
the total of 300 baghalas reportedly operating out 
of the port in the 1830s. [16] 
Fifth, the East African arms trade began to die after 
the General Act of Brussels, signed in July, 1890, banned 
that section of the traffic. Lorimer suggests the 
connection: 
On the East Coast of Africa the arms trade was 
an auxiliary of the slave trade, and a blow was 
struck at it in the General Act of the Brussels 
Conference ••• The contraction of the African 
market compelled manufacturers and exporters to 
seek another outlet for their goods, and the 
unfortunate result was the diversion of the 
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African arms trade to the Persian Gulf, which, 
lying altogether above the 20th. parallel of north 
latitude, was not subject to the arms clauses of 
the Brussels Act. [17] 
Some idea of the volume of the African trade just 
before it began to shift toward the Gulf is given in British 
records from the Zanzibar Consulate. In the first half of 
1888, over 37,000 long guns (called only "fire-arms," but 
distinguished from pistols), three million caps, over 70,000 
cartridges, and other military supplies, passed through the 
Zanzibar Customs House. [18] The result of this high volume 
of trade was clear in the interior of Africa, for one Arab 
leader near Stanley Falls was reported to have 10,000 rifles 
available. [19] This flood of weapons from the Africa trade 
was soon to sweep toward the Persian Gulf. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE PRIVATE ARMS TRADE IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION 
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND EFFORTS AT ITS CONTROL 
When the arms trade first shifted north from East 
Africa, it ran primarily from Zanzibar to Muscat. Between 
April 1890 and June 1892 some 11,500 guns were landed at 
Muscat. Lorimer outlines the trade: 
A large proportion of these were brought by the 
Sultan of Zanzibar's steamers, and the three 
principal Khojar merchants at Matrah were now 
engaged in the trade. Direct shipments from 
Europe had also begun, and at the end of 1890 a 
consignment of 420 Enfields from Austria-Hungary 
for Khojar merchants at Gwadar was stopped at 
Karachi. More than half the arms received were, 
even at this period, re-exported from Masqat to 
Kuwait, Bahrain and other ports in the Persian 
Gulf: thus early was the development of Masqat 
into the chief arms emporium of the Middle East 
foreshadowed. [1] 
The trade became far more complex as time passed, and 
in 1913 Lt. Col. C.C.R. Murphy, then British naval and 
military intelligence officer for the Gulf, wrote about the 
years immediately before the opening of a bonded arms 
warehouse at Muscat (1912): 
The arms traffic problem in the Gulf was like a 
jig-saw puzzle, with pieces scattered about up and 
down the Persian and Arab littorals, in Mekran, 
Fars, Arabistan, and Mesopotamia. [2] 
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To trace the traffic in the Gulf, and to try to 
determine the numbers and types of weapons remaining in 
Arabia, Muscat, and general activities and controls 
throughout the Gulf will now be examined. Chapter VI will 
review the arms trade in the other Arabian ports of the Gulf 
and in the Red Sea. 
THE ARMS TRAFFIC THROUGH MUSCAT AND THE OMANI PORTS 
AND GENERAL CONTROL MEASURES 
Sir Robert Sandeman had found the arms trade 
insignificant, and still anchored at Zanzibar, when he 
investigated about 1889. Matters changed quickly as the 
direct Europe trade grew. By 1891 over a quarter of 
Muscat's import income, worth about 1,000,000 Rupees, came 
from the arms trade, and firms engaged in the trade could 
make a profit of between 20 and 30 percent. [3] 
Lorimer stresses the Sultan of Oman's motives for 
allowing the arms trade: 
Year by year the trade continued to expand at 
Masqat, where it was in all respects legal and was 
favorably regarded by the Sultan on account of the 
large profit he derived from the import duty on 
arms. (4) 
The only immediate British reaction came because of 
report~ that arms from Muscat were being re-exported to the 
Somali and Banadir coasts of East Africa. The British 
pressured the Sultan, and he acted "to satisfy the scruples 
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of the British Government" by prohibiting - in April, 1892 ­
the re-export of arms from "his territories" to Africa. 
International politics began to playa part in the traffic, 
however, when the Sultan refused to grant British war-ships 
the right to search Omani vessels for arms "from a fear that 
his subjects might be led to seek French maritime protection 
in increasing numbers." [5] As a result of this, the ban on 
the Muscat to Africa traffic had little effect. 
The arms traffic at Muscat increased rapidly, and by 
1895 was considered by the British to have assumed 
"formidable dimensions," for during 1895-96 an estimated 
4,350 rifles and 604,000 cartridges were imported there. In 
the next year, 1896-96, the trade grew further to some 
20,000 rifles and approximately 2,777,000 cartridges. All 
of 
~ 
the rifles entering Muscat were breech-loaders, for the 
old muzzle-loaders could no longer be sold in the region. 
Lorimer mentions specifically that Sniders and 
Martini-Henries were among the guns shipped to the Gulf. The 
timing of this European sale of older single-shot 
black-powder weapons is consistent with the earlier 
conversion by European armies to magazine-fed rifles and 
smokeless powder, and the resulting availability of surplus 
arms for the international market. The "cost price of a 
rifle was at this time £3.10.0 to £4" with a "selling price" 
at Bushire of between £8 and £10. Two pounds of this was 
77 
used tobr ibe local Persian officials. [6] 
The guns imported into Muscat during these years 
(1891-97) were almost "entirely of British origin," with, 
however, a "good many Belgian rifles made at Liege" and "a 
small number" of guns from France. [7] The main arms dealer 
in Muscat was the British firm of Joyce and Kynoch. 
Two-thirds of the British weapons were imported directly 
from London, likely through the Canal with a possible stop 
at Aden, while the remaining third were transshipped from 
Bushire. The German Government, it is interesting to note, 
apparently prohibited Germans from joining the Muscat trade 
for fear that the guns would end up in Africa. [8] France, 
with no major colonies on Africa's East Coast would not have 
felt a similar danger in that part of the world. Lorimer 
reports the distribution of the weapons imported at Muscat: 
Some were disposed of locally to tribesmen from 
the interior of 'Oman, some to visitors from other 
parts of the Gulf, and some to Nakhudas (i.e.,
captains: author's comment) of coasting vessels; 
but the greater quantity were re-shipped to 
Trucial 'Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait, or were 
smuggled into Persian and Turkish territory in the 
Gulf concealed in bales of goods and cases of 
Halwa or dry limes; while a few were even 
dispatched to minor ports in the Red Sea at which 
there were no customs houses. [9] 
After its first flurry of activity against the arms 
traffic in 1880-81, the Government of India largely ignored 
the arms trade in the Gulf. The rapid growth in the number 
and quality of arms imported in the l890s soon drew the 
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attention of the Indian military command. In late 1896, 
following a revolt by the tribes on the Indian-Afghanistan 
border, the British "became desirous of knowing the 
destination of the enormous quantities of military material 
which were now being poured into the Gulf." [10] It was 
found that 60 percent of the arms entering the region ended 
up in Persia, 25 percent in the "Turkish possessions in the 
Gulf," and 15 percent in "non-Turkish Arabia." 
While the investigation was underway, London and 
Government of India officials debated whether or not large 
numbers of guns were reaching the Northwest Frontier. The 
men in the Gulf, however, saw a clear danger. The British 
Persian Gulf Resident at Bushire, Lt. Col. M.J. Meade, wrote 
unofficially to Curzon (who was not yet Viceroy of India), 
that "the blood of our poor fellows lies at the door of 
those who have carried on this traffic." [11] He officially 
reported to W.J. Cunningham, Secretary of the Foreign 
Department of the Government of India, on the danger to the 
Gulf itself: 
Unless the arms trade is put a stop to, the 
whole of the population on both sides of the Gulf 
will very shortly be armed with breach loaders, 
and have plenty of ammunition, and this will ere 
long become a serious danger to the peace of the 
country, and possibly to ourselves. [12] 
Figure 3 shows the growth of that part of the Muscat 
trade that passed through Omani customs between 1895 and 
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Figure 3. Graph of legal arms imports at Muscat, 
comparing value in pounds sterling of arms trade and 
non-arms trade from 1896-97 till 1913-14. 
Data From: Busch, C.B., Britain and the Persian Gu1(, 
1894-1911, Berkeley, U. of Calif. Press, 1967, page 394. 
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1914. As Busch notes, this represents the legal trade, and 
does not include the unreported smuggled arms. [13] This 
information does, however, give a general feel for the 
growth of the arms trade through Muscat. 
The situation was, indeed, becoming more serious as 
the volume of the trade grew. Phillips, who was an advisor 
to the Sultan of Oman in the 1950s and may have based his 
figures on Omani records, states that in 1897 over 30,000 
breach-loaders were imported into Muscat. He identifies the 
arms as coming mainly from British and French traders, and 
mentions by name "Messrs. Joyce and Kynoch" and "the 
notorious Baluchi arms trader Ali Musa Khan." Phillips 
states that the traders made an eventual profit of twenty to 
thirty percent on the arms. The trade brought the Sultan of 
Oman revenue of about $MT 4,000 per. month. [14] Muscat 
had become, in Lorimer's words, "the greatest market for 
arms of precision in the Middle East." [15] 
Using the British estimates cited above, this would 
mean that some 7,500 rifles were imported through Muscat to 
the "Turkish possessions in Arabia," while another 4,500 
reached "non-Turkish" Arabia. However, as the estimated 
division of the arms in the region was made at a time when 
shipments were still being made directly to Persia, it is 
likely that a higher percentage of the 1897 shipments ended 
up in Arabia. It is clear, however, that the majority of the 
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guns reaching the Gulf were Martinis, and Lorimer even 
identifies one tribal leader of southern Persia as a 
"Martini Khan." [16] 
The theft of ammunition from Royal Navy ships at 
Muscat gives additional information on the types of rifles 
then on the market in Oman. In 1898 the British authorities 
recovered, "chiefly from the bazaar," 3,800 Martini-Henry 
and 100 Lee-Metford cartridges. Lorimer does not say how 
much ammunition was stolen and not recovered. The Martini 
still predominated, but the new magazine-fed Lee-Metford had 
now entered the market. [17] 
The British moved against the arms trade, with their 
main attack at first directed against the trade between 
England and Persia that endangered the Northwest Frontier. 
The Shah of Persia, concerned about the power of the 
gun-running tribes of southern Persia, agreed to enforce his 
earlier ban on the importation of arms. In December 1897 he 
agreed to the confiscation of all arms that had been 
illegally imported into his country, and granted the British 
the right to search Persian merchant ships in the Gulf for 
arms. Any confiscated weapons were to be given to the Shah. 
[18] 
The Shah then joined the British in warning the Sultan 
of Oman that the import of arms into Persia was illegal. 
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The Resident, Lt. Col. Meade, approached the Sultan to 
obtain his consent. The Sultan was reluctant to issue a 
proclamation because it would reduce his revenue from the 
import duty on arms. Strong British pressure, and the 
expectation that he would be given the confiscated weapons, 
led the Sultan to comply. In January 1898, Sultan Faisal 
issued a proclamation that allowed British and Persian ships 
to search vessels flying their own, or Omani, flags when in 
Omani waters, and allowed the search of Omani vessels in 
Persian or Indian waters. Further, "if these arms and 
ammunition are intended for Indian and Persian ports, and if 
they are the property of British, Persian or Muscat 
subjects" they could be confiscated. [19] 
The timing was important, for the steamer BALUCHISTAN 
was known to be on the way to Muscat with a large shipment 
of arms: British officials wanted the authority to intercept 
her. [20] The vessel was owned by the London firm of F.C. 
Strick & Company "(the Anglo-Arabian and Persian S.S. Co.)," 
and was a respectable 2,409 tons. The weapons were owned by 
Fracis, Times and Company. The arms had been "partly 
consigned to Persian ports," but because of the Shah's 
decree, the destination was changed to Muscat. The ship was 
intercepted by H.M.S. LAPWING outside of Muscat harbor in 
late January 1898, and the arms seized. Five hundred cases 
of arms, a total of 7,856 rifles and 700,000 rounds of 
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ammunition, were removed to the British Consulate. After 
several years' delay because of a legal challenge from 
Fracis, Times and Company, they were handed over to the 
Sultan. The Company lost two suits against the British 
Government, and was driven into bankruptcy. [21] 
The private arms merchants in Britain responded to the 
attacks on the trade by protesting to the Foreign Office in 
London. They were joined in the protests by ship owners, 
manufacturers, exporters, underwriters and others with a 
financial interest in the trade. Lorimer's disgust is clear 
from his reaction: 
The nefarious business itself was even depicted
in moving terms as an 'honest trade, carried on 
for nearly twenty years, and now threatened with 
extinction by the action of the British 
Government.' [22] 
The protests failed to prevent further attacks by the 
British government, and customs records at Muscat show a 
drop in the value of arms imported from Britain from £81,000 
in 1897-98 to £18,000 in 1898-99. [23] 
To control arms traders under their authority, the 
British passed two Acts in 1900. First, the Government of 
India issued an Arms Act that "prohibited the consignment of 
arms and ammunition to the Persian Gulf through Indian ports 
without transshipment, transshipment having already been 
made illegal in 1880." [24] There was little effect from 
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this action: the "bulk" of the weapons reaching the Gulf 
were shipped directly from Europe, and it was easy to ship 
all of them without stopping in Indian territory. Thus, the 
British Government itself passed the Arms Exportation Act, 
allowing "the Sovereign to prohibit by proclamation the 
export of arms and ammunition from the United Kingdom" to 
any place where "they might be employed against British 
troops or subjects." Enforcement was hampered, however, 
because the Admiralty ruled that it did not have the power 
to search "even British vessels for arms on the high seas," 
but could only act in British, Persian or Omani waters. 
The effect of the acts is not certain. Between 
1900-01 and 1902-03, Muscat customs records show a sharp 
drop in the numbers of British arms reaching the Gulf. 
British participation in the arms trade appears, however, to 
have then risen and fallen several times in the next decade 
and a half. (Figure 4) Busch, does not define the customs 
term "British", but implies that it refers to the ownership 
of the arms and the nationality of the importing firm, and 
not to the nationality of the delivering ship or to the 
national origin of the arms themselves. Busch took the 
customs records from the administrative reports of the 
British Persian Gulf Resident and the Political Agent at 
Muscat, and notes that they can give only a rough indication 
of the course of the trade because of fluctuations in 
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Figure 4. Graph of arms imports reported by Muscat 
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sterling of the trade of various nations from 
1895-96 till 19l3~14. 
Data From: Busch, C.B., Britain and the Persian 
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1967, page 394. 
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exchange rates, smuggling, and misleading or incomplete 
reporting of data. He believes, however, that the general 
trends and the relative trading positions of the European 
powers is accurate. [25] Used to compare the arms trade of 
.the European nations, the customs data casts a doubt upon 
Lorimer's repeated statement that British firms were being 
driven out of the Muscat arms trade. In all years reported, 
British trade exceeds that of France. And after French trade 
was effectively ended in 1911-12, British trade increased 
sharply. The apparently significant Belgian trade is 
scarcely mentioned by Lorimer, and the German is not 
mentioned at all. Both came after the main years covered by 
his work. 
The two British arms control acts had, in any case, 
little effect on the number of arms reaching the Gulf, and 
the main result was to ensure that arms would not be carried 
on British ships. The weapons imported to the Gulf, even 
when carried on British ships, were increasingly of 
non-British manufacture. The trade was not seriously 
hindered. It simply shifted to firms and vessels not under 
British authority. [26] The French were eager to pick up 
the trade abandoned by the British. 
In March, 1899, Monsieur Goguyer, a man who became the 
major French arms dealer in the Gulf, arrived in Muscat and 
opened his business. Goguyer had been a French diplomat in 
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Tunisia, and spoke Arabic, and his arms dealings "was backed 
by French newspapers and some influential politicians of the 
Colonial Party in Paris." [27] His background clearly raises 
the possibility the Goguyer was acting in a semi-official 
role in the Gulf, as part of a general French desire to 
discomfort the British. Goguyer told Indian merchants in 
Muscat that: "his operation would be exempt from British 
interference, as he would export arms purchased from him in 
native vessels flying the French flag." [28] In May, 
Goguyer traveled to Bahrein, apparently in an effort to 
expand his markets. His business was slowed by a lack of 
capital, but by 1901 it was increasing rapidly, and by 1903 
he had competition from a Russian firm and another French 
firm operating out of Djibouti. [29] The entry of the French 
firms into the arms trade in the Gulf was soon reflected in 
a shift of the nationality of manufacture of the weapons. 
When the trade began at Masqat the arms and 
ammunition imported, though a proportion were of 
Belgian manufacture, were exclusively of British 
provenance, but in 1899-1900 about one-seventh of 
the imports were from France, and by 1905 the 
proportion of French arms had risen to 
four- ten ths. [30] 
According to British diplomats at the Brussels Arms 
Conference, by 1908, the French share of the Muscat trade 
had risen to 49% of the total, the British had fallen to 24% 
while the Omani sector stood at 27%. Goguyer's firm was 
responsible for 60% of the French trade. [31] These figures 
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are different from those provided by the customs data. For 
1907-08, they show French trade as equal to 9.4% of the 
total arms trade; and for 1908-09, equal to 8.4% of the 
trade. The highest percentage of the arms passing through 
customs in these years are, in fact, attributed to Belgium a 
point not mentioned by Lorimer. The conflict may well be in 
appearance only, for a high proportion of the French trade 
was carried by dhows from Djibouti, and probably did not 
pass through customs. 
The size of Goguyer's operation in Muscat lends 
support to the diplomatic estimates that his share of the 
arms trade equalled 30% of the total trade (60% of the 
French 49% share of the trade). General B.H. Austin, 
assigned as British Naval Intelligence Officer in the Gulf 
in 1909, reports that in that year British authorities 
estimated that Goguyer's warehouse held "not less than 
100,000 arms of many different types, including most 
patterns of modern magazine rifles, and certainly not less 
than 10,000,000 rounds of ammunition for these arms." [32] 
This large a stock of weapons would have allowed the firm to 
continue in business after its imports declined during these 
years. 
As the nationality of the traders began to shift, the 
volume of the trade itself increased. For the five months 
from June through October, 1899, Lorimer reports that 
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"British subjects alone" sold at least 3,792 rifles at 
Muscat. During the first half of 1902, import duty was paid 
at Muscat on 8,732 rifles and 726,110 cartridges, and in 
"the year" 1904-05 Lorimer estimates that over 20,000 rifles 
were imported. [33] 
The trade also appears to have shifted slightly. In 
1896, as noted above, 60% of the arms entering the Gulf were 
shipped to Persia. In 1899 a British study at Muscat found 
that 55% of the weapons imported there had been shipped to 
Persia, while 5% were still in Oman and the remaining 40% 
had been shipped to Kuwait and Trucia1 Oman, presumably 
including Bahrain. [34] While this indicates a growth in the 
Arabian section of the trade, it must be remembered that 
many weapons shipped to Arabian ports were later exported to 
Persia. 
The Government of India proposed in 1902-03 that an 
international effort be made to control the arms trade. 
They suggested that those states with treaty rights in 
Muscat - France, the United States, and Holland - be asked 
to modify their treaties with the Sultan so that he could 
act to control the arms trade. The dispute over the use of 
the French flag by Omani vessels made this impossible, and 
the British turned to imposing such controls as they could. 
It was now generally illegal for arms to be imported into 
India, Persia, "Turkish" Arabia, Bahrein, Kuwait and British 
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and Italian Somaliland. For the British, then: "the contest 
resolved itself into a crusade against smuggling from Masqat 
to all neighboring countries." [35] The crusaders, of 
course, could not touch vessels protected by the French 
flag. 
Efforts to control the arms trade by requiring first 
British subjects (in 1898) and then Omani subjects (1900) to 
report any sale or purchase of arms failed to cut the trade, 
and seem only to have further shifted the trade to other 
nationalities. Even an order by the Sultan requiring a 
special permit for arms being shipped legally from Muscat to 
other Omani ports did little. In 1899, the British reported 
that "hardly a vessel left the harbor (i.e., Muscat) which 
did not carry arms for places abroad." [36] 
Possibly because of controls at Muscat, the main Omani 
port for the internal trade of the Batinah coast north of 
Muscat, and areas inland of the coast, appears to have been 
"Masna'ah." A caravan route then ran inland from the coast 
to Rustaq and Nizwa. In addition, Persian trade was often 
transshipped through Sohar. The Muscat trade was so vigorous 
that if there was not a Royal Navy ship at Muscat, there was 
a "general exodus" of native vessels carrying arms. [37] 
The level of the smuggling illustrates the difficulty with 
the customs information. 
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French activity in the Gulf was centered in Oman, and 
was tied in with the dispute over use of their flag and with 
the various Muscat treaties, discussed above. The French 
had, however, a more direct method of influencing the 
Sultan. Faisal ibn Turki, Sultan from 1888-1913, was seldom 
on good terms with the British, who regularly used the 
Canning Award subsidy to try to enforce their will. The 
British establishment of a Protectorate over Zanzibar in 
1890 had further increased Faisal's concern over British 
ambitions against his own territory. 
To meet his constant need for money, Faisal obtained 
numerous loans. By 1905, he was about $MT 100,000 in debt. 
When the British offered him $MT 20,000 to send his son on 
the pilgrimage to Mecca, he rejected their offer. Faisal 
turned instead to the non-British arms dealers of Muscat for 
money. In particular, he took loans from Goguyer several 
times. Even after the British Agent at Muscat was allowed 
to lend up to 20,000 rupees on his own authority, Faisal 
continued to borrow from the local market. The Sultan 
wished to avoid British control, and the arms dealers gave 
him an alternative source,of money. [38] The French loans 
also strengthened Faisal's interest in a continuation of the 
arms trade. 
Muscat's arms trade flourished. In 1906, some 45,000 
rifles and a million cartridges passed through the port. 
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British concern continued to center on the number of rifles 
that left Muscat and passed through Persia on the way to 
Afghanistan. In 1907, the Muscat Agent estimated that 200 
rifles a week were shipped to Makran (or 10,400 for the year 
through one section of the coast alone), and the total trade 
was high enough in 1908 for the Indian Chief of Staff to 
estimate that 30,000 rifles reached the Northwest Frontier 
in that year. [39] 
Other factors were at work, too, for following the end 
of the Boe~ War (1899-1902) , an old Lee-Enfield could be 
purchased from South African surplus for £ 6, and resold on 
the Northwest Frontier for £65-80. [40] The trade in the 
Lee-Enfields illustrates again two of the major aspects of 
the arms trade: the sale of surplus arms at the end of a 
major war1 and the disposal of obsolete weapons, for after 
the Boer War, the long Lee-Enfield was replaced (1907) in 
British service by the Short Model Lee-Enfield. [41] 
The arms control provisions of the General Act of 
Brussels (1890) were scheduled to be reviewed soon, and the 
Foreign Office began to look toward that conference for 
relief from the arms trade. Officials on the scene in the 
Gulf, however, did not see much real hope in an expansion of 
the arms control zone to the Red Sea and the Gulf. The 
Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Navy's East Indies Station, 
for example, advised the Admiralty not to expect an expanded 
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zone to have any effect, and noted that the presence of 
Djibouti within the existing Zone failed to hinder the 
traffic in that Port. [421 Without French co-operation, the 
trade could not be stopped. 
Even after the conference reconvened in 1908, there 
was a sharp division of opinion between the Foreign Office 
and officials in the Gulf. The British in the Gulf wanted to 
keep any international control group out of the region, 
which they saw as a primarily British area of concern. They 
also warned London that any real limit on the trade would 
require the approval of Sultan Faisal at Muscat, and that 
his assistance would only come if he were compensated for 
the loss of his income from the trade. When Italy pressed 
for the extension of controls, the British delegate sharply 
discouraged the proposal. However, if the French could be 
made to come around on the issue, it was clear that the 
British would agree to the extension of the control zone. 
[431 
The importance of the French role in the trade was 
made clear by the British delegate, Sir Arthur Hardinge, in 
a conversation with the French delegate, Count d'Ormesson. 
The Count responded that Goguyer had strong support in the 
Chamber of Deputies and in the French press, and that any 
discussions should be in private. Hardinge noted that only 
France stood in the way of an extension of the control 
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zone. [44] Goguyer's political protection was vital, in 
view of the important roll he played in the Muscat trade. 
During a recess in the conference, discussions centered on a 
French proposal to trade the British African colony of 
Gambia for French help in ending the arms trade at Muscat. 
This was not acceptable to Britain. The conference 
reconvened in May, 1909 long enough for an announcement that 
no agreement had been reached, and adjourned until fall. 
Private discussions failed to break the deadlock, and the 
conference finally ended on December 30, 1909. [45] 
The French appear to have been chiefly motivated by 
their political rivalry with Britain, though economic 
interests clearly played a part. Abdullah summarizes French 
action during the period: 
French citizenship and the French flag were 
granted to the inhabitants of Sur1 the French 
attempted' to establish a coal depot in Bandar 
Jissah, south of Muscat, for their maritime line1 
they conducted extensive anti-British propaganda1 
and they played a large part in the flourishing 
arms trade in Muscat. The principal aim of the 
French in all four activities was to undermine 
British influence and extend their own. [46] 
Undercutting another power's political position was 
not uncommon in Colonial rivalries. For example, during the 
l880s in East Africa, the Germans and the British apparently 
armed the tribes each other'S areas of interest. [47] The 
French were following an old tradition, as, it seems, were 
the British. 
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During the discussions of 1908-09, the British could 
not understand why the French were so willing to protect the 
activity of their arms dealers at Muscat. Part of the answer 
was found in the economic motive alone, for the dealers were 
wealthy and had high political connection. [48] There 
appears, however, to have been a special reason for the 
French support the arms trade in the Gulf: 
The French (i.e., the French Government) 
tolerated arms trading in the Gulf because of a 
similar British trade in Morocco, which allowed 
the infiltration of weapons through the Algerian 
frontiers. [49] 
Thus, France had apparently linked the Gulf trade with 
wider issues, and tit for tat has always been fair in power 
politics. 
Regardless of the Fr,ench motives for delay, India did 
not wait for diplomacy in Europe. At the end of his Appendix 
.on the Arms Trade, Lorimer reviews the status of the Gulf 
and Muscat trade in 1907: 
Since 1902 the arms trade has been nominally 
prohibited at every port, except Masqat, in the 
Gulfs of Persia and 'Oman; but smuggling and 
connivance at breaches of the law are so 
universally prevalent that arms and ammunition 
continue to be distributed from Masqat over the 
length and breadth of the Gulf region, ••• the 
importations at Masqat ••• are still on the same 
scale as before the general prohibition of the 
trade in 1902; but they now represent the whole, 
or nearly the whole, instead of part only of the 
trade. It has been proved, at the cost of immense 
expenditure of energy by British establishments, 
that the illegal dissemination of arms from the 
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free port of Masqat cannot be prevented, or even 
appreciably hindered, by naval means; also that 
measures, however efficacious, taken in British 
Baluchistan do not and cannot influence the course 
of the Afghan traffic; while officers who have 
studied the question on the spot in Persia agree
that the Government of that country are incapable 
••• of putting down the trade across Persia 
between Masqat and Afghanistan. [50] 
With the total trade at Muscat in 1908 of about 80,000 
rifles, India felt it could not wait for international 
negotiations: the number of imports reaching the Northwest 
Frontier had cut the price of a rifle in half, and the fears 
of well armed tribesmen fighting the frontier forces was 
growing. Early in 1909, the India Office asked for an 
increased Naval force to carry out a truly effective the 
blockade of the Persian coast. By the end of the year, the 
new ships were beginning to impose fairly effective controls 
against the trade, [51] and customs records show a drop in 
the trade from £237,650 in 1908-09 to £101,850 in 1901-10. 
The trade continued to fluctuate widely. [52] 
Lorimer's judgment of the blockade remained valid, 
however, particularly in view of its high cost. (In 1910 
the blockade cost £175,000). [53] The naval expenses can be 
compared with the value of the trade shown in the customs 
records. In 1907-08, a peak year, the legal trade was 
valued at £ 279,000, while in 1910-11 it fell to £ 68,000, a 
reduction of £ 211,000. [54] The naval blockade helped, but 
it was not cost effective. As long as the arms market was 
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open at Muscat, a large number of weapons would slip 
through. The new approach was to use the blockade to show 
, 
the Sultan that Britain could, if it chose to devote 
sufficient naval power tQ the, job, end the arms trade by 
itself, and then pressure him into concessions. At the 
I 
same, the growing Anglo-French alliance against Germany was 
aiding diplomatic action to end the arms trade: in 1910 
France agreed to a one year prohibition of the Muscat 
trade. As a part of any final agreement, however, the 
French demanded compensati~n for their arms dealers. [55] 
In ~ecember, 1910, an armed clash occurred at Dubai 
between sailors from H.M.S. HYACINTH and local Arabs. 
(Discussed below in Chapter VI.) One result of this crisis 
was to show the French how serious the British were about 
the arms trade in the Gulf. Early in 1913, France dropped 
the proposal to exchange of Gambia for helping end the arms 
trade, and suggested that the matter could be settled 
locally through compensation for the arms dealers. Before 
this offer could be fully considered, it was withdrawn, and 
the exchange of Gambia again demanded. This was 
unacceptable, and matters stalled. [56] 
Action was needed, for the French were responsible for 
a higher and higher percentage of the arms trade. Sir 
Arnold T. Wilson summarized the observations he made in 1911 
on the national origin of the arms and the arms traders in 
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the Gulf: 
I had ascertained, by examlnlng rifles and boxes 
of ammunition, that practically the whole trade 
was conducted by French firms, though many of the 
rifles and some of the ammunition were made in 
Germany. There was little British-made ammunition 
and very few British rifles. The few I saw 
antedated the South African war by several years 
and had probably passed through several hands and 
many countries. [57] 
with the French unwilling to help, even with the 
anti-German alliance in place, Percy Cox suggested a local 
solution. Be proposed that the Sultan of Muscat establish a 
bonded warehouse, effectively under British direction, to 
control the export of all arms from Muscat. After receiving 
approval, Cox wrote to Sultan Faisal in November, 1911. 
Cox's letter threatened to end "those cordial relations 
which have now so long existed between the British 
Government and Your Highness and your ancestors" if Faisal 
Qid not break relations with the arms dealers. The Sultan 
agreed to the warehouse and the new control regulations on 
condition that the British deal with any resulting action 
from the French; that the regulations not violate any of 
Oman's existing international treaties; that he be given 
time between the the announcement and enforcement of the 
regulations; and that he be compensated for the reduction in 
the income he received from the duty on arms. [58] 
After the preliminary agreement, it still took time to 
work out the details of the regulations, and to obtain 
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Faisal's signature. Cox was forced to promise, in writing, 
that Britain would "dispose of" any problems that might 
develop with other states: that the Sultan would be 
compensated for his losses: that the regulations would not 
hinder the importation of arms needed by Omanis: and that 
the agreement would not extend British rights to act within 
Omani territory. [59] 
The internal politics of Oman impelled Faisal's 
agreement to the warehouse. Underlying tribal and religious 
splits in the country were easily inflamed by events, and 
the tribes of Oman were already angry with the Sultan 
because of his co-operation with the British in ending the 
slave trade. Gertrude Bell, in an intelligence dispatch 
written in 1916, reported that one of the reasons Faisal had 
issued the regulations was to stop weapons from reaching his 
internal enemies. Faisal: "saw in the suppression of the 
arms trade ••• a distinct advantage to himself, since his 
rebellious subjects became unable to furnish themselves with 
weapons to use against him." [60] 
After additional details of the arms control measures 
were clarified, the Sultan issued the regulations for the 
warehouse in late June, 1911: 
Whereas large quantities of arms and ammunition 
are at present stored without proper control in 
private buildings distributed in this our town of 
Muscat ••• have resolved to remedy this state of 
affairs ••• by the construction and establishment 
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~f a special Customs Warehouse ••• for the storage 
iof arms and ammunition under safe precautions ••• 
IFirstly, on or about the 1st September next all 
iarms and ammunition or parts thereof imported into 
Imy territories will be taken directly from the 
isteamer to the Control •••• Secondly, similarly
iall arms dealers in my territories will be 
irequired to deposit stocks remaining in their 
ihands on 1st September in the said warehouse. 
i ••• [Thirdly, payment of duty] ••• Fourthly, the 
iwithdrawal of arms from the warehouse will be 
I regulated by the issue of special licenses, 
i prepared by the super intendent [of the warehouse] 
I and signed by myself. Fifthly, such licenses will 
I not be granted to traders, but only to approved 
_individual purchasers ••• on the production of 
, satisfactory proof that the number , quantity, and 
destination of the arms and ammunition, etc., to 
be withdrawn from the warehouse are free from 
justifiable objections. • •• [61] 
~ocal reaction to the controls was strong. The Sheikh 
of the Ibadhi sect: "roused the country by his preaching, in 
which he represented the arms warehouse as a device of the 
English to deprive the tribes of Oman of modern weapons .. . " 
In May, 1913, the Imam of the Hinawa tribes joined the 
rebellion. [62] The British sent two Rajput regiments from 
India in July, 1913, to defend Muscat and the-Sultan. The 
city was safe, but the Sultan clearly had little authority 
far beyond its gates. The civil war lasted until 1920. [63] 
Still, local problems could be controlled 
The French Consul also objected, however. He 
maintained that restrictions on trade were as illegal under 
the various Muscat treaties as complete prohibitions would 
be. His view was repeated by the French Ambassador in 
London. Their initial reaction quickly mode,rated, and the 
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Ambassador made it clear that compensation for the French 
arms dealers was the vital issue. [641 with the growing 
tensions in Europe, both parties felt strong pressure to 
settle the Muscat dispute, particularly as the Muscat Dhows 
issue had been resolved at the Hague. Germany had become the 
common threat to both Britain and France. 
As the September deadline set forth in regulations 
approached, the British feared that any action to enforce 
them against the French would lead to a real clash between 
the two allies. But the dispute could not be ended that 
quickly. The regulation was considered to have come into 
effect in September, but no action was taken against the 
French arms merchants. They continued to hold their own 
stocks of weapons. The new dispute involved the nature of 
any compensation granted: the British were willing to 
compensate French arms merchants for business 10ssesJ they 
were not willing to compensate France for a loss of treaty 
rights. Tension grew and France demanded full compensation, 
while Britain was not prepared to admit that the treaties 
had been violated. [65] Both nations claimed to see the 
issue as a point of honor. 
The Entente proved, however, more important to France 
than the Muscat arms trade. A real crisis, otherwise nearly 
assured, was avoided. In May, 1913, France agreed to delay 
consideration of the treaty rights if compensation were paid 
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to the arms dealers. After some squabbling, the matter was 
settled. Britain paid the French firms of Dieu and Goguyer 
£ 64,494 for their stocks of arms and their predicted 
profits. At the same time, France renounced: 
the right of invoking, on behalf of French 
citizens, the privileges conferred on these by the 
Treaty between France and Muscat, 1844, in so far 
as such privileges and immunities are opposed to 
the regulations and laws for the prevention of the 
contraband trade in arms and ammunition in Mascat. 
[66] 
Some 9,000 rifles were confiscated from the arms 
merchants in Muscat. Along with ammunition seized, the value 
of the weapons was estimated to be £ 40,000. Many of the 
rifles proved useful during the World War: 3,000 ~ere used 
to help defend the Mohammera oilfields in Persia, 2,700 were 
shipped to India, 2,600 were sent to England and used for 
training, while the remainder were destroyed or sold in 
Oman. The naval blockade remained in effect until after the 
start of the World War, and was finally ended in August, 
1915. [67] 
The new controls at Muscat seem to have finally 
succeeded in stopping the arms traffic through Muscat. In 
addition to the purchase of European owned stocks, firmer 
action was taken against dealers not protected by a European. 
power, including "the banishment for 5 years of the 
notorious Baluchi arms trader Ali Musa Khan." The warehouse, 
and the related measures, "stopped 90% of the former illegal 
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trade" at Muscat. [68] The customs records, for example, 
show that the value of arms imported at Muscat fell 
dramatically from £ 184,050 in 1912-13, to £ 13,550 the next 
year. The French trade had all but ceased in 1910-11, while 
British trade rose sharply in 1912-13, before nearly ending 
i tse1 f in 1914. [ 69] 
Figure 3 charts the rises and falls in the Muscat arms 
trade compared with the non-arms trade. For most of the 
1895-1914 period there is a general correlation between the 
two figures. In 1913-14 they part sharply, however, with 
the level of the arms trade dropping to the lowest level of 
the entire period while general trade rose dramatically. 
Ironically, the flow of private arms had been stopped just 
before for the massive influx of weapons during World War I. 
The spoils left by the Turkish and British armies, or given 
to the tribal allies of both, would soon dwarf the former 
private trade. 
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CHAPTER VI 

THE PRIVATE ARMS TRAFFIC IN THE SECONDARY GULF PORTS 

AND THE RED SEA AND THE INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION 

OF ARMS IN ARABIA 

While Muscat was the major arms entrepot in the 
Persian Gulf, the secondary ports of Arabia served as the 
final points of entry to the Peninsula north of Oman. Thus, 
as the trade developed in Oman, it also developed along the 
Arabian coast to the north. 
SECONDARY GULF PORTS 
Bahrein 
During the later l890s, Bahrein became a major 
secondary port for arms sold in the Gulf. Shipments from 
Europe were generally transshipped to the Sheikhdom via 
Muscat, and then sold to Arab or Persian tribesmen and 
traders. In 1894-95, the question of whether the Al Bu Ali 
tribe of Qatar owned Bahrein, or whether the island was 
independent, arose as it had at various times in the past. 
Sheikh Isa of Bahrein was threatened with an attack from 
Qatar, and it took the destruction of the Al Bu Ali's boats 
by a British warship to prevent an invasion. (1] The danger 
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faced by Sheikh Isa now helped drive the growth of the arms 
trade in the central Gulf. 
The Sheikh was, understandably, disturbed by the 
danger. During the threatened attack, there had been fewer 
than one hundred rifles in his territory. In January 1896, 
the Sheikh acted to improve his supply of arms. He issued a 
proclamation establishing a special fine (customs duty) on 
any arms imported to Bahrein equal to one-fourth of their 
value. Then, he granted a special exemption, amounting to a 
monopoly on imported arms, to his Wazir. The concession 
prevented the re~sale of arms to residents of Bahrein, Qatar 
or the Arabian coast north of Oman. The conditions of the 
monopoly were designed to insure a steady supply of arms for 
the Sheikh, for it required the concessionaire to pay "an 
annual royalty of 30 Martini rifles and 6,000 cartridges in 
addition to customs duty in kind at a rate of three rifles 
in every hundred and 200 cartridges per rifle." [2] Again, 
the rifle is the Martini, by 1896 clearly the standard arm 
of the region. 
The concession was transferred first to an Arab 
merchant, Agha Muhammad Rahim, and by him to Fracis, Times 
and Company. The trade increased "with phenomenal 
rapidity." Lorimer traced the increase in the arms trade at 
Bahrein by its value: in 1894-95 it equalled £990; in 
1895-96, £6,360; in 1896-97, £94,725; and in 1897-98, 
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£311,386. [3] within four years the arms trade increased by 
over 300 times. Without giving percentages of the trade 
going to each place, Lorimer states that the arms imported 
to Bahrein were sold to visitors from various Persian or 
Arabian regions. For Arabia he mentions Kuwait, Nedj and 
Oman as the major destinations, with Bahrein itself and 
Qatar as secondary destinations. A substantial number of 
arms were clearly reaching Arabia by way of Bahrein. [4] 
The trade through Bahrein was soon disrupted by the 
Sheikh himself. In April, 1897, Sheikh Isa "became alarmed 
at the growth of the trade" and ordered that it be suspended 
for four months. Shortly thereafter, a disagreement 
developed between Agha Muhammad Rahim and Fracis, Times and 
Company over the distribution of profits, and in January 
1898 the Sheikh "attached" the Company's entire stock of 
weapons. Some 2,667 rifles and 637,500 cartridges were 
seized. [5] 
Isa appears to have had several reasons for his 
actions. In his Appendix on the Arms Trade, Lorimer assigns 
two possible motives: first, that the Sheikh was concerned 
over the selling of arms to his own peop1e1 and second, that 
Agha Muhammad Rahim had asked the Sheikh to act because of 
his dispute over profits with Fracis, Times and Company. 
Rahim was, however, also the British political 
representative in Bahrein, and Lorimer notes that while the 
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Sheikh's: 
action was not in any way prompted by the 
British authorities, but it may have been 
instigated by Agha Muhammad Rahim, who, ••• had 
recently become aware that the British Government 
, ••• viewed that traffic with disfavor. 
Lorimer then notes that Lt. Col. Meade, visited 
Bahrein in February, 1898, examined the arms, and refused to 
either take control of the weapons or intervene for Fracis, 
Times and Company to gain their release. [6] 
Lorimer's position that the British were not behind 
the seizure of the arms is undercut by a statement he makes 
elsewhere. An incident in 1899 made the British question 
the "power" and "loyalty" of Sheikh lIsa of Bahrein. 
A warehouse belonging to the Shaikh, in which 
had been deposited a quantity of arms, the 
property of the Anglo-Parsi firm of Fracis, Times 
and Co. BUT AT THE TIME UNDER SEQUESTRATION AT THE 
INSTANCE OF THE BRITISH POLITICAL AUTHORITIES, was 
feloniously entered by night; [7] 
Two Hindus guards, who were British subjects, were 
wounded. The "ringleaders" were one "Sharidah," a 
"high-handed official of the Shaikh ••• his son Fahad, and 
one Amir Salih-bin-Rashid, an old favorite servant of the 
Shaikh." After British pressure, the men were exiled from 
Bahrein for a year and indemnity paid to the injured men. 
[8] Despite Lorimer's denial in his Arms Appendix of any 
British role in the Sheikh's seizure of the arms, it is 
clear that they in fact helped bring about the 
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confiscation. 
The arms were held until 1906, when the Sheikh 
returned them to Fracis, Times and Company "in a much 
damaged condition, on the understanding that they should not 
be sold in Bahrein, or Qatar, or on the Arab Coast." [9] By 
this time, however, the company may already have been 
bankrupt as a result of losing its legal cases against the 
British Government. The arms trade at Bahrein was further 
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damaged by concerted British action. During his February, 
1898 visit, Lt. Col. Meade pressured the Sheikh into signing 
an agreement banning the import and export of arms in 
Bahrein. Any arms were to be confiscated, and British and 
Persian war ships were given the power to search Bahreini 
vessels in Bahreini, British or Persian waters. The 
agreement was effective, and only "small seizures" were made 
after this. [10] A major secondary arms port had been 
closed for the moment. 
During 1904-1905, political and commercial activity 
again picked up in Bahrein. A clash developed involving the 
British, French and the Sheikh. In 1904, the French 
Ambassador in London, supporting French subjects interested 
in pearling in the Gulf, asked "if there would be any 
objection to inclusio~ of Bahrain in the jurisdiction of the 
French Vice-Consulate at Bushehr." The Government of India 
suggested that London delay an answer until related issues, 
112 
presumably the problems at Muscat, had been settled. The 
French traders soon left Bahrain, and the French Government 
did not ask again. [11] This was not the entire picture, 
however. Lorimer later reports on what was probably the 
same group of French merchants: 
In the summer of 1905 Baharin was visited by a 
French family interested in the pearl trade, who 
were joined there by M. Goguyer, the notorious 
Anglophobe arms dealer of Masqat. A memorial 
against his own treatment by the British 
Government, which was sent by Shaikh 'Isa a little 
latter to the Secretary of State for India and to 
the Viceroy of India, was probably inspired by M. 
Goguyer. [12] 
British officials either believed that there was a 
link between the, French pearling interests and the arms 
trade of M. Goguyer, or were simply reacting xenophobically 
to the presence of the French in the Gulf. Lorimer's 
thinking is interesting because of his apparent belief that 
Sheikh Isa would only object to British action if he were 
put up to it by a third party. 
As the direct trade with Persia became more difficult, 
a number of arms were shipped first to Qatar, then on to 
Bahrein where they were sold to Persian buyers. While 
technically outside of the Arabian trade, the process is of 
some importance in showing local resistance to the British 
control efforts. The main traders involved were based in 
Qatar, but neither they nor their Persian customers would 
directly visit each others ports. Instead, they used 
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Bahrein as a transshipment point. The new British Political 
Resident, Major Percy Cox, was not able to stop the trade, 
for it seems that both Sheikh Isa and his son gave it 
protection. [13] 
Communications in 1905 provide insight into the likely 
operation of the smaller arms smugglers. A number of 
British dispatches decried acts of piracy committed by 
"Ahmed-bin-Selman" in the Gulf near Bahrain. They 
specifically note that he took refuge in "Turkish territory" 
with the approval of the Ottomans. (The Arabian coast north 
of Qatar was clearly Turkish territory, and Qatar was 
claimed by the Ottomans.) While the piracy seems to have 
been a very small affair, it nevertheless gained the 
attention of the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, and the 
military Commander in Chief, Lord Kitchener and precipitated 
questions regarding the failure of Sheikh Isa to deal with 
the pirate. The piracy was seen as threatening British 
prestige. [14] Arms shipments are not specifically 
mentioned, but the link between the two was generally firm 
enough to b~ likely in this case. The pattern of the arms 
trade thus involved shipments between Bahrein, el Basa, and 
other areas of the Gulf, with the pirates probably stationed 
on the mainland. 
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Kuwait 
The arms trade at Kuwait began later than that of 
Muscat: only after Sheikh Mubarak took power from his 
brother in 1896 did it start at all. The volume was so 
small at first that the trade did not attract British 
attention until 1899, when "fairly large quantities of arms" 
were reported being shipped from Muscat to Kuwait. The 
"customs contractor of Kuwait port" attached a duty of $MT 2 
per rifle, and Sheikh Mubarak added a "royalty" of $MT 4. 
The volume of the trade was still apparently small, but the 
British were concerned. [15] 
The British feared that Kuwait would replace Bahrein 
as "the principal arms mart of the upper Persian Gulf." The 
new Political Resident, Lt. Col. C.A. Kemba11, visited the 
Sheikh in May, 1900, and gained a control agreement similar 
to that signed earlier at Bahrein. The agreement banned the 
arms trade at Kuwait and allowed for the search of Kuwaiti 
vessels. Even though Sheikh Mubarak "entered into these 
agreements with unexpected readiness," they failed to limit 
the trade for several reasons, according to Lorimer. Kuwaiti 
vessels were still sailing under the Turkish flag, making it 
"inexpedient" for the British to search them. In addition, 
the British felt that to limit the trade at Kuwait would 
have "been to influence materially the course of Central 
Arabian affairs." [16] And the British consistently 
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resisted taking action that would draw them geographically 
and politically deeper into Arabia. It is certain that 
Sheikh Mubarak was fully aware of the inability of the 
British to enforce the agreements when he signed them. [17] 
The British fear that stopping the trade at Kuwait 
would affect internal Arabian affairs is important, for it 
reveals a major arms route to central Arabia. Lorimer states 
that: 
Ibn Sa'ud of Southern·Najd drew h~s supply" of 
arms from Kuwait, and that "It is probable that, 
with the exception of .those received through 
Qatar, nearly the whole of the arms and ammunition 
imported into Najd for use in the wars of 
1900-1904 were brought into the country through 
Kuwait. [18] 
The arms entering Kuwait that did not pass on to Nejd 
were smuggled into TU,rkish and Persian territory. 
The Saudi need for arms caused additional concern to 
the Br i tish, for it gave, an opening to other powers wishing 
to enter the Gulf. In 1903, the Russian cruiser BOYARIN and 
the French cruiser INFERNET visited Kuwait; Abdul Aziz ibn 
Saud was in the Kuwait at the same time. The Captain of 
BOYARIN, joined by the Russian Consul from Bushire, visited 
Abdul Aziz twice, and the Saudi leader's brother visited the 
Russian ship, where he received a five gun salute. 
Commander Kemp or H.M.S. SPHINX "suggested" to Abdul Aziz 
that it was: 
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••• undesirable that foreign European countries 
should interfere in the affairs of Nejd, and 
suggested that he should refuse any offers made to 
him on behalf of the Russian Government, and that, 
as Great Britain was the predominant Power in the 
Persian Gulf, and intended to remain so, it would 
not, in the end, pay him to do anything of which 
she disapproved. 
Abdul Aziz ••• pointed out the Arnir of Nejd 
(i.e. Ibn Rashid) received money and support from 
the Turkish Government, and that it was necessary 
for him to have money to retain the support of the 
Arab tribes in his efforts against the Arnir. 
I think it likely that Abdul Aziz will take 
anything from the Russians he can get, and that 
Mubarak will back him up in doing so, and it is 
possible that some definite arrangement was 
entered into on this occasion. [191 
No direct evidence that the Saudis received Russian 
arms has been found, though the Russian steamer TROUVER did 
deliver a large shipment (25 cases of arms) to Kuwait 
several years later. The TROUVER shipment may have been the 
result of the 1903 conversations between the Russian 
officers and the Saudis. [20] In any case, the threat was 
enough to worry the British, and it may help explain why 
they were willing to aid the arms supply through Kuwait to 
Nejd: better the private arms dealers, than the Russian or 
French Governments. 
Kuwait continued to be a major supply point for the 
Saudis, and in September, 1904, Percy Cox reported that 
"Small supplies of food, arms, and ammunition proceed to the 
interior almost weekly," thus giving a steady source of 
suppl ies. [21] 
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The trade through Kuwait increased rapidly, it seems, 
after a vi~it by the "ubiquitous" French dealer from Muscat, 
M. Goguyer. Goguyer stayed in Kuwait "practically as the 
guest of the Sheikh." He began shipping arms from Muscat "as 
the Shaikh's private property." In August, 1904 over 40 
cases of rifles were landed at Kuwait, and stored in the 
Sheikh's warehouse. Early in 1905, the rate of import was 
estimated by the British to be about 1,000 rifles per 
month. Of these, about 42% arrived by steamer, while 58% 
were shipped by "native vessels." [22) Captain Knox, 
British Political Agent in Kuwait, reported in February, 
1905, that every two weeks the British India steamer 
delivered 200 rifles to Kuwait. Dhows carried the rest of 
the 12,000 rifles imported each year. All came from Muscat. 
A Martini sold at Kuwait for $MT 36 and a Mauser for $MT 42. 
A good rifle could be resold to the bedouins for $MT 100. 
[23) Lorimer estimates that Sheikh Mubarak received an 
annual income of some $MT 50,000 from the arms trade. 
Mubarak "denied" that there was any arms trade through 
Kuwait, while Goguyer "asserted that he held written 
authority from the Sheikh to import arms into Kuwait." [24) 
Half of the Kuwaiti imports were resold to buyers from 
Persia, half to buyers from "Turkish" territory, including 
Nejd. While Kuwait was vital to Nejd's supply of arms, Nejd 
was not as important to Kuwait's arms trade. Most of the 
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arms sold to "Turkish" territory went to the area of Iraq 
between Basra and Baghdad. [25] 
Captain Knox's report gives an insight into the nature 
of Goguyer's organization and activity in the Gulf. Goguyer 
had a permanent agent in Kuwait, Haji Abdullah Thahaba, to 
oversee the market in the sheikhdom. Apparently, Thahaba 
charged so high a price for his guns that he sold few if any 
directly. Knox stated that: "He is not a fool, and it is 
more likely that his trade is a blind, while the information 
that he sends to Goguyer at Muscat is no doubt useful in 
regulating Muscat prices." [26] If Knox was right, Goguyer 
maintained a complex and sophisticated organization in the 
Gulf. 
Despite official objections to the Kuwaiti arms trade, 
there is evidence that the British tolerated, and may have 
actually supported, the shipment of guns to Sheikh Mubarak 
and then to the Saudis. They were not, however, as 
interested in arming the Al Saud, as they were in 
safeguarding Kuwait's independence from the Ottomans. A May 
1904, dispatch from the Government of India to the Secretary 
of State for India noted that: 
Our influence with the Sheikh of Kowait has 
increased concurrently with the success of his 
friend, Bin Saoud, and if, as a result of active 
intervention on our part for the purpose of 
preventing Mubarak from helping Bin Saoud, and of 
preventing the importation of arms, Turkish 
influence were allowed to determine the supremacy 
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of the Turkish nominee against Bin Saoud, our 
prestige at Koweit must suffer materially, and it 
would probably ••• mean absorption of Nejd by the 
Turks. [27] 
If Nejd fell to the Ottomans, Kuwait would be 
out-flanked, and could easily be attacked by the Ottomans or 
their surrogates, the Al Rashid. Thus, the British "might be 
compelled once more to render Mubarak active assistance 
against the Turks." The authorities in India wished to 
influence events in central Arabia by allowing the Saudis to 
continue importing weapons. [28] 
British actions regarding the Kuwaiti arms trade did 
not escape public attention in the Gulf. An article appeared 
in the September 16, 1904, issue of the Cairo paper 
Al-Ahram, signed by its "Special Correspondent at Muscat", 
A. Rahim. Major Grey, the Political Agent at Muscat, 
believed the true author to be Goguyer. [29] The general 
tone of the article is strongly anti-British. Throughout, 
it accuses the "English" of conspiring to separate Kuwait 
and Iraq from Ottoman authority. (Irony rings through the 
twelve years between the Al Ahram article and the 
Anglo-French Sykes-Picot Agreement dividing the middle east 
between them.) The heart of the article, however, is a 
description of the method supposedly used by the British to 
ship arms to Sheikh Mubarak for the Al Saud and other groups 
in "rebellion" against the Ottomans. 
All that he (i.e. Mubarak) requires comes from 
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India, ••• Mail steamers call once a week at 
Koweit via Muscat, and the Koweit merchants ship 
every week hundreds of, rifles and ammunition, 'c., 
to Koweit •••• they write on the cases containing 
fire-arms 'cases containing sweetmeats,' and those 
holding cartridges, 'dried limes.' The Customs 
officials at Muscat do not inquire about the 
contents of the cases, while the English officers, 
who last year made such a noise, when they found a 
Frenchmen carrying six revolvers, shut their eyes
when these cases are concerned. • •• Thus 
Ibn-i-Saood obtains his arms from Koweit and the 
latter from the English1 and so the English are 
the agents who supply the Arabs with arms. [30] 
After this description of a semi-official arms trade 
through Kuwait, the article charges that the British had 
incited most of the inter-tribal trouble in Iraq and 
northern Arabia, all with the goal of seizing control of 
Kuwait and Iraq itself. The Ottomans were urged to "seek 
the aid of the French and the Russians, in order to defend 
yourselves against this aggression, nothing else will 
prevent their (i.e., the English) intrigues." [31] 
While much of the article is an anti-English 
philippic, its description of the arms trade at Kuwait rings 
true, and is generally confirmed by Major Grey, in a 
dispatch analyzing the article. He first states that he 
believes the article to have been written by Goguyer, then 
tacitly admits the general truth of Al-Ahram's report on the 
arms trade. 
(3.) The article clearly implies that arms are 
imported into Koweit by the English. M. Goguyer 
knows well that the (apparent) inconsistency of 
publicly forbidding and privately encouraging the 
importation of arms by us would be thoroughly 
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understood by the natives in the present 
circumstances, and the manner in which the ideas 
are expressed in this extract bears the stamp of 
his ingenious manipulations. 
(4.) It is possible that the writer's remarks 
concerning the conveyance of arms to Koweit by 
merchants in mail steamers are made in the hope of 
inducing action to be taken, which will leave the 
Koweit field in possession of those who send their 
consignments in dhows, as M. Goguyer does ••• [32] 
This semi-official British role in the supply of arms 
to Arabia through Kuwait is not directly supported by other 
British sources, and few non-British sources have been 
available. It is reasonable, however, to believe that the 
British did approve of the Kuwaiti trade, and Muscati 
customs records show a substantial British involvement in 
the trade throughout the period. [33} The British had no 
reason to prevent British arms and influence from reaching 
Nejd. Their primary reason for acting against the arms trade 
was to prevent weapons reaching tribes or groups overtly 
hostile to them - whether on the shores of the Gulf, or on 
the Northwest Frontier. 
The arms trade continued to be extremely active at 
Kuwait through Lorimer's final comments on the 1905-1907 
period. In 1906 the Kuwait Political Agent, Captain Knox, 
pressed the Sheikh to stop the trade, but there was only a 
·slight lull n as a result of the protest, and "by the month 
of September, 1906, it was once more in full vigour.n [34] 
Even if the British had acted consistently in opposition to 
122 
the arms trade at Kuwait, it could not be ended as long as 
"the tap at Muscat was not shut off." [35] 
"Turkish" Arabia: Iraq and el Hasa via Kuwait 
Information on the private arms trade into these 
regions is limited. Lorimer mentions the 1901 capture by 
the Ottomans, just off the Qatar coast, of arms "intended 
for Shaikh Jasim-bin-Thani." During 1904-05 some arms 
apparently reached Iraq from Persia and Kuwait. In these 
years, at least, the Gulf ports do not appear to have been a 
supply point for the Al Rashid, for Lorimer notes that: 
The Turks seem to have done nothing to 
facilitate the obtaining of rifles and ammunition 
from the Gulf by Ibn Rashid of Jabal Shammar, 
their nominal representative in Central "Arabia, 
during the war in Central Arabia. [36] 
It was clearly in Ottoman interests to control as much 
of the arms supply reaching their client as possible. They 
would not have wanted the Rashidi to develop a reliable, 
independent, source of supply. In any case, the Ottoman's 
supplied the Al Rashid from Iraq and Syria. [37] 
THE TRUCIAL COAST PORTS AND SMALLER PORTS 
The arms traffic along the Trucial Coast was closely 
linked to the traffic at Muscat, and developed during the 
same years, reaching its peak between 1896-98. According to 
Lorimer, the trade appears to have been mainly for internal 
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consumption, but with some export to Persia. Lorimer 
specifically credits the decline of the Trucial Coast arms 
trade to the "glutting of the local market and to the 
absence of communications with profitable markets in the 
interior." The trade was first centered at Ajman, then 
became "general" along the coast, being carried on mainly by 
Dubai. [38] 
During its short period of operation, the arms trade 
on the Trucial Coast is described by Heard-Bey as a 
"sizeable" part of the region's imports. She notes that 
rifles were the "most treasured possession" of tribal Arabs, 
and that there was a high demand for modern arms. She, 
however, states that many guns were re-exported to the 
"tribes in Makran and other areas of the Persian Coast." 
[39] 
Even though the trade along the Trucial Coast appears 
to have been fairly modest in size, controls were soon 
imposed by the British. In 1902 the sheikhs of the Coast 
signed agreements to prohibit arms and ammunition from being 
imported to or exported from ·their territories. The 
agreements were motivated in part by the sheikhs' 
apprehension over the arming of their own people, and in 
part by pressure from the British Resident, Col. Kemball. 
Compared with the thousands of weapons seized at Muscat, 
only a few hundred Martini-Henries are mentioned by Lorimer 
124 
as present in 1902. [40] 
In the 1905-07 period, the arms trade along the 
Trucial Coast was at "a standstill" [41], despite local 
political trouble and the visit of M. Goguyer. In 1906 
Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi was involved in a territorial 
dispute with Sheikh Rashid of Umm al-Qaiwain. Zayed was 
trying to make his state dominant on the Trucial Coast, 
while Rashid was trying to weaken the alliance headed by 
Zayed. In 1906 Zayed "collected and armed his adherents" in 
preparation for an attack on Umm al-Qaiwan territory." The 
matter took on wider dimensions from the British point of 
view when it was reported that Goguyer " ••• had visited Umm 
al-Qaiwain." Percy Cox entered the dispute, and forced a 
settlement of the political dispute between the Sheikhdoms 
after threatening a bombardment of Abu Dhabi. [42] The 
ending of the crisis further undercut the local market for 
arms, again cited by Lorimer as a factor in the failure of 
the Trucial Coast trade. [43] 
The trade on the Trucial Coast flared to notice with 
an incident on December 27, 1910, that played a part in the 
ending of the Muscat trade. [44] H.M.S. HYACINTH was 
patrolling along the coast when her captain learned of a 
cache of arms at Dubai. He sent men ashore to search the 
town, and was met with armed resistance by some of the local 
population. Before the fighting was over, thirty-seven 
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Arabs had been killed. In addition, four sailors died while 
ten were wounded or missing. The Gulf Resident, Percy Cox, 
and the Commander-in-Chief East Indies arrived quickly to 
clean up the mess. [45] 
The British, typically, demanded compensation from the 
Sheikh, to the tune of 50,000 Rupees (Rs.) and 400 rifles. 
They also demanded that the Sheikh accept a british agent 
and facilities. The Sheikh's reaction was strong. While he 
would pay compensation, he would not accept an agent, and 
even protested to the American Consul in Muscat, presumably 
in the hope of assistance. Before Cox and the Royal Navy 
could enforce their demands, however, London ordered them to 
drop the idea of a British agent and facilities, lest these 
demands disrupt Anglo-Turkish negotiations over Qatar. The 
matter was resolved when the Sheikh handed over the money 
and the guns. [46] Britain was generally reluctant to 
extend its influence or control inland, but the arming of 
the sheikhdoms and tribes of the Trucial Coast was seen as a 
possible threat to their maritime interests in the Gulf. 
Thus, unlike the situation at Kuwait and in Nejd, they moved 
quickly to stop the trade on the coast. 
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Qatar 
The small ports of Qatar together formed one of the 
most important routes for the import of arms into southern 
Nejd during the period of 1898-1905. The Ottoman claim to 
Qatar prevented the British from taking any direct steps to 
stop the shipment of weapons through the peninsula. Lorimer 
gives no hard information on the volume of the early trade. 
[47] 
By the end of 1906, the British appear to have gained 
more solid information on the Qatar trade. There was a 
"flourishing trade" at the port of Dohah on the west coast 
of the peninsula, where some 2,000 rifles a month were 
delivered by "native craft" sailing from Muscat. The arms 
cost about Rs 15 more per rifle than at Muscat, and an 
import duty of Rs 3-8-0 was charged by the Sheikh of Dohah. 
The bulk of the arms, some 75%, were sold to the "Central 
Arabian market," with the remaining 25% going to Bahrein for 
"sale to Persians." [48] Thus, some 1,500 rifles a month 
were passing through Qatar for Nejd in 1906. 
Mesopotamia and Kuwa'i t 
The Ottomans maintained fairly tight control of guns 
in Iraq, and except for the official transfers to client 
tribes, the region does not seem to have been a major source 
of arms, excepting those imported through Kuwait, until 
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World War I. British interest, in fact, centered on Ottoman 
imports later used in the War. Murphy discusses the arms 
trade in Iraq under Turkish rule, and notes: 
As far as gun-running was concerned, the center 
of interest was not Basrah itself, but a place 
called Magil, on the right bank of the Shatt­
al-'Arab about four miles above that city. By 
arrangement with the Turkish Government all 
materials for the Baghdad railway arriving at 
Basrah from overseas were dumped here without 
being examined by the Turkish customs officials. 
A good many rifles were smuggled ashore with the 
railway material, and no doubt most of them were 
used against us in the Great War. [49] 
The Persian Coast 
Information available about the arms trade along the 
Persian coast gives a general indication of the volume of 
trade, and of the types of weapons imported to the Gulf. In 
his Appendix on the Arms Trade, Lorimer deals extensively 
with the arms imported along the Persian coast of the Gulf, 
and into Persian Makran. Referring to the 1898-1905 period, 
he notes the capture of shipments ranging from a few hundred 
to over 1,500 rifles. Lorimer repeatedly mentions the 
Martini-Henry as the weapon being imported. No other gun is 
named. [50] 
Slowly, it seems, the major Persian ports in the Gulf 
were brought under control by the British and the Imperial 
Persian Customs, and by 1905-1907 results were noticed. 
While the controls may well have slowed the arms traffic in 
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persia, the main effect was to shift the trade to the 
smaller ports, where control was not possible. In 
particular, the central section of the Persian coast, 
opposite Bahrein and Qatar, became a major area of 
activity. [51] 
Persian Makran, the district of the Persian coast 
bordered by the Gulf of Oman, was important to the trade 
with Afghanistan, and was thus carefully investigated. In 
1906, Captain McConaghey, Assistant Political Resident in 
British Makran, investigated the Karwan District (inland 
from the coast) and found that: 
••• almost every inhabitant ••• was armed with 
some sort of breech-loading rifle: ••• The weapon 
most prized was the Martini-Henry rifle or carbine 
of English manufacture: but the .303 carbine 
(i.e., the magazine-fed, smokeless-power 
Lee-Metford) had begun to find favour with the 
well-to-do classes. The arms carried by the poor 
were generally obsolete military rifles of 
Russian, French or German models, ••• [52] 
DJIBOUTI AND THE RED SEA PORTS 

OF ARABIA 

Much less information on the arms trade in the Red Sea 
is available than for the Gulf. Fortunately, Bidwell has 
reprinted a number of British diplomatic dispatches that 
give some information on the Red Sea trade. The major 
British concern was with the general pattern of the trade, 
involving the shipment of arms from Djibouti to Arabia, and 
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then back to Africa. The trade was considered a problem not 
because of the entry of weapons into Arabia, but because of 
their re-exportation to Africa. Beachey discusses the 
pattern of the trade shortly after its shift from southern 
Africa: 
This new pattern of the arms trade, as seen by
British Residents at Aden, Muscat, and Berbera, 
was as follows: Suri Arabs, from Sur, south of 
Muscat, were engaged in carrying dates from Sur, 
Bussorah, and other ports on the Arabian coast, to 
Aden and then to the North Somali ports. After 
discharging their dates, they would proceed to 
Jibouti, where the trade in arms was practically 
unchecked, though no doubt contrary to French 
orders. At Jibouti the dhow masters purchased 
arms with the proceeds from their sales of dates. 
These arms were then taken down and sold at the 
Benadir coast ports on the way to Zanzibar, where 
they usually went for a return freight for the 
south-west monsoon, which gave the dhows a fair 
wind back to Sur and the Persian Gulf. The whole 
operation might entail up to a year. It was 
lucrative and the work was not arduous. Profits 
were high. [53] 
The winds may have played a major part in the pattern 
of the Djibouti trade. The local captains thought it better 
to sail from the French colony to Arabian ports such as Ras 
al Ara, Mokke, and Macullah, in Yemen or Aden for 
transshipment to vessels from the African coast than to sail 
directly down the coast. Beachey suggests that one group of 
dhows exported the arms from Djibouti, while another group 
carried some of the guns back to Africa by way of the 
monsoons. This pattern clearly supported the substantial 
Arabian section of the business: the British Resident at 
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Aden, in fact, reported in 1901 the capture of French Gras 
rifles, early single-shot breech-loaders, those captured 
being dated 1874. [54] By sailing first to Arabia the native 
vessels gained an additional benefit, evading any French 
attempts to enforce the Brussels Act. This, of course also 
allowed the French to claim that they did not allow arms to 
be. shipped to Africa. 
Much of the trade was apparently carried in dhows 
flying the French flag. Captain Dugmore reported in 1894 
that weapons could easily be purchased from a company in 
Aden for later delivery on vessels protected by the French 
flag. The Captain implies a direct French military role in 
the trade at this time, noting talk at Aden that "there can 
never be any difficulty in getting arms into the country so 
long as there is a French man-of-war at Zanzibar." The Arab 
sailors captured with arms reported that there was no 
official inspection at Djibouti, in any case, to stop the 
export of arms. And Suri vessels were now gaining the 
protection of the French flag through a method similar to 
that used earlier during the height of the slave trade. The 
owners simply purchased plots of land at Djibouti which they 
visited once a year, and were issued French papers. [55] 
This was eight years before Ottavi began distributing the 
flag at Muscat. 
The volume of trade through Djibouti was very high, 
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and while many of the arms imported there were transshipped 
to Africa, a high proportion clearly ended up at Muscat or 
other Arabian ports. Beachey reports that in the four weeks 
from August 7, to September 3, 1902.five steamers arrived at 
Djibouti: three were French, one British and one Belgian. 
They delivered 985 cases of arms, normally loaded with 
twenty rifles per case, for a total of about 20,000 guns, 
and 625 cases of cartridges, at about 1,600 per case, for a 
total of some one million rounds of ammunition. In 
addition, a large amount of lead was delivered. All within 
a month. During one nine day period in August, 1902, ten 
dhows left Djibouti, each shipping an average of 80 to 100 
rifles with some 100 rounds per gun. [56] 
The Italians had started their conquest of Eritrea in 
the l880s, and despite their defeat by the Ethiopians in 
1896 at the Battle of Aduwa, they continued to occupy the 
coastal region. Both the British and the Italians faced 
raids and armed resistance from Mohammed bin Abdullah (the 
Mad Mullah) in their respective Somaliland colonies. The 
fighting lasted from 1899 till 1905, when he gained 
recognition for a semi-independent region in the Italian 
colony. Despite this settlement, fighting continued at 
various levels of intensity, and only ended after Abdullah's 
death in 1920. [57] Both powers thus faced military 
opposition in African colonies easily supplied by arms 
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traders from Djibouti. 
Throughout the first years of the century, the British 
and the Italians expressed considerable concern about the 
shipment of arms from Djibouti to Arabia, and then back to 
Africa. During 1905, the British and Italian ambassadors to 
Paris approached the French government hoping to obtain 
French cooperation in controlling the Djibouti trade. On 
June 20, 1905, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Lansdowne, wrote to the British Ambassador to France to 
report the French reply. The French Minister of Marine 
claimed that control measures on the African coast were 
adequate, and that a French warship was not needed in the 
area: 
Moreover, the Governor of the French Somali 
Coast reports that since his arrival in the Colony 
on the 5th. August, 1904, no native vessel flying 
the French flag has been reported to him as 
carrying arms or ammunition intended to be landed 
at any point of the French Coast, or of the 
neighboring Italian or British Colonies. [58] 
The transshipment of arms via Arabia allowed the 
French Government to deny any knowledge of the illegal 
African arms trade, while still protecting that trade, and 
the trade to Muscat. Lansdowne understood what the French 
were doing, and continued: 
Your Excellency will perceive that the above 
observations of the French Ambassador contain no 
allusion to the export of arms from Jibouti to the 
opposite Arabian Coast for re-exportation to that 
of Africa. As this is the manner in which the 
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traffic is chiefly conducted, it will doubtless be 
necessary again to approach the French Government 
on the subject. Before doing so, however, I have 
thought it advisable to consult the Italian 
Government, ••• [59] 
Given French failure to respond to the problem as seen 
by the British, the Foreign Office agreed to an India Office 
proposal to send the British Resident at Aden to Djibouti 
and Berbera to directly investigate the arms traffic. It 
was expected that the French would cooperate with the 
investigation. Later, however, they rejected the contention 
that any further regulations were needed to control the arms 
trade. [60] Unfortunately, Bidwell fails to print the 
Resident's report which probably includes detailed 
information on the Djibouti arms market. 
Throughout the seas surrounding Arabia, there was 
continued trouble with piracy, and the general pattern 
ind,icates that those native vessels engaged in occasional 
piracy were also involved in the slave trade and the traffic 
in arms. British diplomatic dispatches, printed by Bidwell, 
contain repeated mention of piracy along the Yemeni coast. 
And British authorities appear to have used the excuse of 
suppressing pirates to attack slavery and the arms trade, in 
both the Gulf and the Red Sea. 
The charge that the native craft were pirates was of 
considerable practical importance to ,the British, for if 
upheld, it stripped the vessel and crew of any real legal 
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protection against search and seizure. Lauterpacht states 
the international law that applied, and still applies, to 
pirates: 
A pirate and his vessel lose ipso facto by an 
act of piracy the protection of their flag State 
and their national character. Every maritime 
State has, by a customary rule of the Law of 
Nations, the right to punish pirates. And the 
vessels of all nations, whether men-of-war, other 
public vessels, or merchantmen, can chase, attack, 
and seize the pirate on the open sea, and bring 
him home for trial and punishment by the courts of 
their own country. [61] 
In late September, 1905 H.M.S. FOX was sent to the Red 
Sea, with orders to cooperate with the British Vice-Consul 
at Hodeida, Yemen. They were to obtain compensation for 
certain recent acts of piracy and "unless local authorities 
immediately destroy pirate boats, this had better be done by 
His Majesty's ship." [62] The FOX, with the aid of Turkish 
troops, entered the pirate harbor and seized ten boats, but 
had to return for reinforcements before attacking the 
villages. [63] The Ottoman Government objected to the Fox's 
action. [64] It is not clear as to whether the vessels were 
actually pirates, or if the British were using an excuse to 
destroy boats engaged in the arms trade. 
A full report on the operation was sent on October 7, 
1905, by Captain J.B. Eustace, Senior Naval Officer, Aden 
Division, from aboard H.M.S. FOX. The events had been 
precipitated by the destruction in June of the sambok 
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ALWANI, a boat under British protection, by pirates from the 
Yemeni coast. Captain Eustace issued three demands to the 
Ottoman military and civil authorities of the Hodeidah 
district. First, he demanded the payment of compensation, 
$MT 3,717 plus £ 4907 second, and most important for the 
subject of this paper, he demanded "destruction of all 
piratical boats between Hodeidah and Ras Mutenina, (i.e., 
Ras Miteina) belonging to the Zaranikhs or Karashias"; and 
third, the arrest and punishment "as soon as possible" of 
the culprits. He then began planning a combined 
military-naval expedition against the "pirates" at 
"Ghuleifaka" (i.e., Gulfeika, some ten miles south of 
Hodeidah.) [65] 
The compensation was fully paid, in part immediately, 
in part after H.M.S. FOX informally blockaded Hodeidah. The 
first military operation, undertaken by FOX and two Turkish 
gunboats with 100 Ottoman troops, was only able to capture a 
few Yemeni samboks (small coastal vessels). After returning 
to Hodeidah, the British determined that the Mayor of 
Hodeidah, Seyyid Ahmed Pasha, had warned the tribesmen of 
the expedition. A second expedition on October 2-5, using 
the Turkish gunboats and British launches armed with Maxim 
machine guns, captured or destroyed a number of samboks. 
Captain Eustace specifically mentions the capture of the 
sambok MOTASSAHIL, "belonging to the Chief of the Karashia 
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tribe." The boat was involved in the arms trade: 
As she had evidently just landed a cargo of arms 
(an arms chest with a newly-broken lid was found 
in her), at the request of Commodore Arif I 
ordered her seizure. • •• Subsequent information 
at Hodeidah showed that this sambok "Motassahil" 
is a well-known gun-runner. When searching her 
the Turkish officials with me told the interpreter 
not to report or see any of the evidence of 
gun-running. I, however, personally assisted, so 
they were unable to deny the facts I pointed out. 
[66] 
The expedition was not a great success, because the 
samboks were small enough to be pulled inland and many had 
been hidden. Captain Eustace did not believe that the 
problem of piracy could be ended without a fairly large land 
force to search for and destroy the boats. This would have 
to await the subjugation of the region by the Ottomans, who 
were then fully involved inland with the revolt of the Imam 
Yaya. Because of this, and the poor quality of the Ottoman 
naval officers, no further action could be taken. Captain 
Eustace reported, however, that the Governor of Hodeidah 
was: 
••• most grateful for my information upon the 
arms traffic and smuggling of arms now going on 
into Yemen. Upon my showing him a telegram from 
Perim of the 6th October, with the names of two 
dhows carrying arms, the dates of their departure 
from Jibuti, and destination, the Governor ordered 
the dhows seized. [67] 
The general pattern of the Yemen trade was reported by 
Captain Eustace in a dispatch, unfortunately not reprinted 
by Bidwell, but discussed in a letter from Lord Lansdowne to 
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the Italians on November 13, 1905: 
From this (the Eustace report) it would appear 
that canoes (i.e., samboks) leave Obokh frequently 
for Kadduha, southward of Mukha, with from 80 to 
100 rifles in each, and although no arms can 
officially leave Jibuti, there is said never to be 
any difficulty in obtaining a clearance from Obokh 
by vessels engaged in this trade. • •• owing to 
the disarmament of the Arabs of Yemen by the 
Turks, the former are now endeavoring to rearm 
themselves, and find Kadduha a very suitable 
place, as the Turkish troops did not stop at 
Mokha, and never visited Kadduha. [68] 
The interesting aspect of the Lansdowne note is that 
it shifts the emphasis from the re-export of arms from 
Arabia to the internal Arabian demand for weapons. It is 
important to remember that the Imam Yaya, in leading a 
revolt against the Ottomans, was also protesting the British 
position in the Aden Protectorate. Thus, Lord Lansdowne had 
to be concerned over the possibility that some of the 
smuggled arms would reach Aden. At the very least, this 
would have threatened order in Aden, and at worst, British 
control. British concern over the arms trade was great 
enough for Lord Lansdowne to order the Resident in Aden to 
investigate and report on the trade. Unfortunately, Bidwell 
again fails to reprint this report. [69] 
The Ottomans were clearly aware of the threat to their 
position in Yemen posed by the arms trade. In November, 
1905, the British Military Attache in Constantinople 
reported the reorganization of the coastal districts of 
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Yemen, and an order to increase the size of the Turkish 
naval flotilla guarding the coast against gun-runners. 
Several weeks later, the Ambassador reported the departure 
from the Golden Horn of the ships to be stationed in Yemen. 
[70] 
DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS WITHIN THE PENINSULA 
After weapons had been landed at Muscat and the other 
ports of Arabia, local t.raders distr ibuted them throughout 
the Peninsula. In addition, Ottoman troops in need of money 
frequently sold their own weapons on the blackmarket, while 
still other weapons were distributed directly by the Ottoman 
Government to client tribes. [71] Many of these weapons 
were later sold or captured, and thus spread further. The 
distribution routes were complex. 
Local traders, stationed throughout the Peninsula, 
were a major source of arms for the tribes. Musil discusses 
the operations of one trader operating in the northern edge 
of the Nefud of north-central Arabia during M~y, 1909. A 
Sulabah tribesman brought news to the Ruwala camp that a 
trader, with "eight camels carrying weapons and goods for 
clothing" had arrived from Karbala (called by the messenger 
"al-Mashad") and was staying with the Slejb in al-Bwejtat. 
The trader was based in the Iraqi city, but when operating 
in the desert lived with the Krese clan of the Sammar tribe 
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in the northern section of the Skara oasis, and the Krese 
were enemies of the Ruwala. [72] The Iraqi trader probably 
obtained his goods from the arms market in Kuwait. 
Tribal political alliances placed the arms trader in a 
bind: he wanted to continue selling to the Krese and the 
Sammar, as he had been doing, and still expand his market to 
the Ruwala and their allies, the Maazle clan that lived in 
the southern part of Skara. In dealing with the Krese the 
trader "alienated" the Ruwala and Maazle. (Musil does not 
show the Maazle as belonging to either the Ruwala or the 
Sammar on his lists of those tribes.) [73] 
The trader sent a number of messages to the Ruwala 
Prince, al-Nuri, asking to trade. The dilemma was clearly 
drawn in quotes given by Musil: 
"Should we not sell arms to the Krese, how would 
they treat us?" they pleaded. "They would 
demolish our houses and rob us of our propertY7 
and whether they would spare our necks Allah only
knows." 
DYe supply our enemies with arms and ammunition, 
therefore ye are to blame for their defiance, and 
I do not want to mediate with ye," responded 
an-Nuri curtly. [74] 
The Ruwala tried to capture the small caravan, but the 
Sulabah (Slejb) were friendly with both the Ruwala and the 
Sammar, and helped the trader hide. The Ruwala were unable 
to track them over the rocky ground. 
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In his general work on the Ruwala, Musil first reports 
the types of weapons used by the tribe [75], then discusses 
the shipping of arms within northern Arabia, revealing the 
pattern into which the above incident can be placed. 
Unfortunately, material in this particular book was drawn 
from both Musil's 1908-10 and 1913-15 travels, 'and he does 
not date the shipments he reports. 
All arms were brought from the seaports of Jidda 
or al-Kwejt. During my stay with Prince an-Nuri 
he was visited by six trade caravans with war 
munitions. One of the caravans numbered 210 
camels carrying more than a thousand rifles with 
many thousand rounds of cartridges as well as much 
lead, gunpowder, and many caps. [76] 
The report makes it clear that the Ruwala were still 
using many old percussion cap rifles, and that they obtained 
their weapons from ports on both the Gulf and Red Sea 
coasts. Lorimer, reporting generally on the 1905-06 period, 
provides important information on the arms route into 
central Arabia. Talking about the' district he called 
Southern Najd (Nejd), then under Saudi influence, he says: 
The trade in arms is of an exceptional character 
••• at present it is conducted by Najdi merchants 
who visit Masqat at least once a year and, after 
purchasing a stock of arms, introduce them into 
Southern Najd by way of Qatar, ••• [77] 
In late 1906, the arms flow through Qatar was 
substantial, with 1,500 rifles a month, or a rate that would 
yield some 18,000 a year, entering central Arabia through 
the port of Dohah alone. [78] In addition to the shipment 
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of arms through Qatar, a large number of the arms imported 
at Kuwait were intended for the Saudi forces, and, after 
Qatar, that port appears to have been their most important 
point of supply. [79] While 200 to 300 camels a week 
carried goods from the Hasa port of Oqair Nejd, [80] it is 
unlikely that many arms entered through this route until 
after Abdul Aziz ibn Saud drove out the Turks in 1913. 
Other arms entered Arabia through the small ports of 
the Red Sea coast. Lorimer specifically notes that the Harb 
tribe of Nejd and the Hijaz imported its breech-loaders by 
way of Yanbo. [81] In addition, Musil reports that old 
British guns were imported from Egypt, [82] probably through 
Jedda or other Red Sea ports. Lack of information on the 
Red Sea ports unfortunately prevents a detailed analysis of 
that section of the arms trade. 
CAPTURE OF OTTOMAN WEAPONS 
The capture of weapons in war has always been one of 
the major sources of supply for groups or nations that do 
not have easy access to manufacturers. Lt. Col. C.C.R. 
Murphy reported on the the capture of Ottoman weapons after 
the fall of Kerak in 1910, as discussed in Chapter VIII. 
Weapons were clearly lost in various Ottoman expeditions 
against the Saudis, and there would have been a steady 
leakage of arms during small engagement. But it took a 
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major revolt to bring major losses. 
The 1904-07 revolt in the Yemen proved extremely 
difficult for the Ottomans to suppress. The British 
Military Attache in Constantinople, Colonel H.C. Surtees, 
reported in early 1906 that by July of the previous year the 
Ottomans had a total of some 80,000 riflemen in Yemen, 
supported by artillery. Of these a dispatch from 1905 
states that at least 40,000 were armed with Mausers, of 
various types. [83] (Bury, as noted above, later reported 
that all of the smokeless powder Mausers used by Ottoman 
troops were returned to Constantinople after the 
rebellion.) 
During Imam Yaha's revolt, British diplomatic 
dispatches reported the capture of many weapons from the 
Ottoman troops. At the fall of Sana alone in April, 1905, 
they lost some 11,000 rifles and 24 artillery pieces. [84] 
When luck was with them, the Turks were able to recapture 
the lost rifles. For example, a dispatch from the 
Vice-Consul Richardson at Hodeida, Yemen, in October, 1905 
first records the Ottoman loss of two guns (artillery), 100 
rifles and much ammunition near Sana in August. Two weeks 
later, an Ottoman force recaptured Sana, and the rebels 
escaped, "abandoning a considerable quantity of ammunition 
and numerous rifles." [85] Several months later, a dispatch 
of January, 1906, from the Military Attache, Constantinople, 
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discussed a December, 1905 attack in which the Ottomans 
first lost "arms, ammunition, and money" followed by a 
counter-attack in which they recaptured them. [86] Many of 
the lost weapons, of course, were never recaptured. 
CAPTURE FROM TRIBAL ENEMIES 
One of the clear benefits from a military victory was 
the capture of weapons from the enemy. Raids against the 
long supply lines of the desert were also a good source of 
arms. The British Consul at Basra, F.E. Crowe, reported to 
the Ambassador in Constantinople that a: 
••• convoy of arms dispatched to 
Yussuf-el-Ibrahim from El Katr has been 
intercepted by Mohamed, brother of Abdul 
Aziz-bin-Saoud, at El Sirr, some two days from 
Boreyda. It is said he captured ten loads. [87] 
And again, in January or February, 1904, letters from the 
Consul and from Abdul Aziz ibn Saud reported a Saudi victory 
over a Rashidi 400 man force led by Husein-el-Jerad. All 
their weapons were captured, and somewhat later, a convoy of 
150 camels with a small treasury (1,000 "Reals") was 
seized. [88] Capture of enemy arms was an important source 
of supply, even if it fell far short of the volume obtained 
by other means. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE GOVERNMENTAL ARMS TRAFFIC 
Modern arms entered the Peninsula through two main 
channels, private traders and governmental action. While 
all aspects of the private trade accounted for the greater 
part of the arms entering Arabia, purchases by the Ottoman 
Empire - and the distribution of those weapons to Ottoman 
clients - may have formed the largest single source of 
modern weapons entering Arabia during the period under 
study. 
OFFICIAL OTTOMAN ARMS PURCHASES 
During the nineteenth century, as now, the major 
powers continually replaced obsolete guns with new weapons. 
When this happened, or when the end of a war brought 
demobilization, thousands of rifles were sold to other 
nations or private arms dealers. The Ottoman government was 
a major buyer of both new and surplus firearms. 
Following Mahmut II's reorganization and modernization 
of the Ottoman army in 1827, the state factories were unable 
to supply the modern weapons needed by the army, and 
throughout the remainder of the Century the Empire became 
150 
increasingly dependent upon expensive imported arms. [1] 
Many of these weapons later appeared in Arabia. To trace 
them, it is necessary to review Ottoman purchases, and the 
technical specifications of the rifles involved. 
Examples of both the sale of old weapons on the 
international market and of Ottoman purchases are found 
after the American Civil War. With the change to 
breech-loading rifles by the united States Army, old 
muzzle-loaders were worth little, and many were sold 
overseas. In 1869 "at least 60,000 government owned Enfield 
r ifl1es were clec';lned and repaired at the Spr ingf ield Armory 
and sold to the Turkish government." [2] In 1869 the 
Ottomans 'also expressed interest in buying machinery from 
the Armory that could make some two hundred Springfield 
muzzle-loading muskets a day. [3] I do not know if this 
purchase was actually made. 
Modern rifles were also sold by United States 
companies. In 1870, Winchester sold the Ottomans 15,000 
Winchester Model 1866 repeating rifles and 5,000 carbines in 
caliber .44 Turkish Rim Fire. (These Winchesters were 
important in the early stages of the Russo-Turkish War of 
1877-78.) By 1873, Winchester had a Turkish contract for 
2,000,000 blank metallic drill cartridges and 50,000,000 
"Snyder" rifle cartridges. The Company also shipped 
cartridge-making machinery to the Ottomans. [4] Smith 
151 
reports that many of these Turkish Winchesteys were later 
converted from lever-action repeaters into the first 
semiautomatic rifle, using an 1881-83 design by Hiram Maxim. 
Smith does not say if the rifles were converted while still 
in Turkish service. [5] 
The "Snyder" cartridges mentioned by Deyrup make it 
probable that the Enfield rifles purchased by Turkey were in 
fact Snider rifles, for the Snider was an Enfield 
muzzle-loader converted into a breech-loader. The Model 
1853-1866 Snider Single Shot, British service rifle, was 
based on the invention of American inventor Jacob Snyder. 
After the conversion a breec~ plate swung up to allow the 
loading of a brass cartridge, which expanded on firing to 
seal the chamber. The gun was caliber .557. [6] The 
official British name for the rifle appears to have been the 
Snider-Enfield, and it was only considered a "stopgap" until 
a better gun was designed. [7] 
During the Civil War, the United States imported over 
428,000 Enfield muzzle-loading rifles from England and 
purchased some 670,000 U.S. made Springfieldsl [8] at the 
end of the War, over "a million muzzle-loading rifled 
muskets, caliber .58, in first-class condition" were still 
held by the United States Government. [9] The "Snyder" 
cartridges sold by the Springfield Armory to Turkey had to 
be for use in the Snider rifle. Ottoman use of the Snider 
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is confirmed by Metschl, who states that it was "exclusively 
employed" by their army, though he gives no service dates or 
numbers. [10] Their use of the Snider during the 1877-78 
Russo-Turkish war is also mentioned by Yapp, [11] while 
Lewis notes its use by Ottoman forces in Transjordan in 
1869. [12] 
At about the same time, the Ottomans began purchase of 
the rifle that, as discussed above, was to become common 
throughout Arabia. Springfield Armory Records note that in 
about 1870 the Providence Tool Company made Peabody-Martini 
rifles for Turkey, [13] while Metschl reports that in 1873 
the Ottoman Government purchased 600,000 peabody-Martini 
rifles, .45 caliber, center fire. The rifle in the 
Nunnemacher Collection has Turkish "figures" on the lock 
plate and rear sight. [14] The Martinis were used by the 
Ottomans, along with Sniders, during the Russo-Turkish war 
of 1877-78, [15] with at least 75,000 Ottoman troops armed 
with one or the other by the time of the War. [16] 
Because the Peabody and its successor Martinis became 
so dominant in Arabia, they are of special importance. 
Different forms of the rifle entered the international arms 
market over the years, as the Peabody evolved through a 
number of designs, several of which later appeared in 
Arabia. The Peabody was first patented in 1862 by Henry O. 
Peabody of Boston. His rifle used a falling breech-block, 
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hinged at the rear, that was opened by levering the large 
trigger guard down and forward. As with most black powder 
models derived from the Peabody, it was of .45 Caliber. The 
gun was tested by the united States in 1865, and performed 
very well. with the Civil War over, however, the Government 
had no interest in a new gun: 
Like the British, all we could think of was how 
to convert our enormous stock of muzzle loaders 
cheaply, we had no time for new designs. and 
the manufacturers ••• were encouraged to seek 
fore ign mar kets. [17] 
The first change in the Peabody was made by a Swiss 
mechanic, Frederich Von Martini. Martini's major alteration 
of the rifle replaced the original external hammer with an 
internal hammer. "The result was a streamlined design 
retaining the Peabody breechblock but embodying the now 
famous Martini firing mechanism." [18] This created the 
Peabody-Martini sold to the Ottomans. Martini submitted his 
design to the British, who further modified the rifle by 
adding a Henry pattern rifled barrel. The new weapon was 
called the Martini-Henry. Both the Peabody-Martini and the 
Martini-Henry were later common in Arabia, though often 
simply called Martinis. 
Smith discusses the Turkish Peabody-Martini rifle in 
conjunction with the Romanian Model 1874-78, which was 
similar. The Turkish rifle was the Martini modification of 
the original peabody design. It was issued with a black 
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powder Center Fire, caliber .45 Turkish shell. The Martini 
was also made as a carbine. While the Martini was an 
excellent weapon, magazine-fed rifles soon entered military 
service, making it obsolete. [19] Following the normal 
pattern for arms procurement, the Ottomans felt that they 
had to continue modernization. 
In 1887, the Ottomans ordered 500,000 Model 1887 
Mauser rifles and 50,000 cavalry carbines in 9.Smm. 
caliber. The Model l887s were repeaters with tube 
magazines, and were the last of the black powder guns made 
by Mauser, for the invention of smokeless powder by the 
French in the same year made black powder rifles obsolete. 
The Ottomans took delivery of 220,000 rifles on the order, 
then renegotiated with Mauser in 1890 and changed the 
remainder of the order to the new, smokeless powder, Model 
1890. This rifle had a vertical box magazine and came in 
7.65mm. Turkish Rimless Caliber. 280,000 were delivered, and 
in 1893 an additional 150,000 Model l890s were purchased. 
Also in 1893, the Ottomans ordered 201,000 modified Spanish 
Mausers with a staggered built-in box magazine, again in 
7.65mm. Turkish. In 1905, a modified Mauser pattern was 
adopted by the Ottomans, still in Caliber 7.65mm Turkish. 
[20] (See Table I.) 
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OTTOMAN SINGLE-SHOT BREECH-LOADERS AND AMMUNITION 
YEAR RIFLE 	 NUMBER PURCHASED 
11 Snider (Converted Enfield Musket) 1 
1869 Enfield (or U.S. conversion) 60,000 
1870 Winchester Model 1866 Rifles 15,000 
1873 Peabody-Martini Rifles 600,000 
1873 Snider Cartridges 50,000,000 
OTTOMAN PURCHASES OF MAUSER MAGAZINE RIFLES 
YEAR 	 MODEL CALIBER ORDERED RECEIVED 
1887 	 1887 Rifle 9.5mm. Black powder 500,000 220,000 
1887 Carbine 50,000 ?" 	 " " " 
1890 	 M. 90 Rifle 7.65mm.Turkish Rimless 280,000 
1893 	 M. 90 Rifle 7.65mm. " 201,000 
(Modified Spanish Mausers. Cited as Model 1895 Turkish.) 
1905 1 7.65mm.Turkish 1 	 1 
(New pattern adopted.) 
[21] 

TABLE I 

OTTOMAN PURCHASES OF BREECH-LOADING RIFLES AND AMMUNITION 
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Smith's figures for the purchase of Mausers up to 1905 
total 751,000 rifles and carbines. A contemporary estimate 
by Vincent Cai1lard, a director of the British arms firm of 
Vickers, Sons & Maxim and a former president of the Ottoman 
Public Debt Council, and Financial Representative of 
England, Holland and Belgium in Constantinople, gives a 
substantially higher total for the Mauser models 1887 and 
1890 of 1,120,000. As Caillard's estimate appears in the 
1911 Encyclopedia Britannica, it may have included the order 
Smith mentions for 1905. Caillard also notes that the 
Ottomans had a reserve stock of 510,000 "Martini-Henry" 
rifles. These, presumably, were the remaining 
Peabody-Martinis ordered in the l870s, and mis-labeled by 
the British source. [22] Given the wars between the two 
dates, the attrition from the original 600,000 is not 
excessive. 
In addition to the purchases from Mauser, Turkey had 
in service some British Lee Enfield, Rifle No.1, magazine 
fed breech-loaders. This designation, sub-divided into 
various models, or "Marks," covers weapons made from 1895 
until after World War I, and Smith does not give dates of 
purchase or numbers. He does say that a major design change 
occurred in the Lee Enfield after the Boer War, when the 
rifle was shortened to produce the Short Model Lee-Enfield. 
At the end of the Boer War, thousands of surplus Enfie1ds 
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from South Africa were sold on the world market, many of 
them ending up in Arabia. The decision to change the design 
of the gun no doubt encouraged these sales. [23] It is 
probable that the Ottoman purchases that I have cited 
constituted most of the rifles obtained by them, but it is 
also probable that they did buy additional rifles from time 
to time. 
To understand the number of surplus weapons available 
for the Ottomans to distribute to clients in Arabia (and 
elsewhere), an estimate must be made of the size of the 
Turkish army. Two general categories are of importance, the 
regular standing field force, and the variety of reserve and 
irregular forces. 
The standing force (nizam) remained remarkably 
consistent in size during th~ four decades preceding World 
War I. At the end of the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War the 
Nizam, according to Yapp, stood at about 250,000 men. [24] 
Caillard estimated the 1904 strength of the Nizam at 
230,408. [25] And Shaw states that in 1912 the Ottomans had 
"no more than 250,000 men under arms." [26] Caillard 
includes a variety of fully and partially trained reserves, 
territorial forces, and gendarmes to reach a total figure of 
1,795,350 men, but this includes many questionably trained ­
or even untrained - reserves. A more accurate reserve force 
is gained by taking Caillard's figures for the active 
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reserves (ihtiyat), 251,511; and the trained inactive 
reserve (redif, Class I), 237,026 , both of which had 
various garrison duties. This gives a total serious reserve 
strength of 488,537, for a total infantry force of 718,945. 
In addition, there were over 27,000 cavalry and the 
gendarmes to be armed. While the total of trained regulars 
and reserves would still have been under one million men, 
the Ottomans also had a substantial number of untrained or 
semi-trained reserves on the rolls in 1904. 
The Ottoman military thus had a standing force of 
about 250,000 in the years before World War I, and a large 
reserve force. Caillard states that the Ottomans had 
issued, or had available in stores, 1,120,000 Mausers by 
1904 with 510,000 Martinis in reserve. This is 
substantially higher than Smith's figures for an Ottoman 
purchase of 751,000 Mausers, but is consistent - allowing 
for losses - with his figure of 600,000 Martinis. Caillard's 
total of 1,630,000 Mausers and Martinis is substantially 
higher that Smith's total of 1,351,000. With either figure, 
however, it is apparent that after arming their own forces, 
the Ottomans still had a significant surplus for 
distribution to clients, as will be discussed later. [27] 
The British Military Attache in Constantinople, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Maunsell, reported to the Counselor of 
the Embassy in early November, 1904, on the Ottoman reaction 
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to recent victories by Abdul Aziz ibn Saud. The Ottomans had 
already lost one expedition attempting to aid the Al Rashid, 
and now, rather that send more men were preparing to 
modernize the arms carried by their troops in Iraq. The 
dispatch provides important information on how quickly the 
Mauser was replacing the Martini-Henry. 
The troops of the 6th. or Bagdad Corp are still 
armed with the old Martini rifle, now much worn, 
and practically the same weapon as possessed by 
Ibn Saoud's men. It has now been decided to issue 
them the Mauser rifle like the rest of the army,
and for this purpose 40,000 small-bore Mausers and 
also six batteries of the newer pattern of 7.5 
centime mountain guns, ••• , have been packed up, 
and are awaiting shipment by an early steamer to 
Bussorah (Basra). [28] 
Throughout the period, the Ottomans appear to have 
armed their regular army with the best modern rifles 
available. 
EGYPTIAN ARMS PURCHASES 
Before WW I the Egyptians used various European 
rifles, "none truly standard." In 1870, Egypt ordered 
60,000 Remington Single Shot Rolling Breechblock rifles in 
llmm. (caliber .43) Egyptian. After that order had been 
partly filled, Egypt defaulted, and many rifles were shipped 
to France in 1870-71. In 1876 the Egyptians renegotiated 
with Remington, and the order for the full 60,000 rifles was 
completed. [29] 
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Interestingly, thirty-five years after the initial 
Egyptian order of Remingtons, the British Military Attache 
in Constantinople reported (March, 1905) that Ottoman 
Zaptiehas (i.e. gendarmes) serving as border guards between 
Aqaba and the Mediterranean were armed with Remington 
carbines. [30] I have found no mention of a direct Ottoman 
purchase of Remingtons, and these weapons may be those 
originally bought by Egypt and later re-sold to local 
Ottoman commanders. The distribution patterns to the tribes 
of Arabia show that arms did reach the Peninsula from the 
Red Seacoast. While no direct evidence has been available, 
it is likely that some surplus arms from Egypt were sold to 
Arabian traders. 
OTTOMAN DISTRIBUTION TO CLIENTS 
The Ottoman Government's distribution of weapons to 
client tribes in Arabia, both to strengthen them and keep 
them under a measure of control, was a major source of arms 
for the Peninsula. During the war between the Saudis and the 
Rashidis, Turkish shipments of arms to the Al Rashid 
illustrate both this practice, and the disposal of obsolete 
weapons on the frontiers of the Empire. In April, 1904 the 
Persian Gulf Resident, citing newspaper articles, reported 
that the Ottomans had shipped Ibn Rashid "800 Martini-Henry 
rifles, 1,000 Sniders, with 60,000 rounds of ammunition, and 
4,000 lira - rifles, ammunition, and money having left 
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Bagdad three days ago." preparations for the sending of 
artillery were also reported underway. [31] The 
distribution of arms was a standard element of Ottoman 
policy in Arabia. 
In his various books, Alois Musil reports the use of 
arms and ammunition by the Turkish authorities to strengthen 
some tribes while checking the power of others. In 
December, 1914, he was traveling with the Emir of the Ruwala 
tribe, al-Nuri ibn Hazza al-Shaalan and his son, Nawaf. 
Al-Nuri noted that the Turkish governor of Syria had asked 
him to remain loyal to the -government during the War, and 
had promised to aid the Ruwala against their enemy (and the 
main enemy of the Al Saud, at the time), the Sammar tribe 
led by the Al Rashid. Nawaf objected, declaring that the 
Turkish Minister of War, Enver Pasha, considered the Emir of 
the Rashid "his most loyal ally." Nawaf then gave details 
of a large arms shipment to the Sammar. 
At the beginning of this year he (i.e. Enver 
Pasha) sent him (i.e. the Rashidi emir) by rail to 
al-Hegr fifteen thousand Mauser rifles, four 
hundred thousand cartridges, field guns, and so 
much gold that ten camels could hardly carry it. 
Zamel eban Subhan transported the arms to Hajel 
(i.e., Hail) and distributed them among the Sammar 
and even the Slejb. Before that the Sammar had 
barely five hundred good rifles; now they have so 
many that they sell Mauser rifles in Hajel for two 
Turkish pounds ($ 9.00) apiece. And what did 
Enver send these rifles to Eban Rasid for? That 
he might more easily defeat Eban Sa'ud, who 
eighteen months before had driven the Turkish 
soldiers out of the province of al-Hasa. [321 
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Later, in his appendix on the Al Rashid, Musil states 
that the weapons were sent by the Ottomans in late 1913, and 
that the shipment included only 6,000 Mausers and 60,000 
cartridges. Ibn Rashid was also sent an automobile and "a 
large sum of money." [33] (The Sammar Emir appears to have 
used his family name as a title, thus being called Ibn 
Rashid.) Philby reports that in 1912, in reaction to the 
Saudi capture of al-Basa, the Ottomans sent Ibn Rashid 
12,000 rifles "with corresponding quantities of ammunition 
and money," and notes that Abdul Aziz viewed this as 
directed against him. [34] Philby's figures are thus closer 
to the Ruwala estimate than to Musil's. 
Lancaster reports that Musil, a Czech, worked for the 
Austrian Government and that he "escorted parties of 
military engineers" through parts of Arabia. [35] Musil's 
official position went beyond Lancaster's implication. 
Winstone reports that Musil had met an officer of 
Austro-Bungarian military intelligence, Berr Thomasberger, 
while still a student: Thomasberger accompanied Musil on his 
1910-12 trip to Arabia. In addition, that trip was taken at 
the direct request of the Austrian Embassy in 
Constantinople. [36] It is clear that throughout his trips, 
Musil was acting for Austrian military intelligence, and in 
at least one case, he carried the orders of the Ottoman 
Government to the tribes. 
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Throughout his travels, Musil acted in a semi-official 
role for the Austrians, and occasionally for the Ottomans. 
Thus, it is likely, though not explicitly stated by Musil, 
that he obtained his own figures on arms shipments from 
sources in either the Ottoman Government or the Austrian 
diplomatic service. It is possible, of course, that both 
figures are accurate, and that the shipment of 6,000 rifles 
mentioned in Musil's appendix was only one of several 
shipments in late 1913 and early 1914 that totaled between 
12,000 and 15,000 weapons. Of the two sets of figures, 
however, Musil's lower numbers are probably more accurate 
for this period than either Philby's or the Ruwala's. 
Musil estimated that the Rashid had formerly had a 
normal "mercenary" force of 10,000 tribesmen who were given 
arms, ammunition and riding camels by the Emir, but that by 
1914 this force had been reduced by defections to 3,000. 
This force could be supplemented by other tribesmen. 
Lorimer estimated the heart of Sammar territory around Hail 
to have a population of about 55,000. [37] Although he 
reports a fighting force by this time (c.1905) of only 
3,000, his normal percentage of fighters is 29% of the total 
population, a rate that would easily have raised 10,000 
troops during the Rashidi's hayday. 
Assuming that the figures given by Nawaf were either 
highly inflated, or represented shipments over a prolonged 
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period of time, there is still an internal logic to Musil's 
lower numbers. The normal Rashidi force had been reduced to 
3,000, and Musil notes that it was entirely armed with new 
Mausers. The shipment of 6,000 rifles would have fully 
re-armed the core of the army and still left a surplus for 
additional tribal irregulars and for sale. 
The 60,000 rounds in the shipment reported by Musil 
comes to only ten per rifle: this is scarcely enough to 
sight-in the rifles, much less use them in war. Even the 
ratio given by Nawaf provides only 26 rounds per rifle. 
Thus, at either rifle figure, the ammunition provided was 
insufficient for serious use of all the guns. As discussed 
above, the Sheikh of Bahrein set a ratio of 200 rounds of 
ammunition per rifle as his import duty in 1896. [38] 
Limiting the supply of ammunition, however, gave the Turks 
greater control over their clients. 
Musil suggested that the guns were not properly 
distributed to the Al Rashid army, but were diverted for the 
benefit of the chief minister/regent of the weak Emir Saud 
ibn Abdul Aziz al-Rashid. The minister, Saud ibn Salih 
al-Subhan, had murdered his predecessor and assumed power in 
early 1914. He then distributed the newly arrived Mausers 
"among his supporters and, as these were not very numerous, 
even among the Slejb, men without honor in Arabia." Further, 
Musil states, many of the guns also armed "robber bands" 
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sent by Saud to harass the tribes of the Iraqi and Syrian 
border regions. [39] 
The Ruwala were placed at a serious military 
disadvantage because of the modern equipment sent the 
Sammar. Nawaf suggested joining his forces with his father's 
and attacking Ibn Rashid with the combined army of 5,000. 
Al-Nuri pointed out that even if the Rashidi forces were 
only equal to the Ruwala's 5,000, and not the 10,000 or 
15,000 he would expect, the chances of success were not 
good, for the Al Rashid had "plenty of good ammunition, 
while we must be sparing of bad ammunition." [40] Musil 
~ later commented on the proposed attack and on the power of 
the Rashidi's chief minister, Saud, that "Saud possessed 
more effective arms than ours and that we should be unable 
to drive him out of Hajel if he once fortified it." [41] 
Modern weapons gave a major advantage to a fortified 
defense. 
The Ottomans, moreover, had been supporting the Al 
Rashid for some time, for when Abdul Aziz ibn Rashid was 
killed in a clash with the Saudis in 1906, the British 
Ambassador in Constantinople reported that the Ottomans had 
given official recognition to his successor. [42] In 
addition, they sent a military force into Central Arabia in 
an effort to support the Al Rashid directly: the Ottomans 
were defeated by the Saudis. [43] 
166 
... 
The Ruwala were opposed by other tribes armed by the 
Turks, for Musil reports on vicious fighting between them 
and the Fedan in the 1910-1915 era. The Fedan were allied 
with the Turkish Government, received arms and ammunition 
from them, and were "stirred" to attack the Ruwala by the 
Ottomans. [44] The Turks' distribution of guns to the tribes 
they favored did not, however, guarantee the results they 
wished. 
After the start of the World War, the Turks attempted 
to stop the inter-tribal fighting that they had previously 
encouraged. They tried to call the tribes to help fight an 
expected English attack from Egypt. In December, 1914, Musil 
spoke with Awde abu Tajeh, "head chief" of the Huwaitat 
tribe, who were camping with the Ruwala. After a long 
discussion of the possibilities of, and need for, peace 
between the tribes, Awde commented on Turkish aid, and the 
degree to which it brought his obedience: 
So long as there is no peace, I shall not move 
from the desert. If I become reconciled with 
Abtan and Eben Rasid, and if my affiliated Hwetat 
camping in Egypt call to me for help, then I will 
march there. The Government promises me arms and 
also gold at some station of the Hegaz Railway. I 
need both. I shall take both arms and gold but I 
shall fight him whom my affiliated Hwetat fight. 
If they arise against the Inkliz (English), I 
shall combat the Inkliz1 if they rise against the 
Government, I shall massacre the government 
troops. I shall not separate myself from my 
fellow tr ibesmen. [45] 
167 
THE BLACKMARKET: PRIVATE SALES BY OTTOMAN TROOPS 
OR CLIENT TRIBES 
The Ottoman Government regularly failed to pay its 
troops in Arabia, and when their pay did arrive, its value 
was often reduced by local economic factors and graft. 
Ochsenwald describes the poor condition of Ottoman troops in 
the Hijaz in the late l850s, noting that they were paid with 
paper currency that was only worth 40 percent of its face 
value in the markets. To make the situation worse: 
When the troops protested about pay, the 
governors bought rice from dealers, with a 
kickback to them and to the governor, and the 
soldiers were given the rice in lieu of money; 
then the soldiers, in order to raise ca$h to 
purchase necessities, had to sell the rice back to 
the original dealers at a substantial loss. [46] 
The situation in the Hijaz became worse as the 
Ottomans were pushed into bankruptcy later in the century. 
And as matters deteriorated, private Ottoman soldiers sold 
their rifles and ammunition to the tribes. Given the lack 
of proper pay, and the need to survive, many had little 
choice. At the same time, it is likely that officers and 
local officials also sold weapons for personal profit. 
Musil quotes a 1910 conversation with Afnan ibn Abu Tkeka, 
whose father was sheikh of the coastal section of the 
Huwaitat tribe. They spoke at Sarma, just south of the Gulf 
of Aqaba on the Red Sea coast. Afnan cursed the Turkish 
Government and attacked it for poor administration that took 
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money but gave no benefit. He then discussed the condition 
of the Turkish soldiers in the Hijaz: 
I am sorry for the soldiers who die here or who 
are killed by our arms. They are destroyed by the 
climate, to which they are not accustomed, and 
they are destroyed by us when they steal our 
goats, sheep, and cows. They are supposed to 
protect us against our enemies, but they do not 
venture even so much as a gunshot beyond their 
barracks and indeed scarcely dare even to thrust 
their heads outside of doors. IT IS A GOOD THING 
THAT THEY LET US HAVE THEIR AMMUNITION AND EVEN 
THEIR FIREARMS BY TRADE OR SALE. [47] 
In April, 1915, Musil again noted the sale of weapons 
by Ottoman troops. He was then traveling near al~Ruhbe, 
just west of the Euphrates and about 100 miles south of 
Baghdad. In that area, Turkish deserters and gendarmes sold 
their rifles to the local tribesmen, the gendarmes later 
claiming that they had been robbed. At the same time, Musil 
learned that a number of Mausers the Turks had given the 
Sammar had been sold in Mesopotamia by members of his own 
par ty. 
The negroes of Eben Rashid, too, were willing to 
sell their own arms or those of anybody else. 
With reference to this, Nazel told us that Rased 
and the other slaves who had come with us to 
an-Negef sold in five days thirty-eight Mauser 
rifles which had been sent to Eben Rashid by the 
Turkish Government. [48] 
Thus, not only did the weapons given out by the 
Ottomans fail to guarantee the allegiance of the tribe 
receiving them, there was a fair chance that the guns would 
be sold rather than used to support the Ottoman's goals. 
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BRITISH DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS 
Arms shipped to the Al Saud 
The role of the British in allowing, and perhaps 
encouraging, arms deliveries to the Saudis through Kuwait as 
early as 1904 has been discussed in Chapter VI. Muscat 
customs figures show a substantial and continuous British 
role in the arms trade. (Figure III.) As World War I 
approached, Britain's position becomes clearer. While most 
of the British involvement in supplying arms to various 
Arabian factions during the World War are beyond the scope 
of this work, two examples illustrate the practice in 
relation to the Saudis. During the summer of 1914, the 
British expressed their good will toward Abdul Aziz aI-Saud 
by sending him 1,000 rifles and £20,000. They also gave 
nfacilitiesn at Bahrain to import the ammunition Abdul Aziz 
needed for his campaign against rebels of the Ajman tribe. 
Later, near the end of 1916, Abdul Aziz agreed to accept 
from the British £5,000 a month, 3,000 rifles with 
ammunition, and four machine guns in exchange for keeping a 
force of 4,000 men in the field to attack the Rashidi forces 
around Hail continuously. [49] Arms were to continue to 
flow into Arabia throughout the War. 
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Aden 
The British distribution of guns to various local 
rulers in Aden provides a sidelight on the use of obsolete 
guns to further British policy. In 1914 and 1915 the 
British authorities at Aden signed agreements with three 
rulers - the Haushabi Sultan Ali bin Mani, the Alawi Sheikh 
Ali Nasher, and the Kotaibi (or Quteibi, Aitchison uses both 
spellings) Sheikh Mahomed Saleh al Akhram - for the 
protection of local trade. The three rulers were given 
Martini-Henry rifles and ammunition to help patrol the 
roads. The 1914 Agreement with the Haushabi Sultan was the 
prototype for the other two. After standard diplomatic 
platitudes promising mutual "peace and friendship" between 
the British and the Sultan, the Agreement reached the heart 
of the issue, with the Sultan promising to guard the roads 
and protect travelers going to or from Aden. The Agreement 
continued: 
ARTICLE IV 
To assist him in carrying out the 
obligations imposed by this agreement the said 
Sultan Ali bin Mani engages ••• to establish 
suitable posts at El-Mitlah, Am Tannan or such 
other places on the roads as may be necessary and 
to maintain a force of 50 men or such less number 
as the Political Resident, Aden, may agree to; in 
consideration of which a present of 50 
Martini-Henry rifles with 100 rounds of ammunition 
per rifle will be granted to him by the British 
Government, and a reasonable supply of ammunition 
will be furnished to him hereafter for the same on 
payment. • •• 
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The Haushabi Agreement was signed on September 24, 
1914, and renewed on February 11, 1920. [50] [51] 
The Martini-Henry was a good rifle, but as a 
single-shot black powder rifle, it was completely obsolete 
by 1914. The British were, in effect, dumping old weapons to 
keep the natives happy. In view of Bury's 1914 report that 
the tribes of Yemen were armed with magazine-fed smokeless 
powder rifles, the local road patrols established by the 
agreements would have been at a serious disadvantage in any 
fight. The policy of giving obsolete guns to the natives 
was consistent, however, with Bury's strong warning of the 
danger of modern arms in the hands of what he called 
"subject races": 
The relations between governors and governed 
in Yamen have undergone a radical change during 
the last decade or two, owing to Turkey's laxity 
or inability to check the surreptitious import of 
arms. This covert traffic has gradually 
undermined the pillars of Ottoman rule, 
honeycombing the whole vi1ayet ••• Now the 
population is as well armed as the forces of 
government, far more numerous, and, on their own 
ground, more formidable, man for man. [52] 
ITALIAN DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS 
The first major Italian interest in the Red Sea 
littoral was manifest in 1869 when merchants from Genoa 
purchased land at Assab, just north of Djibouti, in an 
effort to gain advantage from the opening of the Suez Canal. 
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The Italian Government did not take control of the port 
until 1882, and made no effort to expand its territory until 
1885. International events led to the growth of the colony. 
After Italy failed to gain territory she desired in Tunisia, 
she looked for other areas of colonial expansion in Africa. 
Acting with the encouragement of the British, who wanted 
support against the Mahdi after the fall of Khartoum, Italy 
seized the Ottoman Red Sea port of Massawa. 
Italian designs were checked in 1887 when they were 
defeated by Ras Aloua, an ally of Ethiopia, at the battle of 
Dogali. with the death of Emperor Yohannis of Ethiopia two 
years later, Italy gained an opportunity to expand her 
colony. When Menelik of Shoa fought his political rivals 
for the Ethiopian throne, he took arms and ammunition from 
the Italians. In return, Menelik recognized Italy's 
authority over Massawa and territory inland, including the 
town of Asmara. On January 1, 1890, Italy's territories on 
the Red Sea coast were formed into the colony of Eritrea. 
Italian expansion inland was stopped, sharply and 
dramatically, when they tried to invade Ethiopia itself in 
1896. At the battle of Aduwa in March, 1896, an Italian army 
of over 17,000 was smashed, 6,000 men killed, 2,000 wounded 
and 2,000 captured. While the attack had been motivated by 
internal Italian politics more than by a real desire to 
seize Ethiopia, the result confined Italy to the coastal 
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areas until after World War I. [53] The battle also revealed 
the danger to would-be colonial powers of modern arms in 
native hands. These events established Italian interests in 
the region. As noted above, they later joined the British 
in protesting the arms market at Djibouti. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
EFFECT OF MODERN ARMS ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA 
The increased deadliness of the modern firearms 
introduced into Arabia has been discussed in general, but 
the other effects of modern arms on the Peninsula have not 
been considered. The use of the new weapons, and their 
effect on the military and political balance of power is 
hard to gauge, but some general points can be made. First, 
however, the general problems created by modern weapons must 
be rev iewed • 
INCREASED DEPENDENCE ON EXTERNAL AMMUNITION 
The introduction of increasingly modern firearms into 
Arabia inevitably produced a growing dependence on external 
sources of ammunition. With muzzle-loaders, ammunition was 
a comparatively simple matter of lead shot and gunpowder. 
Even the more complex projectiles fired from the later 
rifled muskets - such as tht Minie with its conical bullet ­
could generally be replaced with a simple lead ball, 
although performance would suffer. And while the lead and 
powder had to be imported, both were cheap and abundant, and 
could be purchased from many sources. 
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At first, modern ammunition for breech-loaders came 
only from modern factories. It was, however, inevitable 
that reloading equipment would be imported after particular 
weapons became well established. The major cities 
surrounding Arabia did have reloading and repair 
facilities. It will be remembered that al-Nuri of the 
Ruwala was able to have his Mannlicher's magazine-fed lock 
replaced with a Martini-style single-shot mechanism by a 
gunsmith somewhere near Damascus. [1] Lorimer, however, 
mentions only one center for reloading within Arabia, the 
town of Dam or Ildam, in Nejd. [2] 
The fact that Lorimer only mentions a single site in 
the interior of the Peninsula should not be taken to mean 
that facilities were not available. It is most probable 
that the major towns and tribes the ability to reload 
amm~nitionand make minor repairs. Some ten years after 
Lorimer's study, Musil reports that the northern tribes all 
had gunsmiths to repair guns and reload ammunition. [3] But 
even with reloading facilities, the tribes could not meet 
the demands of war and remained dependent upon an external 
supply of ammunition. A desire not to waste ammunition, for 
~ 
example, motivated al-Nuri's conversion of the Mannlicher. 
Shortage of ammunition for the new weapons was a constant 
problem to military leaders, as illustrated by the dangerous 
situation of the Saudi forces during the 1902 battle of 
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Dilam. 
Following Abdul Aziz's capture of Riyadh in January, 
1902, Rashidi forces were slow to move against the renewed 
Saudi state. When they finally attacked in the autumn, the 
two armies met at the town of Dilam, approximately fifty 
miles south-southeast of Riyadh. Ibn Rashid's forces 
attacked in the morning, and "came under a withering fire 
from the well-concealed defenders of the Dilam palm-groves 
and were forced to retreat in some disorder." The Saudi 
cavalry counter-attacked, and the cavalry battle continued 
fiercely until sunset. During the night, the Rashidi forces 
withdrew, yielding the district to the Al Saud. Abdul Aziz 
later reported that had Ibn Rashid continued the battle, he 
would have found the Saudis to be nearly out of ammunition. 
"The cavalry pursuit had been little more than a gesture of 
defiance; but it had served its purpose." [4] 
The battle illustrates two of the factors involved in 
the conversion to modern weapons. First, modern weapons 
greatly increased the strength of the defense. The initial 
Al Rashid attack would not, in all likelihood, have been 
repulsed without the high rate of fire of breech-loading 
rifles. Second, in spite of their effectiveness, the 
shortage of ammunition for the modern guns nearly led to a 
Saudi defeat. In the end, Ibn Rashid's tactical leadership 
failed, preventing him from crushing the resurgence of the 
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Al Saud. Technology was important, but leadership was more 
important. 
IMPOSITION OF OTTOMAN AUTHORITY FOLLOWED BY 

SUCCESSFUL LOCAL RESISTANCE 

Two incidents from the northern borders of Arabia 
reveal one of the major influences of modern arms on the 
history of the region. The introduction of breech-loaders 
first helped the Ottomans extend their authority, and later 
helped the tribes resist that authority. 
During the last decades of the nineteenth century, the 
Ottomans began to bring uncontrolled territory in 
Mesopotamia and the Levant under their administration. The 
Euphrates road to Palmyra was secured, and much of 
Transjordan was placed under direct Turkish administration. 
Tactically, the process involved the use of military and 
police posts as the basis for wider patrols. A number of 
conditions, both in the Empire at large and in the local 
districts, aided the Ottomans. The greatest difference 
between this expansion and earlier attempts to establish 
control, however, was that the Ottomans now had a marked 
superiority in weapons over the tribes. [5] 
Beginning in the l860s, Turkish troops were armed with 
modern breech-loaders. For example, during a successful 
1869 expedition against the Beni Sakhr of Transjordan the 
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Ottoman troops used Sniders, and by the late l870s the Turks 
were using the "much dreaded" Winchester in their 
expeditions against the tribes. "Companies of mule-borne 
riflemen, operating from the new garrison centers and posts, 
proved very effective," and "for the first time the Turkish 
soldier found himself superior to the bedouin warrior, and 
the whole balance of force was changed." [6] 
The balance of arms, however, shifted again. As a 
part of its attempt to modernize its military, the Ottoman 
Government made a strong effort to increase the coverage of 
military conscription throughout the Empire. When the Druze 
of the Hauran area resisted in 1909-10, they were easily 
disarmed and forced to submit to conscription. Lt. Col. 
C.C.R. Murphy reported what happened when an attempt was 
made to confiscate breech-loading rifles and impose 
conscription upon the Arab tribes around the town of Kerak. 
[7] Murphy later became Persian Gulf Intelligence Officer, 
and was in Damascus for an important meeting of British 
military intelligence officials. During his stay in the 
region, he met with Arab leaders from Al Ahad, the military 
section of a secret society interested in starting a general 
Arab revolt in Syria and Mesopotamia. [8] 
Following the success against the Druze, the Wali 
(governor) of Damascus advised similar action against the 
Arabs near Kerak. The Ottoman government agreed, and ordered 
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extra troops sent to Kerak November 1910, to disarm the 
tribes and enforce conscription. The commander of the 
Hauran area, an Arab, Sami pasha, advised against the 
operation. Orders to disarm and to comply with 
conscriptions were, however, sent to the tribes. The 
commander of the Turkish forces at Kerak called in the local 
sheikhs to obtain their comments. They advised him to set a 
"strong girdle of posts" around Kerak to impress the tribes 
with the government's power, by December 4, sixteen posts 
had been established around the town, each having two guns 
(artillery) and forty riflemen. The remainder of the 
garrison, whose numbers are not given, were stationed in 
Kerak's citadel. This meant that the "bulk" of the Turkish 
infantry and "nearly all the guns" were in the outposts. 
[9] 
At sundown on December 4, "without the slightest 
warning" the Arabs of Kerak opened fire on the Turks. They 
were joined by "hordes" of Arabs from outside the town. The 
outposts were quickly taken, with two Turks from each kept 
alive to man the guns, which were now directed against the 
citadel. The Arabs looted the local treasury and bazaar 
before moving to attack the Hejaz Railway. In these attacks, 
stations at Lubin, Jizeh, Qatraneh and al-Hassa were 
destroyed; telegraph lines and equipment was destroyed and 
railroad tracks were torn up at intervals for over 80 
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miles. 800 Turkish troops were killed, along with many 
officials. The tribesmen who staged the attack vanished. 
[10 ] 
The official Turkish reports said the Arab attack had 
been caused by cuts in the tribal subsidy given to protect 
the railway, and that the attack had also been incited by 
the Druze. Murphy states that this was false, that the 
attack had been only against Turks, although four Christians 
were killed accidentally in the streets, and that no Druze 
were involved. Turkish soldiers and officials were the 
targets of the revolt. He added that several thousand Arabs 
were involved from the "Mujelli, the ruling Keraki family, 
and the Hamaideh, Atami, Salaiteh, Hajaiyah, Saidin, 
Ghawarni, Jawabari and several other tribes." The Ruwala, 
Huwaitat and the Beni Sakhr were not "actively concerned" 
though the Beni Sakhr failed to protect the railway, as they 
r 
had been paid to do. [11] Peake, citing Audeh Bey Qusus - a 
"Christian notable" who at the time of the revolt lived in 
Kerak and who later (c.1939) became the Attorney General of 
the Jordan Government, and other sources, confirms Murphy's 
report of Arab tactics. [12] Vatikiotis also agrees with 
Murphy, noting that the rebellion "did not in any way 
represent an Arab challenge to Turkish authority" but was a 
reaction "against growing administrative control of their 
area." [13] 
184 
The inability of regular military officers to 
understand and deal with irregular forces and tactics has 
been common throughout history. Murphy does not comment on 
the rifles used by either side in the fight, but the Turkish 
troops would, at the very least, have been armed with 
Martinis and probably carried older Mausers. Their attackers 
would very likely have been unable to gain such an easy 
victory unless they too were armed with breech-loaders, and 
Gubser specifically reports that the Turkish orders that 
precipitated the attack called for the confiscation of 
breech-loaders. [14] The qualitative gap between the rulers 
and the ruled had been closed, and was closed further by the 
Turkish weapons captured in the raid. 
While Musil does not mention this raid, he reports 
that before this section of the railway had opened in 1906, 
the Ottoman government had paid the Beni Sakhr a subsidy to 
protect and guide pilgrims passing through their territory. 
After the railroad opened, the Government stopped both the 
tribe's subsidy and the salary of its sheikh, Talal ibn 
Fajez. In September, 1908, Talal visited Damascus in an 
effort to straighten out the problem of payment, but found 
the governor unable to obtain a decision from 
Constantinople. When Musil met Talal in October, the Sheikh 
was "very bitter against the governor and said he did not 
know what his kinsmen might yet compel him to do." [15] 
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Even if the subsidy had been renewed by the time of the 1910 
raid, a residue of bad feeling among the Bani Sakhr probably 
contributed to their failure to protect the railway after 
the Kerak raid. 
THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY IN WAR 
Technology pas always played a part in war, as it did 
in Arabia during the period under study. But technology has 
rarely been a primary factor in determining victory. 
Rather, the use made of the technology - the tactics and 
strategy that applied the technology to a particular 
situation - has generally been the deciding factor. 
Technology can seldom overcome poor tactical doctrine or 
poor leadership. All of the major tribes and factions 
fighting in Arabia had modern arms. While it is probable 
that there were many incidents where one side had better 
weapons than its enemy, between the major tribes such an 
imbalance was transitory. 
The most important effects of modern arms came from 
the nature of the arms themselves, from factors common to 
the technology. The rapid increase in the deadliness of the 
guns is the first of these. Colonel T.N. Dupuy directed a 
study for the United States Army in 1964-65 on the 
comparative lethality of weapons. The study analyzed 
weapons ranging from swords through a one-megaton nuclear 
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airburst, and produced a "Theoretical Lethality Index" for 
each. The analysis was based upon the "range, rate of fire, 
accuracy, reliability, radius of damage, etc." of the 
weapons. [16] The study is interesting in its attempt to 
compare the deadliness of weapons, several examples of which 
are reproduced in Table II, with [bracketed] comments by the 
author: 
Hand to Hand (sword, pike, etc.) 23 
Longbow 36 
17th. century musket 19 
18th. century flintlock 43 
Early 19th. century rifle 36 
Mid-19th. century rifle/conoidal bullet 102 
[The Minie or the Pattern 1853 Enfield.] 
Late 19th. century breech-loading rifle 153 
[The Snider or the Martini-Henry.] 
Springfield Model 1903 rifle (magazine) 495 
[Equal to the Mauser or the Enfield 
smokeless powder magazine-fed rifles.] 
World War I machine gun 3,463 
TABLE II 

DUPUY'S THEORETICAL LETHALITY INDEX 

Dupuy's study is useful because it graphically 
displays the progressive improvement in small arms 
technology. In particular, the rapid increase in the 
deadliness of rifles between the early and the late 
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nineteenth century is dramatic, and shows clearly why both 
the armies of Europe and the tribes of Arabia were driven to 
modernize their weapons as the technology changed. But it 
remained for the parties in a war to use their new weapons 
well. 
Again, leadership, not technology, determined the 
victors in Arabia. It is true that machineguns and cannon 
were beginning to reach the Peninsula in the decade before 
World War I, but not in significant numbers. It is only 
necessary to look at that war itself to see that when the 
technology was equally matched, leadership (or lack of sound 
leadership, in the case of the European powers in that war) 
determined the results. Philby gives an example from Arabia 
in 1918 comparing the leadership of the Saudis with that of 
the Hashimites. While it comes a few years after the main 
period considered here, it illustrates the point. 
Both sides were receiving arms from the British to 
fight the Ottomans or their allies, the A1 Rashid of Hail. 
The Hashimites, in particular, were very well supplied. But 
they controlled neither their weapons nor their men. Philby 
reports that various tribal leaders would approach the 
Hashimites and swear "undying loyalty": 
But no sooner had they received an appropriate 
number of rifles and boxes of ammunition - to say 
nothing of bags of gold - than they loaded up 
their beasts and returned to their pastures, to 
take no part in their patrons' operations except 
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perhaps to return a second or even a third time to 
replenish the stocks of ammunition exhausted by 
sales in the markets of Najd. [17] 
The weapons the British gave the Hashimites to fight 
the Turks were thus sold on the open market, much as the 
guns sent the Al Rashid by the Turks were sold in Iraq. 
Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, on the other hand, maintained strict 
control over his men. Be believed that it was to his 
benefit for all men to be armed, and made no effort to 
control the sale of guns within his territory, "but with 
ammunition it was a different matter." Abdul Aziz supplied 
his men with ammunition for war and raids, while acting to 
control the ammunition market in Nejd. His agents purchased 
all ammunition that they found in his territory, and placed 
it in the state's arsenal. Further, he tried to prevent the 
re-export of ammunition to Persia. While the Hashimites 
distributed guns and ammunition without maintaining control, 
the Saudis carefully managed their own weapons. [18] The 
Hashimites actually had easier access to weapons than did 
the Al Saud, but they failed to control and use them 
effectively. 
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CONCLUSION 
Gunmetal, exposed to the sun of Arabia, soon becomes 
hot enough to sear flesh. The human emotions that lead to 
the use of weapons in war burn as sharply as sun-baked 
steel. The political policies that make arms available, and 
the trade that distributes them to the world appear cold. 
But they are also fired with emotion. 
The factors that drove the arms trade in Arabia were 
themselves driven by a mix of cold commercial interest, and 
hot emotions stirred by international and local rivalries. 
Nor was the technology driving the arms trade without 
emotion, for there is emotion in science and engineering. 
And the desire for scientific discovery was fueled by fear 
of enemies, both new and traditional. The international 
rivalry between Britain and France was driven by emotion, 
and only cooled with the growth of a threat to both powers. 
The local demand for arms was a mix of emotion-driven 
national and tribal resistance to foreign invasion - on the 
Northwest frontier, and elsewhere - with a cold analysis of 
strategic and tactical needs by local leaders. Xenophobia 
in part drove the local need for arms, as surely as the 
British reacted xenophobiclly to the presence of any other 
power in the region 
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The mix of hot and cold, and the mix of three major 
factors directed the arms trade in and around Arabia. The 
general pattern of the trade is clear (Figure 1), but many 
of the specifics remain uncertain. Because most of the 
available sources are British, and because those sources 
accuse the French and other Europeans of being the major 
participants in the arms trade, it is probable that British 
participation in the arms trade appears smaller here than it 
actually was. The customs data for Muscat (Figure 3) show 
that in all years reported, the British trade was higher 
than that of the French, and was only exceeded by the 
Belgians for the last seven years of the period, years 
unfortunately not covered by Lorimer, who might have 
provided valuable information. 
More detailed work on the British records for the Gulf 
and the Red Sea, and serious attention to the French records 
could be vital to fully understanding the arms trade in 
Arabia. In particular, the records of the French Consulate 
at Muscat and the records of the Goguyer company should be 
carefully examined. Despite the remaining issues, there is 
no question that modern arms flooded into Arabia and the 
Gulf in the later decades of the nineteenth century. The 
technology has changed, it has become easier to kill on a 
momentous scale, and the flood continues. 
DISCUSSION OF SOURCES 
The great majority of the information available on the 
arms trade to Arabia comes from British sources, most of 
these dealing with the Persian Gulf. Lorimer is the most 
important primary source that has been re-published, and 
made generally available in the united States. Bidwell's 
collections of British diplomatic papers is also important, 
and provides information on areas of Arabia outside of the 
Gulf. In addition to these governmental sources, a variety 
of memoirs have been published by British officials who 
dealt with the arms trade. Bury's two books read as if they 
were taken directly from his intelligence reports. Murphy 
is also good in this regard. Austin, Keppel, Thomas and 
others give information, but their books were written for a 
general audience, and do not give enough detail on military 
affairs. Philby comes between the two styles, depending 
upon which of his books is involved. 
The few non-British sources are important when trying 
to obtain a full picture of the trade, but few of those 
available give much information. The best primary source 
available is the collected writing of Alois Musil, who 
traveled throughout Northern Arabia. Musil worked for 
Austrian Military Intelligence, and provides excellent 
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information. Unfortunately, the series of books Musil 
published after World War I were intended for a civilian 
audience. Somewhere in the Austrian records there may still 
exist Musil's intelligence reports: they should be found and 
published. Barclay Raunkiaer's short book gives information 
on the types of rifles he saw, but little on the trade 
itself. 
Many excellent secondary sources have been available. 
The best of these is Busch, with Landen and others providing 
good information. The great lack is in non-British 
sources. Only one French work has been available. Review 
of numerous bibliographies, and Index Islamicus, reveal 
little European work on the arms trade in Arabia. It appears 
that even the French have failed to study the trade at 
Djibouti. 
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APPENDIX A 
PRIVATE FIRMS ENGAGED IN THE ARMS TRADE 
The following is a list of firms cited by name in the 
sources available. 
FIRMS ACTIVE IN THE PERSIAN GULF 
Joyce and Kynoch 
The British firm of Joyce and Kynoch is cited by 
Lorimer as being the main arms dealer at Muscat between 1891 
and 1897. However, he gives little additional information on 
the company. [1] The company is mentioned again by Phillips 
as being a major trader at Muscat. [2] 
Fracis, Times and Company 
The Anglo-Parsi firm of Fracis, Times and Company 
(apparently headquartered, at least for some time, in London 
at 27 Leadenhall Street [3]) opened its first office in the 
Gulf in 1887 at Bushire. In 1891 one of the partners of the 
firm moved to Bushirei presumably to oversee the business. 
Additional offices opened at Bahrein in 1895 and Muscat in 
1896. For reasons not given by Lorimer, but which were 
probably related to increased controls by the British, the 
225 
English partner sold his interest in the company by 1896. 
The arms trade proved profitable for the firm, and Lorimer 
notes that by "the middle of 1897" they had made profits of 
"not less than £40,000." [4] 
During the later 1890s and the early years of this 
century, a number of the firm's weapons were captured on the 
Northwest Frontier of India by British troops and 
officials. The weapons were identified by various stamped 
marks, ranging from the letters "F.T.C." and a double-headed 
eagle "the device of Messrs. Fracis, Times and Company" to 
the mark on a captured revolver of "Made for Fracis, Times 
and Company, London." [5] 
Because Fracis, Times and Company was owned by British 
subjects, the firm was easily brought under control. In 
1897-89 they filed suits against the commander of H.M.S. 
LAPWING because of his capture of the BALUCHISTAN and 
against the Persian Gulf Resident, Lt. Col. Meade, over the 
seizure of arms in Bahrain and Bushire. By 1901 they had 
lost both cases, and been "reduced to bankruptcy." Both 
Conservative and Liberal Governments refused to indemnify 
the firm's London underwriters for any of the loss. [6] 
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The Firm of M. Goguyer 
The exact name of Goguyer's firm is not given by 
Lorimer. He opened his Muscat office in March, 1899, and 
soon prospered. [7] By the 1904-1905 period, M. Goguyer 
"appeared to transact most of his business" between Muscat 
and Kuwait, with the bulk of the arms shipped on that route 
reaching the Al Saud. [8] He appears to have maintained a 
complex and sophisticated organization in the Gulf, with one 
agent - Haji Abdullah Thahaba - reported by the British as 
stationed at Kuwait. Goguyer may have used agents to monitor 
the market so that he could establish his price for arms at 
Muscat. [9] 
M. Goguyer, a former French diplomat in Tunisia, spoke 
Arabic. While in Muscat he wrote anti-British articles for 
the Paris paper "Depeche Coloniale." In his arms dealings, 
Goguyer "was backed by French newspapers and some 
influential politicians of the Colonial Party in Paris." The 
firm's activities seem to have continued until 1914 and the 
Anglo-French settlement at Muscat. [10] 
Goguyer was heavily engaged in the trade with 
Afghanistan, and Lorimer reports that in 1907 there were 
some 100 Afghans in Muscat, "more than half of whom appeared 
to be living there at the expense of M. Goguyer." [11] 
According to British diplomats at the 1908 Brussels Arms 
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Conference, Goguyer carried on a very high proportion of the 
entire Muscat trade: in 1908, French traders were 
responsible for 49% of the arms trade at Muscat, and of that 
49%, Goguyer was responsible for 60%. [12] Goguyer died late 
in 1909, and the business was passed to his sons. His total 
stock was estimated in 1909 at some 100,000 weapons of 
various types and 10,000,000 rounds of ammunition. Goguyer 
had started with "very slender resources", and in the ten 
years he operated managed to accumulate "a considerable 
fortune (reputed to be £40,000) at the time of his death." 
[13] 
By February, 1914, when the British paid the Goguyer 
firm compensation for the loss of its stocks and future 
profit after the establishment of the Muscat arms warehouse, 
the company was sill being run by his sons. [14] British 
reports of Goguyer's activities carry a strong flavor of 
Francophobia, and while his firm's trade was clearly 
important, the British may have inflated its importance 
relative to British trade. 
Baijeot and Company 
The French firm of Baijeot and Company, operating out 
of Djibouti, opened an office at Muscat in 1905. [15] 
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The Firm of Dieu 
The French firm of Dieu was active in the arms trade 
at Muscat. Dieu was paid compensation for the loss of its 
property and future profit in 1914 after the establishment 
of the bonded warehouse by the Sultan. [16] 
Keverkoff and Company 
The Russian firm of Keverkoff and Company, with its 
headquarters in Odessa, opened an office in Muscat in 1903 
for the shipment of arms. [17] 
TRADERS ACTIVE ON THE PERSIAN COAST 
A. and T.J. Malcolm and Company 
The company A. and T.J. Malcom, a "Persian Armenian 
firm under British protection," first imported arms through 
Bushire in 1884. [18] In November, 1900, the firm was still 
active at Bushire, when some 380 Martini-Henries and 183,000 
cartridges were seized from them. [19] 
Belgian Firms 
In 1900, an un-named Belgian firm was shipping about 
5,000 rifles a year into Bushire, for delivery to an 
Armenian arms dealer. [20] Based upon customs records, 
there appears to have been considerable additional Belgian 
trade at Muscat between 1906-07 and 1913-14. Details have 
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not been available. [21] 
German Firms 
Muscat customs records show German activity there 
between 1907-08 and 1912-13. Details have not been 
available. [22] 
FRENCH FIRMS AT DJIBOUTI AND OBOCK 
In 1881 the French trading company, the Compagnie 
Franco-Ethiopienne, set up a coaling station at Obock. Three 
other French firms soon followed: the Societe Francais 
d'Obock and the Factoreries Francaise~ in 1882, and the 
Compagnie Mesnier in 1883. Because of the geographical 
limits of Obock, France moved her main base across the Gulf 
to Djibouti in 1888. [23] Between them, the two ports were 
vital to the arms trade, with Djibouti rapidly becoming the 
major transshipment point for arms imported from Europe. 
FIRMS OPERATING FROM ZANZIBAR 
In 1893, the British consul at Zanzibar reported that 
in addition to the Sultan of Zanzibar himself, a number of 
German firms were engaged in shipping arms to Muscat. Two 
mentioned are O'Swald and Company, and Hansing and Company. 
The total volume is given at some 1,000 rifles a month. 
[24] 
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NATIVE TRADERS IN THE GULF 

ACTIVE AT MUSCAT 

Ali Musa Khan 
A Baluchi arms trader, Ali Musa Khan, is mentioned by 
Phillips as being active at Muscat in the l890s, and is 
described as being "notorious." [25] Following the opening 
of the bonded arms warehouse at Muscat in 1911, and the 
associated controls on the arms trade, Ali Musa Khan was 
banished from Muscat for a period of five year. [26] His 
activity is discussed in detail by Austin. [27] 
Islam Khan 
Lt. Col. C.C.R. Murphy, then naval and military 
intelligence officer for the Gulf, was sent by Percy Cox 
(following the Oman rebellion of 1913) to Galag on the 
Mekran Coast of Persia to talk with Islam Khan, a "gun­
running chief" of the area. Islam Khan's camp was 
surrounded by guards armed with rifles. Islam Kahn: 
gave assurances of his friendship toward the 
British Raj, of his future good behaviour, and all 
the rest of it, in the most approved style. 
However, the interview did achieve certain results 
and passed off successfully. [28] 
Murphy does not give specifics of the talk, or of Islam 
Khan's connections with Muscat. 
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Traders Reported at Kuwait 
A February, 1905, dispatch from Captain Knox at Kuwait 
mentioned five men as the "principal" arms dealers at 
Kuwait: "Haji Mohammed Ali, Marafi, of Persian extraction"J 
Mohammed Taqui, "also Persian"; Mohammed Jaueyfi; Mubarak 
Sayer; and Goguyer's agent, Haji Abdullah Thahaba. [29] 
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APPENDIX B 
THE DEMAND FOR ARMS IN ARABIA: ARMIES AND POPULATIONS 
THE GENERAL POPULATION 
The size of the Arabian population and of the various 
armies in Arabia provide a rough measure of the demand for 
modern arms in the peninsula. Overall estimates of the 
Arabian population are uncertain. Issawi prints a World War 
British Admiralty estimate: 
The population of Arabia cannot be estimated 
with any approach to accuracy. It is usually 
guessed to be from five to eight millions. The 
lower of these figures is probably nearest to the 
truth. If we allow two and a half millions of 
settled and nomadic to the whole Red Sea slope 
from Midian to Yemen (the last-named, with Asir, 
holding two-thirds of the total): one and a half 
to the southern districts and the gulf littoral, 
inclusive of Hadramaut (Oman alone has about half 
a million): half a million to all the Central 
settled districts together: and one million 
Central nomads, we are probably over the mark. 
[1] 
Issawi immediately suggests that the five to eight 
million British estimate be compared with one from the 
Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition, which gives a total 
population not over ten million. [2] In any case, even the 
lower population estimates would have been sufficient to 
support the number of fighters suggested below. 
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ARMIES 
The Army of the Al Saud 
Some months after the Saudi defeat of Ibn Rashid at 
Dilam in 1902, near the end of the 1902-03 campaign season 
Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait asked for Saudi help against a 
large Rashidi raiding force. Abdul Aziz "no doubt 
influenced by the urgent need of replenishing his 
ammunition" after the earlier fighting appeared near Kuwait 
town with a force Philby reports may have approached 10,000 
of his own troops. He was joined by a Kuwaiti army of 
4,000, thus providing "an impressive demonstration of force 
in the eastern desert." The Al Rashid and their allies did 
not press an attack. [3] 
When Abdul Aziz later attacked and captured the towns 
of Kassim, Buraida, and Anaiza in April, 1904, the British 
Consul at Jeddah reported that he used a "strong following 
of more than 5,000 men •••• " Following the capture of 
Anaiza, which did not resist strongly, Abdul Aziz took the 
title of Emir of Nejd. [4] 
Estimates of the strength of desert armies varied 
rather widely. In August of the same year, the British 
Resident at Kuwait, Major Knox, sent Percy Cox a copy of a 
report given him by Sheikh Mubarak on the Saudi army then 
operating against the Al Rashid. Mubarak reported a Saudi 
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force "said to be 10,500 infantry strong, with 1,800 
horse." Knox did not believe the figures, and commented "It 
will probably be found advisable to divide the numbers given 
for Bin Saood's forces by ten to arrive at a just 
appreciation of his fighting strength." [5] Even if 
Mubarak's figures are high, Knox's cut to 1,500 infantry and 
18 cavalry is absurd, and not consistent with other 
estimates. 
The Army of the Al Rashid. 
During the height of Sammar power under Muhammad 
ibn-Rashid, who ruled in Hail from 1869-97, the Emir 
maintained a large bodyguard under his direct control. This 
force, described by Musil, appears to have served as the 
core of the Rashidi army as well. 
The bodyguard of the prince was formed by about 
four hundred slaves, who dwelt in groups of twenty 
each and were supported by the prince. Besides 
these he had at his disposal about as many young 
volunteers, called, together with the slaves, 
ragagil as-sjuh (men of the head chief), all of 
whom he had to arm and pay. [6] 
Writing about the general period of 1914-15, Musil 
described the military organization of the Sammar tribe led 
by the Al Rashid as they entered the final years of their 
fight against the al Saud. He first noted that the monetary 
standard, the Maria Theresa dollar - called locally the 
"rejal abu suse," or the rial showing a person with short 
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hair - had dropped in value in the territory of the Al 
Rashid. Measured against the Ottoman megidijje (worth about 
90 cents U.S.) the Maria Teresa had moved from one and a 
half to one to two to one. In the territory of the Al Saud 
the old value still held. Musil then discussed the tax and 
military situation. 
The Sammar paid their tribute to Eben Rasid in 
rejal abu suse, one rejal for every five camels. 
This tax, called zeka, was not paid by the 
chiefs. As a rule, out of every clan of any 
importance forty to eighty men were exempted from 
the tax. These were men who, at the order of Eben 
Rasid, took active part in his military 
campaigns. Although he gave them arms, 
ammunition, and riding camels, they received no 
pay, getting a share of the spoils instead. Each 
chief was obliged to appear before Eben Rasid 
every month or two (tasjir). Eben Rasid relied 
mainly on his mercenary troops, his slaves, and 
his settlers. Whenever he proclaimed a gihad 
(religious war) against Eben Saud, he had up to 
five hundred white tents (hejme) in which his men, 
both cavalry and infantry, lived; but when he made 
a raid on the Bedouins, the number of white tents 
amounted to only about one hundred. On such 
occasions he was accompanied by many Arabs mounted 
on camels (gejs), for whom tents were never 
taken. Eben Rasid was obliged to support the 
mercenaries. The settlers did not pay the zeka in 
money but contributed a part of their crops 
instead, and these contributions in kind were 
stored away in magazines (bejt aI-mal) and were 
issued again to the slaves and mercenaries. 
Usually twenty men messed together. [7] 
Taking Musil's figure of twenty men to a mess to mean 
twenty to a tent, a figure supported by the organization of 
the earlier force of bodyguards, this would give him a 
"mercenary" army of some 10,000 men that could have been 
supplemented by additional tribal forces. The force used on 
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a standard raid would have been 2,000 plus other tribal 
forces. This estimate is confirmed by a statement from Emir 
al-Nuri of the Ruwala. As discussed in Chapter VII, when 
considering a large-scale attack· on the Sammar led by 
ibn-Rashid, al-Nuri estimated the possible enemy strength at 
between 10,000 and 15,000, most armed with modern rifles. 
[8] These figures appear much too high, however, represent 
the forces available to the Al Rashid at this late date. 
In his appendix on the Al Rashid, Musil states that 
when Saud al- Rashid proclaimed a jihad against the Al Saud 
in 1914, he was only able to muster 1,000 townsmen and 2,000 
bedouin, all armed with new Mausers. [9] These figures 
reflect the failure of the minister, Saud al-Subhan, to hold 
the Rashidi forces together. 
The figures for the full muster of the Al Rashid army 
are, however, consistent with the population estimate given 
by Lorimer, writing in about 1906-07. He estimated that the 
region of Jabal Sammar - under the titular authority of the 
Al Rashid - had a total settled population of 28,000 and a 
bedouin population of 27,000. [10] This population of 55,000 
should have been able to provide a military force of 10,000, 
but it is most unlikely that this figure represented the 
paid troops of the Al Rashid. The estimated strength of 
10,000-15,000 implied by Musil and supported by the 
expectations of al-Nuri, was probably the full muster of the 
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Sammar and their allies when they had been united under 
Muhammad ibn-Rashid. As the force put in the field by a 
large alliance, the numbers would be in the same range as 
the 14,000 man figure given by Philby for the combined 
Saudi-Kuwaiti army of 1902-03, discussed earlier. 
The Army of Kuwait. 
Estimates of Kuwaiti forces varied widely. The 
British "News-Agent" at Kuwait provided an estimate of 
Sheikh Mubarak's forces in November, 1900 that the Gulf 
Resident, Lieutenant Colonel Kemball, believed to be 
"exaggerated, though I have no reason to doubt that he can 
put a considerable body of men into the field." The Agent 
reported that the Sheikh was prepared for war against the Al 
Rashid, and had a force of "15,000 cavalry and 40,000 
camels," while Sheikh Sadun of the Muntafiq who was allied 
to Mubarak, had "5,000 cavalry and 20,000 camels. Ibn 
Rashid is said to have had only some "2,000 cavalry and 
10,000 camels." [11] 
Several months later, in February, 1901, Commander 
Phillipps of H.M.S. SPHINX forwarded the latest military 
estimates of the British "Secret Agent at Koweit, Haji 
Ali-bin Ghulum Reza" to Kemball. This report lists the 
following tribes and approximate number of men from each 
with Mubarak: Matier = 4,000; Owazen = 10,000; Rashaidah = 
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7,000: Ajman = 9,000: Adwaiesh = 5,000: Beni Hajar = 3,000: 
Beni Khaled = 6,000: Sheikh Sadoun = 10,000 for a total of 
the allied forces of 54,000. To this are added Mubarak's own 
forces of 10,000 to give him a total army of 64,000. Ibn 
Rashid is estimated to have 10,000 men with him. [12] A 
month later, March 19, 1901, the "News Agent" reported from 
Kuwait that Mubarak, now nearing Nejd, had an army of "about 
70,000." At the same time, a garrison of about 4,000 had 
been left to protect Kuwait. [13] These figures are absurdly 
high. 
A more accurate report was later given by Lt.-Col. 
Kemball after Mubarak's defeat by Abdul Aziz ibn Rashid. 
Kemball lists the forces of the parties before the battle at 
some 5,000 for Mubarak, not counting his allies, and 7,000 
for the Al Rashid. Mubarak's casualties were reported to be 
heavy, with 2,000 "killed in action or subsequently perished 
in the desert. II [14] 
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